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ABSTRACT
HOLY WARRIORS AND BELLICOSE BISHOPS:
THE CHURCH AND WARFARE IN EARLY MEDIEVAL GERMANY
By Nicholas E. Friend
The Frankish kingdoms of the early Middle Ages were the inheritors of both
Germanic warrior culture and the Christian institutions of the late Roman Empire. Under
Charlemagne, the Franks conquered most of Western Europe by the early ninth century
and established a new empire of their own. To do so, they had to reconcile the Christian
doctrine of peace with the necessity of killing the enemy during war. This was especially
challenging for the highest ranks of the clergy. Though forbidden by canon law to
commit violence, bishops and abbots were responsible for defending the property and
people in their jurisdictions. The pious Carolingian kings endowed the Church with more
property but required service of their land-holding prelates in exchange, which included
providing troops for the royal army and, frequently, leading those troops themselves. By
the time of the Ottonians (919-1024), rulers of the East Frankish kingdom that developed
into the medieval German empire, the participation of bishops and abbots in war had
become institutionalized. Even so, opinions within the Church remained divided on the
morality of clerics taking an active part in combat. The context of Ottonian rule and the
complex relationship between the German emperors and their ecclesiastical magnates are
examined in this study. This is followed by an analysis of the primary narrative sources
from the period. The textual evidence shows the range of opinions held by the clerical
authors and the extent of Ottonian prelates’ military roles and allows a conclusion to be
formed as to how common the phenomenon of the “warrior bishop” actually was.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the great reifications of history is that society in the European Middle Ages
was organized into the “three estates”: the armed nobility who fought for the defense of
all, the Christian clergy who prayed for everyone’s souls, and the commoners who
farmed and worked so that all should have food and the material necessities of life.
Though simplistic, this understanding is based on a vision of an ordered society that
began to inspire the pens of clerical thinkers with increasing frequency beginning in the
late tenth century.1 The reality of medieval social structure was, of course, more complex
and varied according to time, place and socio-economic conditions. This was especially
true in the Medieval German Empire. As in the rest of Christian Europe, bishops and
abbots belonged almost to a man to the same social stratum as secular counts and dukes,
so that the division between “the Church” and “the nobility” was often blurred. The
conditions that prevailed in early medieval Germany produced a clerical class that not
only tended to have worldview similar to that of the armed aristocracy but was obliged to
fulfill many of the same military duties in service to the emperor and the Reich, up to,
and sometimes including, fighting in person. Such at least is the lingering impression.
The literati of the High Middle Ages, looking at their own generation, could be as guilty
of oversimplification as moderns looking back over several centuries, and the “fighting
bishops of the Empire” seems to have become something of a self-effacing joke. German

1

Timothy Reuter, “Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare,” in Medieval Warfare: A History, ed.
Maurice Keen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 34.

2

moralists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries often harped on the sins of militant
ecclesiastics; Caesarius of Heisterbach, writing in the 1220s, told of a Paris student who
was prepared to believe anything except that a German bishop could achieve salvation,
since such a man was more apt to think on the wages of his troops than the souls of his
flock.2
This caricature of the warrior prelate was not just a product of high medieval
imagination but an image that evolved from reality. It was based on a practice that
originated in the Frankish empire founded in the fifth century by the Merovingian kings
and continued under the Carolingian dynasty that came to rule nearly all of Christian
Europe—first as uncrowned warlords, then as kings, and ultimately as “Roman”
emperors—from the early eighth century through the end of the ninth. Frankish society
was very much defined by war and its bishops and abbots were frequently involved in
military matters in apparent contradiction to the teachings of the church. After the
Carolingian empire fragmented, the royal bloodline faded away in East Francia and gave
way to a dynasty of Saxon lineage, which ruled the nascent German Reich during the
tenth century and the first quarter of the eleventh. History knows them as the Ottonians.
The idea of the martial prelate is most commonly associated with Ottonian Germany.

2

Dialogus Miraculorum II.27, ed J. Strange (Cologne, 1851), vol. 1, 99. Cited in Timothy Reuter,
“Episcopi cum sua militia: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early Staufer Era,” in Warriors and
Churchmen in the High Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Karl Leyser (London and Rio Grande:
The Hambledon Press, 1992), 79.

3

Until relatively recently,3 the study of the period has hinged on the premise of the
Reichskirchensystem (imperial church system). This approach assumes that the German
monarch had the power to appoint prelates to positions of his choosing and that he relied
on the lords of “his” church to serve as the principal ministers of government in
preference to the lay nobility and to provide troops for the empire’s defense.
This notion of the “fighting churchman” raises a series of questions which are
examined and answered in this study. In the first place, how did early medieval society
reconcile the sin of killing with the necessity of waging war, and how particularly did the
leading churchmen of the Frankish empire come to be tasked with military duties?
Having established this, what evidence can be found in primary source documents for
churchmen in early medieval Germany participating in war, and what form did such
participation take? In simplest terms, did these bishops and abbots actually do battle with
weapon in hand? If so, was this the rule or the exception? Finally, since the literate of
the European Middle Ages were overwhelmingly clerical, what opinions were held by the
authors of the above sources regarding the morality of war? How did they understand the
role(s) played by fellow men of the cloth in war, and did they approve?
These questions are best understood through the narrative sources, that is, chronicles
and histories, personal accounts of events, and the vitae (lives) and gesta (deeds) of great
men (and occasionally women). A significant number of these were written under the

3

For Timothy Reuter’s 1982 rebuttal of the Reichkirchensystem, see Chapter 8.
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Ottonians. In particular, the biographical works of leading prelates have survived in
quantity unmatched by the Carolingian era. With this in mind, and also because of the
widespread association of warlike churchmen with the later period, this study focuses on
Ottonian Germany and considers the Carolingian sources more briefly and by way of a
preamble to the story of the tenth and early eleventh century. The limitations of this
study impose a cut-off date of 1024, the year that saw the death of the last Ottonian
emperor Henry II and the accession of the Salian dynasty in the person of Conrad II.
Likewise, there are related topics that are well worth exploring but are beyond the scope
of the present work. These include (but are not limited to) a comparison of practices in
early medieval Germany to those in Anglo-Saxon England, whether the development of
the martial church in the post-Roman West had parallels in the Byzantine East, the
evolution of tactics and military equipment, and how the voices of women, too often
marginalized, contributed to the record. The author regrets that not all the questions that
deserve answering have been answered herein.
Part I analyzes the acceptance of war by the early Christian church and describes the
genesis and development of the Frankish empire in relation to these doctrinal challenges.
It concludes with a short overview of the evidence for churchmen at war found in the
Carolingian narrative sources of the eighth and ninth centuries. Part II begins with a
summary of the reigns of the Saxon-Ottonian kings, followed by a description of their
“imperial church system.” The remaining five chapters examine the main source
documents of the late tenth century and early eleventh century to determine the military
roles of Ottonian churchmen and the opinions of the writers who chronicled them.

5

PART I
THE ORIGINS OF MEDIEVAL GERMANY AND ITS CHURCH

6

1. THE PARADOX OF THE CHRISTIAN SOLDIER
The contradiction between God’s seventh commandment not to kill (Exodus 20:13)
and the soldier’s profession of bearing arms to do just that presented a stumbling block
for the integration of Christianity into the late Roman Empire. Holy scripture was, as it
always has been, ambiguous and open to interpretation. On the one hand, Saint Paul
seems to have approved the use of the sword by authority to punish wrongdoing (Rom.
13:1) and also encouraged Christians to abide in the career to which they were called (I
Cor. 7:20), which tenet could be applied as well to soldiering as to any other profession.1
On the other, the most enduring words of the prophet Isaiah, who declared that swords
would one day be beaten into ploughshares (Isaiah 2:4), were quoted in the second
century by Justin Martyr as grounds for non-violence.2 The opinions of the early church
fathers varied as they did on many topics during Christianity’s formative centuries. Some
condemned killing in war as outright murder, while others decried the soldier’s
profession not for the killing per se, but because it was worldly and idolatrous to follow
an authority other than that of God. The church’s official retention in the second century
of the authority of the Old Testament with its vengeful God of war made it difficult to
repudiate war altogether.3 Theologians of the third century exhorted pious Christians not
to enlist in the Roman army, or, if they had converted while in the ranks, to lay their arms

Arthur Cushman McGiffert, “Christianity and War: A Historical Sketch” (The American
Journal of Theology 19, No. 3), 323.

1

2

Justin Martyr First Apology 110; cited in McGiffert, 324.

3

McGiffert 325.
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down; but gradually the position of the church was evolving from the wholesale rejection
of armed violence in any form to an acceptance of war waged in the cause of justice.
Origen (184-254) wrote that while Christians ought not to participate in war directly, they
could with a clear conscience pray for the emperor to fight and rule righteously.4 The
success of Constantine the Great (306-37) at the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312 was
not only a watershed moment in the eventual conversion of the Empire, but a turning
point for the place of warfare in Christian thought. As Constantine ascribed his victory to
the Christian God who had supposedly inspired him in a vision the night before the battle
to advance his army under the banner of the Chi Rho for Christ, so his Christian subjects
saw him thereafter as their champion against heathenism. This was reinforced by
Constantine’s subsequent triumphs in the civil war that made him sole emperor, and the
church would henceforth support the imperial wars, embracing God as a god of war like
the Jewish Yaweh.5 Christianity was officially protected from persecution within the
Empire under Constantine and subsequently became the state religion. Nearly a century
later, the emperor Honorius (393-423) issued an edict expelling pagans from the army6
and made the Christian soldier a matter of law.
The writings of Saint Augustine (354-430) gave the authorities of late antiquity and
the Middle Ages the means to explicitly justify war as a good Christian endeavor and part

4

Origen Contra Celsum viii.73; cited in McGiffert, 326.

5

McGiffert 328-9.

6

Michael Grant, The Roman Emperors (Charles Scribner’s sons, 1985), 285.
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of a well-ordered society. Augustine posited that the bellum justum (just war) waged for
the right reasons—to defend life and property, or to avenge wrongs and recover property
unjustly taken—was acceptable if it was conducted by a prince whose authority derived
from God and was not motivated by greed or cruelty. In essence, as Karl Leyser puts it,
the just war was a form of Christian charity intended to produce an outcome of peace and
harmony that was better than what had been before.7 Modern students are most apt to
cite Augustine’s discussion of the bellum justum found in chapters XV.4 and XIX.7 of De
Civitate Dei (the city of God), written late in his life. However, an earlier work, Contra
Faustum Manichaeum (against Faustus the Manichee), which Augustine completed
around 398 to repudiate the Manichaean religion he had once followed, contains his
fullest treatment on the theme of warfare.8 Here he refutes Faustus’ claims that wars
waged at God’s behest by the patriarchs of the Old Testament are in contradiction with
the teachings of Jesus. He cites three passages from the New Testament in support of the
lawfulness of war: Luke 3:14, in which John admonishes the soldiers who came to him
for baptism, “be content with your wages,” i.e., continue in your career; Matthew 22:21,
in which Jesus says, “Give to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” explaining that “tribute

7

Karl Leyser, “Warfare in the Western European Middle Ages: The Moral Debate,” in
Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and Beyond, ed.
Timothy Reuter (London and Rio Grande, Ohio: The Hambledon Press, 1994), 192-201 passim.
Also Phillipe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1989), 264-5.

8

R.A. Markus, “Saint Augustine’s Views on the ‘Just War’,” in The Church and War: Papers
Read at the Twenty-First Summer Meeting and the Twenty-Second Winter Meeting of the
Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. W.J. Sheils (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 5.
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money is given on purpose to pay the soldiers for war;” and Matthew 8:9, where Jesus
“gave due praise to [the centurion’s] faith. He did not tell him to leave the service.”9
Augustine continues, “If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare, because in
after times it was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, ‘I say unto you, That ye resist not evil:
but if any one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left also,’ the answer is, that
what is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition.”10
At first blush, this interpretation of Christ’s ubiquitous tenet of peace might seem
unorthodox to the modern reader, but it was not so in the context of the fifth century.
R.A. Markus points out that Augustine can scarcely be credited, as he often has been,
with checking the pacifist inclinations of early Christian thought.11 Saint Athanasius
(296-393), who had participated in the Council of Nicaea under Constantine, wrote that
even though “…it is not permitted to kill… in war to slay the enemy is both legitimate
and worthy of praise.”12 The great Saint Ambrose (340-397), Bishop of Milan, observed
that while the study of war seemed foreign to the clergy, the holy figures of the Old
Testament such as Joshua and David “won the highest glory also in war.”13 Ambrose

9

St. Augustine Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, trans. Rev. Richard Stothert (in A Select
Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Vol. IV, ed. Philip
Schaff [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1872]), XXII.74.

10

Ibid. XXII.76; cited in McGiffert, 331.

11

Markus 11.

12

St. Athanasius Ep. Ad Amunem; cited in McGiffert, 329-330.

13

St. Ambrose On the Duties of the Clergy; cited in McGiffert, 330.
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used descriptions of war to illustrate Christian principles on several occasions, sometimes
literally and sometimes metaphorically. Though one should strive for peace, it could be
achieved “…through the anxious forethought of the emperor or the hands of the soldiers,
or… from the favorable outcome of wars…”14 He also spoke of how “…the wonderful
power of discourse that incited the good soldiers of Christ to battle… [with] our enemy
the devil,”15 and described unit banners on the battlefield as a metaphor for the strength
of one’s faith: “One who is a loyal soldier follows his own ensigns and does not
recognize those of a stranger.”16
Expanding on the thoughts of these earlier church fathers, Augustine believed that
pacifism may have been appropriate for the apostolic age, but that in his own troubled
time war was an inescapable part of society and must therefore be regulated, like all
human activity, by God’s law. Further, in his Questions on the Heptateuch, he not only
reiterates the conditions for a just war but justifies the use of strategems and the
legitimacy of offensive war as well as defensive.17 Augustine thus provided the mold for
“official” Christian opinion on war from that point on. In the words of A. C. McGiffert,

14

St. Ambrose Jacob and the Happy Life, trans. Michael P. McHugh in St. Ambrose: Seven
Exegetical Works (The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 65 [Washington, DC: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1972), 6.29.163.

15

St. Ambrose The Patriarchs, trans. McHugh in ibid.11.56.273.

16

St. Ambrose The Prayer of Job and David, trans. McHugh in ibid. 7.26.409-10.

17

St. Augustine Questions on the Heptateuch VI.10; cited in McGiffert, 332.
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he “made it possible… for Christian princes to invoke the authority of religion in
justification of many wars of very doubtful character.”18
The princes of the early medieval period did not necessarily subscribe to this
contradiction in blind faith. Charlemagne, that shining example of kingship idealized by
so many who came after him, seemed to have been well aware of the disconnect between
the theory of peace and the reality of war, though he was no more able to close that gap
than any of his successors.19

18
19

McGiffert 332.

J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Barbarian West: The Early Middle Ages A.D. 400-1000 (New York
and Evanston: Harper & Row: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 104.

12

2. THE BIRTH OF THE FRANKISH KINGDOM
“The Fall of the Roman Empire” is a phrase that conjures vivid images in the Western
imagination, but historians have long understood it to be a misnomer. After 395 there
were for all practical purposes two empires: a western one ruled by an emperor in Rome
(later Milan and Ravenna) and an eastern one under an emperor in Constantinople, with
the latter being the more influential of the two.1 The Empire itself continued under
eastern rule well after the deposition of the last western emperor. The transfer of power in
the west from Roman to Germanic control was a drawn-out process that occurred over
two centuries, gradual at some stages and abrupt at others. Throughout the fifth century,
the Germanic peoples, nearly all of whom were Arian Christians compared to the
Catholic Romans,2 fought against Rome and for Rome against one another for land and
influence. Far from remaining mere foreign mercenaries, many of the tribal leaders, the
so-called “imperial Germans,” integrated themselves thoroughly into the uppermost
circles of Roman society and politics. The Franks in particular seemed to have been a
consistent source for ambitious military commanders. These men advanced to the highest
of ranks during the fourth and fifth centuries, influencing the rise and fall of emperors

1

John Moorhead, The Roman Empire Divided (London: Pearson Education: Longman, 2001), 289.

2

Wolfram, Herwig Wolfram, The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples, trans. Thomas
Dunlap (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1997), 309.

13

and becoming at times virtual rulers of the Western Empire.3 Even before Rome herself
was sacked (for the first time) by the Visigoths in 410, categories such as barbarian or
Roman, pagan or Christian, were not easily delineated.4 In 476, the warlord Odoacer
deposed the last Roman emperor in the west, Romulus Augustulus, and advised Emperor
Zeno in Constantinople that he would henceforth be happy to rule directly in his name.
The date has long been marked as the moment when the Western Roman Empire “fell,”
but the fall seemed to have been a fait accompli for some time. Averil Cameron calls the
final transition “one of the most famous non-events in history.”5
The first significant point that should be understood from this process was that the
Germanic migrants neither destroyed the Western Empire nor restored it, but transformed
it into their own home while continuing to honor the emperors in Constantinople.6 They
took great pains to continue the Roman system of agriculture and property ownership in
their new lands,7 and “…the fact that their swords were drawn in no way diminished their
resolve to behave like Romans.”8 The tradition of Romanitas, “Roman-ness,” was to be
nostalgically revered by the descendants of Romans and barbarians alike. The Franks,

3

Patrick J. Geary, Before France and Germany: The Creation and Transformation of the
Merovingian World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 18-23 passim.

4

Geary 23. See also Moorhead, 13-30 passim.

5

Averil Cameron, The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993), 33.

6

Wolfram 313.

7

Wallace-Hadrill 24.

8

Ibid. 25.
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already established in a position of strength from their domination of the Roman military,
were the foremost of the new tenants in the west. Clovis (r. 481-511), the third king of
the great Merovingian dynasty, and probably the first Christian one,9 aggressively
expanded the Franks’ dominion to include all of Roman Gaul (modern France) and
extended their authority over rival tribes on the Eastern side of the Rhine. Merovingian
hegemony would endure for some two hundred and fifty years despite constant internal
warfare stemming from a bewildering series of divisions, subdivisions and reunifications
of the realm amongst sons and grandsons of royal blood, all of whom had a legitimate
claim to rule under the Frankish tradition of partible inheritance.10
The second notable point is that the threats posed alternately by the Goths and the
Huns gave the church in the West a new significance. The Catholic bishops, as the de
facto leaders of the Roman urban centers, came to be identified with local resistance
against the barbarians’ military incursions and also stood as torchbearers of orthodoxy in
the face of the Goths’ heretical Arian Christianity. As the old Roman authority waned in
favor of barbarian rule, the bishops represented continuity with Romanitas. The Goths, in

9

According to Gregory of Tours, Clovis converted after being “found worthy of victory [over the
Alamanni] by calling on the name of Christ”—much like Constantine. Christianity and military
success were thus linked early on. Gregory of Tours Historia Francorum, trans. and ed.
Alexander Calder Murray in The Merovingians (Readings in Medieval Civilizations and Cultures
X, series ed. Paul Edward Dutton [Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006]), II.30. See
also Patrick J. Geary, Before France and Germany: The Creation and Transformation of the
Merovingian World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 84-86.

10

Matthias Becher, Charlemagne, trans. David S. Bachrach (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003), 20-23. Also covered at length in Geary, Before France and Germany.

15

spite of their religious differences, eventually accepted the bishops’ role as intermediaries
between themselves and the imperial government.11
The Catholic Church was arguably the most important of the furnishings that the
Empire left behind in her western house. For the most part, the ecclesiastical institutions
in Gaul survived the crumbling of imperial rule and the rise of the Frankish kingdom
intact. The administrative structure of the church, similar to the Late Empire’s civil
structure, provided continuity between the old regime and the new during the period of
“Germanization” of Gaul during the sixth through seventh centuries. The old Roman
province became a church province administered by a metropolitan archbishop. This
office declined in importance over the sixth century as the influence of the Frankish kings
in church politics grew.12 The bishopric usually occupied the same space as the old
Roman civitas (a city and its surrounding territory) and the bishop took over its politicaladministrative duties, becoming increasingly more involved in secular government as
well as church leadership.13 This was not new; Constantine had long since established a
precedent of allowing bishops to wield a degree of secular jurisdiction.14 It became
especially true south of the Loire. Many bishops in this region came from the old GalloRoman senatorial class, which was able to maintain its social superiority within the new

11

Becher 28-29.

12

Becher 20-23.

13

Friedrich Prinz, Klerus und Krieg im früheren Mittelalter (Monographien zur Geschichte des
Mittelalters, Band 2 [Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1971]), 7-8. Also Becher 28.

14

Cameron 61.
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Frankish order well into the seventh century. Although canon law required bishops to be
elected freely by their people and clergy, their importance meant that the Frankish kings
saw to it that the offices went to trusted supporters,15 a power they had exercised since
the time of Clovis.16
The responsibilities of local government included defense, and here the ideal vision of
the bishop’s office came into conflict with the reality he faced. Priests had been
exempted from military service once the Roman Empire officially adopted Christianity
and the practice was further codified by ecclesiastical councils in the fifth century. The
synodal decrees of the Frankish kings proceeded from this late antique tradition, but the
terms used indicate that separating the clergy from violent activity was becoming a
matter of prohibition rather than exemption. The councils of the sixth century enacted
general bans on both the bearing of arms and hunting for all clergy down to the rank of
deacon and provided a table of punishment by excommunication from one to three
months for violators. The longest span was reserved for the bishops, suggesting that
social status was also a factor. Yet in subsequent councils from the start of the seventh
century, the threat of punishment became less defined. The last important Merovingian

15
16

Becher 28.

Pierre Riché, Daily Life in the World of Charlemagne, trans. Jo Ann McNamara (The Middle
Ages Series, gen. ed. Ruth M. Karras [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978]), 84.

17

synod, that of St. Jean de Losne (673-75), failed to mention penalties at all, though
bishops were specified in its ban on clerical arms-bearing.17
The strident and repeated insistence that the clergy forbear the use of violence,
seemingly at odds with the increasingly vague terms of enforcement, shows that the
problem had developed into a crisis, at least so far as the council fathers were concerned.
However, it was simply unrealistic for them to expect a bishop to adhere strictly to canon
law in the face of the reality of defending his civitas. While militancy may originally
have been forced upon the Bischofsherrschaft by circumstance, it seemed to be
developing into the status quo. The entry of the conquering Frankish nobility into highchurch careers alongside the old Gallo-Roman aristocracy, beginning in the late sixth
century and with increasing prevalence in the seventh, introduced strong familial bonds
between the lords of the church and their warlike secular counterparts.18 This was a key
feature of Frankish-German society and politics from then on.
The later Merovingian rulers and their councils seemed unable or unwilling to enforce
their own prohibitions. This is perhaps unsurprising given the decline of royal authority
in the latter half of the seventh century under the so-called rois fainéants, the “do-nothing
kings.”19 Real power had passed into the hands of the chief royal officer, the maior

17

Prinz 5-7 passim.

18

Prinz 8.

19

Becher 29. See also Geary, 223-226, for an analysis of the Carolingians’ political need to
perpetuate this image as justification for dynastic turnover.

18

domus (mayor of the palace). In the northeastern sub-kingdom of Austrasia, this was a
hereditary office held by the nobles of the Arnulfing, or Pippinid, line. The mayor Pepin
II conquered rival Neustria following the battle of Tertry in 687. His vigorous son
Charles secured the office in 717 after a struggle against his rivals, partly by virtue of the
fact that he was the only one of Pepin’s male children to survive long enough to take the
title. He consolidated his family’s power further, subjugating a series of lesser kingdoms
and territories, extracting tribute from the pagan Saxons, and defeating a Muslim invasion
force at Poitiers in 732. This deed earned him the sobriquet Martel, “the Hammer.” De
facto lord of the Frankish kingdom, Charles Martel ruled by his own hand without even
the façade of a crowned monarch from 737 to 741. His sons Pepin III (called “the
Younger” or “the Short”) and Carloman succeeded him as co-rulers for another two years
of interregnum until they found it necessary to raise the last feeble Merovingian,
Childeric III, to the throne as their puppet. Carloman abdicated to follow a monastic
calling in 747. In 749 or 750, Pepin appealed to Rome with his famous leading question:
was it proper for a king without power to have the title? Pope Zacharias returned the
answer no, and Pepin deposed Childeric altogether and was anointed in 751. Although
the dynasty that followed him was named after his illustrious father, Pepin the Younger
became the first true king of the Carolingian line.20
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Geary 195-200 and 218-220 passim, and Becher 33-37 passim. The date assigned to Pepin’s
appeal varies.
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3. BISHOPS, ABBOTS, AND WAR UNDER THE CAROLINGIANS
The Carolingian period saw Christian Europe beset by enemies on all sides: Vikings to
the North, Slavs and steppe nomads to the East, and Muslim expansion from the South.
The society that developed under these pressures was one largely organized by war, in
which the political community, which is to say the nobility, both secular and clerical,
tended to be called “the army” even when it was not functioning as one.1 The disconnect
between the growing military obligations of Frankish churchmen and the canonical “rules
of engagement” that were repeatedly laid upon them continued to be problematic. Into
this unquiet theatre stepped Saint Boniface, the great Anglo-Saxon missionary, reformer
and eventual martyr. Boniface was named missionary-bishop for Germany by Pope
Gregory II and came under Charles Martel’s protection in 723. On the surface, the
warlord of the Franks might have seemed an unlikely sponsor. His highest priorities
were military and he had no qualms about appropriating church land to support the
vassals who provided his troops. This policy continued under his sons, as seen in
Carloman’s capitulary publishing the decrees of the synod of Les Estines of 743:
We order also, by the advice of the servants of God and of the Christian people
and in view of imminent wars and attacks by the foreign populations which
surround us, that a portion of the properties of the Church shall be used for some
time longer, with God’s indulgence, for the benefit of our army, as a precarium
and paying a census [i.e., rent]. 2

1
2

Timothy Reuter, “Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare” 13.

Statuimus quoque cum consilio servorum Dei et populi christiani propter inminentia bella et
persecutiones ceteratum gentium, quae in circuitu nostro sunt, ut sub precario en censu aliquam
partem ecclesialis pecuniae in adiutorium exercitus nostri cum indulgentia Dei aliquanto
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Boniface was certainly one of those who gave the mayor advice. No doubt he
disapproved of the “borrowing” of church property per se, but he accepted the necessity
of supporting Charles Martel, and then his sons, in their wars against the pagans on their
borders. They were happy in turn to sponsor his missionary efforts as an additional way
to bring their enemies to heel. In a letter to his friend and colleague Bishop Daniel of
Winchester shortly after the succession of Pepin and Carloman, Boniface explained that
without the support of “the Frankish prince,” he could “neither govern the members of
the Church nor defend the priests, clerks, monks, and maids of God; nor can I, without
orders from him and the fear inspired by him, prevent the pagan rites and the sacrilegious
worship of idols in Germany.”3
His indulgence of Carolingian militarism did not, however, extend so far as the
Frankish clergy, especially the aristocratic bishops and abbots whose lifestyle seemed
indistinguishable from that of their secular relations.4 In a letter to Pope Zacharias in
742, Boniface congratulated the Holy Father on his recent accession, but complained in
the same breath that in Francia, he found bishops who were “drunkards and shiftless men,

tempore retineamus… MGH Epist. III.56 (Berlin, 1916), 312.13-16; trans. Ephraim Emerton in
The Letters of St. Boniface (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 71. (All subsequent
translations are Emerton’s.)
3

Sine patrocinio principis Francorum nec populum aecclesiae regere nec presbiteros vel
clericos, monachos vel ancillas Dei defendere possum; nec ipsos paganorum ritus et sacrilegia
idolorum in Germania sine illius mandato et timore prohibere valeo. MGH Epist. III.63, 329.1417 (93-94).

4

Riché 85.
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given to hunting and to fighting in the army like soldiers and by their own hands
shedding blood, whether of heathens or Christians.”5 By strengthening the connection
between the Frankish church and Rome, Boniface intended to impose stricter controls on
the behavior of these offenders. One of his actions was to re-emphasize the Roman
archiepiscopal system in the West, under which groups of bishoprics were placed under
the authority of a metropolitan archbishop. It was standard practice in Boniface’s native
England but seemed to have fallen by the wayside in the Frankish domains.6 While royal
influence was still brought to bear on the selection of candidates, only the pope could
bestow the archbishop’s sign of office, the pallium.7
Pepin and Carloman supported his reforming efforts, but cautiously, as they needed
the political support of their “secular” clerics.8 The legislation enacted under the Pippinid
(early Carolingian) rulers suggests that an uneasy balance was starting to develop
between piety and realpolitik, though one needs to read between the lines to perceive it.
The second canon of the Concilium Germanicum of 742 reiterated and elaborated upon

5

Et inveniuntur quidam inter eos episcopi, qui, licet dicant se fornicarios vel adulteros non esse,
sed sunt ebriosi et incuriosi vel venatores, et qui pugnant in exercitu armati et effundebant
propria manu sanguinem hominum, sive paganorum sive christianorum. MGH Epist. III.50,
300.13-16 (58).

6

Thomas F.X. Noble, introduction to Emerton, xxi. Becher (p.36) contends that the office of
“archbishop” replaced that of “metropolitan,” but it is unclear how he comes by this distinction of
terminology. Emerton’s translation seems to use the titles interchangeably (see, for example,
letter LXII, p.115).

7

Becher 36.

8

Ibid. 117-118.
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the ban on armed clerics. Carloman’s publication of this decree was couched in
unyielding terms:
We have absolutely forbidden the servants of God to carry arms or fight, to
enter the army or march against an enemy, except only so many as are especially
selected for divine service such as celebrating Mass or carrying relics—that is to
say: the prince may have one or two bishops with the chaplains, and each prefect
one priest to hear confessions and prescribe penance. We have also forbidden the
servants of God to hunt or wander about the woods with dogs or to keep hawks or
falcons.9
Boniface probably had in mind warlike bishops such as Milo of Trier, who had won
influence in the Frankish church as partisans of Charles Martel, when he convinced
Carloman to back these regulations. However, the specific exemption for priests seeing
to the troops’ spiritual needs or carrying holy relics before the army seems to represent an
important concession to the ruler’s wishes.10
The results of the Council of Soissons in 744, under Pepin’s auspices as ruler of
Western Francia, give an indication of how far removed Boniface’s ideal was from the
reality of Carolingian military practice. In what Prinz calls a “stagnation of Bonifacian
reform,” neither the ban on clerics going armed in general nor the prohibition against

9

Servis Dei per omnia omnibus, armaturam portare vel pugnare aut in exercitum et in hostem
pergere, omnino prohibuimus, nisi illi tantummodo, qui propter divinum ministerium missarum
scilicet sollemnia adimplenda et sanctorum patrocinia portanda, ad hoc electi sunt. Id est: unum
vel duos episcopos cum capellanis presbiteris princeps secum habeat, et unusquisque praefectus
unum presbiterum; qui hominibus peccata confitentibus iudicare et indicare poenitentiam
possint. Nec non et illas venationes et silvaticas vagationes cum canibus omnibus servis Dei
interdiximus; similiter, ut acceptores et walcones non habeant. MGH Epist. III.56, 310.22-29
(69-70).

10

Prinz 8-9 passim.
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their participation in combat was re-emphasized here. A provision was made that
enjoined abbati legitimi (i.e., not lay abbots) from going to war. Otherwise, the best that
could be managed at Soissons was a ruling in the third canon that clerics should not wear
lay clothing. The bans of 742 were repeated at Boniface’s Frankish council of 747 and
again at the one called by Pepin in 756 at Verberie, showing how routine they had
become.11 Yet these were not simply hollow exercises in moral indignation, but real
attempts by the church to influence the conditions of the ongoing wars against the
Franks’ most immediate and threatening pagan enemies. Boniface himself met his
martyrdom at the hands of the Frisians in 755. As the story was told afterwards by his
hagiographer Willibald, he had ordered the soldiers in his entourage to lay down their
weapons,12 thus disarming the men whose duty it was to fight where a bishop could not.
It is doubtful that the saint would have appreciated the irony.
On Pepin’s death in 768, the Frankish kingdom passed to his two eldest sons
Carloman and Charles. Carloman predeceased his brother three years later, much as his
namesake uncle had done. King Charles, of course, became Charles the Great, the man
best known to the Western world by his French appellation Charlemagne. He was a
larger-than-life figure whom Simon MacLean rightly calls “the hero of the [Carolingian]

11

Prinz 9-10. Lay abbots were a prominent feature of the Carolingian political landscape. In the
sources analyzed below, it is often impossible to tell from the text at face value whether suchand-such an abbot who went to war was in fact a tonsured cleric, or simply a secular beneficiary
of royal favor.
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Willibald Vita Bonifatii (MGH SSrG 57.I [Hannover, 1905]), 8.49-50.
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story.”13 While Charlemagne oversaw extensive contributions to culture, scholarship and
art, initiating the so-called Carolingian Renaissance, the fire that burned hottest during his
kingship was that of war and conquest. His most notable military achievements included
the defeat of the nomadic Avars, the conquest of the Lombard kingdom of Italy, and the
subjugation and conversion of the Saxons in a bitterly fought war that lasted more than
thirty years, almost literally a lifetime’s work. The climax of his story took place on
Christmas Day of 800 when he was crowned Emperor of the Romans—reluctantly,
according to his biographer Einhard—by Pope Leo III.14
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Simon MacLean, introduction to History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian
Europe: The Chronicle of Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2009), 1.
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Einhard Vita Karoli Magni, ed. G. Waitz (MGH SSrG 25 [Hannover, 1911]), 28.32-33.
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4. THE LINGERING MORAL DILEMMA OF CHRISTIAN WAR
Warfare in the early Carolingian period was characterized by the great conquests of
Charles Martel and Charlemagne in which substantial royal armies met the Muslim threat
and conquered the peoples of its Eastern periphery. Having overcome the enemies at
hand, the Franks could expand their dominion no further.1 By Charlemagne’s death in
814, the Frankish empire encompassed a million square kilometers.2 It was as well for
the survival of this domain that the emperor’s two eldest legitimate sons, Charles the
Younger and Carloman, predeceased him and let the imperial title pass to their younger
brother Louis the Pious. Louis’ reign as sole king ameliorated the problems of partible
inheritance for a generation but by no means solved them. Before his death in 840, he
designated his son Lothar as his successor. Lothar’s brothers Charles the Bald and Louis
the German disputed the settlement and allied against him. Their inability to come to
terms brought a resurgence of the kind of bloody internecine warfare seen under the
Merovingians. The three met near the villa of Fontenoy in 841. In the words of the
chronicler of Fulda, they “…decided that the issue should be determined by the sword
and subjected to God’s judgment. On June 25 a great battle was fought between them,

1

Reuter, Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare 17-18.

2

MacLean 1.
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and there was such slaughter on both sides that no one can recall a greater loss among the
Frankish people in the present age.”3
Fontenoy illuminates the quandary that still faced the warriors of Christendom in the
early medieval period, even though Augustine had smoothed the way for the acceptance
of war into the Christian worldview as a necessary evil. Defensive or even preemptive
warfare against pagan enemies had taken on an aura of spiritual redemption long before
Pope Urban II preached crusade in 1095. John VIII (872-882) wrote to a group of
Frankish bishops in 878 that the faithful who died fighting pagans and unbelievers would
attain eternal life.4 John X (914-928) boasted in a letter to Archbishop Hermann of
Cologne that he had twice put his own life at risk for the good of Christianity doing battle
with the Saracens.5 Yet the necessity of waging large-scale war against fellow
Christians, increasingly the norm after the death of Louis the Pious, still presented a
moral problem. One way in which Carolingian society assuaged its collective guilt was
to regard battle as a trial by combat before the judgment of God, as stated explicitly by

3

…et Dei iudicio causam examinandam decreverunt. Factumque est inter eos VII. Kal. Iulii
proelium ingens et tanta caedes ex utraque parte, ut numquam aetas praesens tantam stragem in
gente Francorum factam antea meminerit. Annales Fuldenses, ed. F. Kurze (MGH SSrG 7
[Hannover, 1891]) 841.32.17-21. Trans. Timothy Reuter in The Annals of Fulda (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992), 19.

4

MGH Epist. VII.150 (Berlin, 1928), 126. Cited in David Bachrach, Religion and the Conduct of
War, c. 300-1215 (Warfare in History, gen. ed. Matthew Bennett [Woodbridge, Suffolk: The
Boydell Press, 2003]), 60; also McGiffert 337.

5

Scribit praeterea, ‘Saracenos, qui sexaginta iam annis terram Romanam vastassent, et quasi
propriam possedissent, dissipatos esse, se ipsum corpusque suum opponendo et secunda vice per
se ipsum proelium ineundo.’ P. Jaffé, ed., Regesta pontifica romanorum I.450.3556 (Leipzig:
Veit, 1885); cited in Prinz, 143.
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the writer Nithard as well as the anonymous chronicler at Fulda. This was a superexpanded version of the judicial duel between two individuals in which God’s grace
could only permit the rightful party to win, the legal ordeal most preferred by Europe’s
warrior aristocracy into the fifteenth century. Karl Leyser gives these Carolingian wars
of division as the custom’s starting point.6 Phillipe Contamine traces the use of both
group combat and single combat between opposing commanders or champions to older
Germanic origins, as recorded by Gregory of Tours.7 No matter how deep its roots, the
idea of war as an appeal to God’s justice gained an even firmer foothold in the ninth
century and was conspicuous well into the eleventh. Contemporary writers recorded
divine judgment in the Normans’ capture of Pope Leo IX at Civitate in 1053, the victory
at Hastings in 1066, and the death of the anti-king Rudolph of Rheinfelden, nemesis of
Emperor Henry IV, at Grone in 1080. These battles also helped reinforce the papal
doctrine of declaring the fideles Sancti Petri who died in arms martyrs assured of
salvation and helped lay the groundwork for the First Crusade.8 During the Carolingian
period, however, this view of battle as trial-by-ordeal was a somewhat passive solution to
the moral dilemma of intra-Christian violence and not universally accepted.9

6

Leyser, Moral Debate 192.

7

Gregory of Tours Historia Francorum VII.14 and VII.32; cited in Contamine, 260.

8

Leyser, Moral Debate 192-193.

9

Ibid. 192.
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Regardless of how the church managed to justify warfare in general, its first mission
was the salvation of soldiers’ souls. The root problem was that killing even in a
“sanctioned” conflict was still technically a sin. To this the church took a more active
approach, namely, the assignment of post-battle penance. This applied at the individual
level, even when the individuals involved numbered in the thousands. The idea that
penance should be tailored specifically to killing done in war grew out of the changing
views from the fifth through the seventh centuries on penitence as a whole. Penance for
early Christians was seen as a single life-changing act, much like a pilgrimage or the
taking of a vow, following which the individual was admitted into the company of the
faithful and expected to abstain from sin from then on. Backsliders were rejected from
the fold. This was clearly impractical for ordinary men and women who were unprepared
to follow a pseudo-clerical lifestyle, but particularly so for soldiers in the late Roman
army who wished to convert and at the same time heed the words of St. Paul and remain
in their calling. Compromise came in the form of so-called penitentials or “tariff books,”
schedules of short-term penance that could be performed as needed, which were
developed first in Irish and then English monasteries during the seventh century. These
lists usually laid down much lighter penalties for killing in war than for that done in
ordinary civilian life and the distinction seems to have existed quite early.10 It hinged not
only on the aegis of the bellum justum, but also on the mindset of the offender. Just as
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D. Bachrach, Conduct of War 28-30 passim, and Contamine 266. It should be noted that the
Anglo-Saxons did not practice judicial combat between individuals (Leyser, Warfare 192); it
seems likely by extension that they did not apply the view to the clash of armies either.
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Augustine required that a just war waged by a Christian prince be motivated by the public
good and not by greed, vainglory or cruelty, so a man who took a life in battle could only
do so from the purest of motives to be considered innocent of murder. The influential
theologian Rabanus Maurus, abbot of Fulda and a critic of Louis the German at the time
of Fontenoy, accepted the possibility that such a soldier might exist; but given the
tendency of man towards avarice, the root of all evil, he thought it highly unlikely. Some
saw the justice of the cause as sufficient to expiate the sin of killing for it, but Rabanus, in
a letter written after the battle, questioned whether soldiers who were “just following
orders” were truly innocent in God’s eyes.11 The bishops from the armies of Charles the
Bald and Louis the German at Fontenoy seemed to have agreed. Nithard recorded that
they imposed a three-day fast as a penance for all who fought.12 Regino of Prüm
reiterated the position of Rabanus in 906,13 as apparently did Burchard of Worms circa
1020.14 The most prominent example may be the highly detailed penance imposed by the
bishops of Normandy in 1067 on the victors at Hastings.15 However, by this point, the
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MGH Epist. V.32 (Berlin, 1899), 464; cited in D. Bachrach, Conduct of War 99, and
Contamine, 268.
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Nithard Historarium Libri IV III.1 (MGH SSrG 44 [Hannover, 1907]), 28-29; cited in
Contamine, 265.
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Regino of Prüm De synodalibus causis et disciplinis ecclesiasticis 50, ed. F.G.A
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D. Whitelock et al (Oxford, 1981), II: 583-4; cited in D. Bachrach, Conduct of War, 102.
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contradictory practice of praising warriors for defending Christianity while
simultaneously treating them as murderers was falling out of fashion. The problem began
to be addressed by Pope Alexander II in 1063 in a letter to the clergy of Volturno
allowing men of that city to kill Muslims in Spain without the taint of homicide.16 This
was not yet a license to kill fellow Christians in combat, as Alexander’s own legate
confirmed the penance imposed on the Normans seven years later (and this even though
William the Conqueror had invaded under the papal banner!).17 However, Bishop
Anselm of Lucca, a partisan of Gregory VII, used the writings of Gregory the Great and
Augustine to argue that war against schismatics and heretics could be fought without
sin18 and referred specifically to the fight against the forces of Emperor Henry IV in
1084.19 Ultimately, Gregorian reform brought about an end to the automatic sacrality of
war. Following the treatment of war in Gratian’s Decretum circa 1140, “the single most
important and influential canon law text of the twelfth century”—specifically, questio 5
of causa 23, which also relied heavily on Augustine to disprove the sinfulness of
authorized killing—the use of post-battle penance for homicide disappeared altogether.20
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Epistolae pontificum Romanorum ineditae, ed. S. Löwenfeld (repr. Graz, 1959), 43; cited in D.
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5. TEXTUAL EVIDENCE FOR CAROLINGIAN CHURCHMEN IN COMBAT
Without an intensive scouring of primary source documents beyond the scope of the
present study, it may not be possible to pinpoint exactly when a Frankish king first tasked
his greater church lords with military duties beyond the basic one to defend each his
civitas. Given the extent of his campaigns, it is likely that Charles Martel required
landholding bishops and abbots to contribute troops to the royal host. Pepin and
Carloman certainly summoned them to war in person frequently enough to draw the ire of
reformers, as borne out by the complaints of Boniface and the rulings from the
Germanicum and Soissons. Charlemagne was not an impious man and he enjoyed a
good relationship with the Roman church—he considered Pope Hadrian I, whose
unusually long reign (772-795) dovetailed with his own, a close friend—but he was also
as pragmatic as his father and grandfather had been and not one to compromise his
military needs for the sake of doctrine. Given his interest in the spiritual welfare of the
troops on his numerous campaigns, he could scarcely toe a strict Bonifacian line and ban
his clergy from the field altogether. A capitulary dated early in his reign seems to have
been a word-for-word reiteration of his uncle Carloman’s bans of the Concilium
Germanicum of 742, but its authenticity is questionable.1 Hadrian, otherwise a
cooperative partner in Carolingian policy, wrote that in no case could he authorize
churchmen to take an active role in combat. If the king insisted on taking bishops and
abbots with him on campaign, they should assiduously pray, preach and hear confessions,

1

MGH Cap. I.19 (Hannover, 1883), 44; cited in Prinz, 11.
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wielding a spiritual sword and not an earthly one (an interpretation of Christ’s “two
swords” from Luke 22:38).2 In practice, Charles applied the rules formulated by
Boniface and clarified by Hadrian only to the “other ranks” of the clergy, the presbyters
and deacons, and not to the bishops and abbots. Not only were the latter indispensible to
him in terms of the armed men they could provide, their noble status played no small part
in how they were treated in royal law. Social stratification within the church hierarchy
had been reflected by the synods of the sixth and seventh centuries, which provided a
sliding scale of penance according to rank and spoke to bishops specifically in their bans.
Now under Charles, it seems clear that the “noble church” and the “clerical church” had
evolved into separate entities.3
In any case, it seemed to have been de rigeur for Charlemagne’s church vassals to
lead their own contingents.4 The numerous exemptions granted them indicate that this
was the norm and speak to the consequences of active participation in combat, not merely
spiritual duties in the field.5 In the following letter dated circa 804-11, the emperor
summons one Abbot Fulrad to a muster of the royal army at Stassfurt in eastern Saxony.
The personal readiness that is apparently expected of Fulrad himself (noted in italics) and
the logistics entailed in mobilizing an armed company are illustrative:
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Come, accordingly, so equipped with your men to the aforesaid place that thence
you may be able to go well prepared in any direction whither our summons shall
direct; that is, with arms and gear also, and other equipment for war in food and
clothing. So that each horseman shall have a shield, lance, sword, dagger, bow
and quivers with arrows; and in your carts utensils of various kinds, that is, axes,
planes, augers, boards, spades, iron shovels, and other utensils which are
necessary in an army. In the carts also supplies of food for three months, dating
from the time of the assembly, arms and clothing for a half-year. And we
command this in general, that you cause it to be observed that you proceed
peacefully to the aforesaid place, through whatever part of our realm your journey
shall take you, that is, that you presume to take nothing except fodder, wood and
water; and let the men of each one of your vassals march along with the carts and
horsemen, and let the leader always be with them until they reach the aforesaid
place, so that the absence of a lord may not give an opportunity to his men of
doing evil.6
Even if the sight of an abbot or bishop clapping on his helmet and mustering his men
to join the royal army was commonplace, it did not mean that all Carolingian church
lords were comfortable with the idea of clerical military service. The exemptions that
Charlemagne granted from their duties are one indicator of this. Some were not afraid to
express their unease on parchment, even if they were not prepared to openly resist the
royal prerogative. In a letter dated to 789-790, Paulinus, patriarch of Aquilea, begged
Charlemagne to let his priests fight only in “God’s camp,” i.e., with prayer, in accordance
with Christ’s admonition in Matthew 6:24 that no man may serve two masters.7 Bishop
Claudius of Turin, a courtier of Louis the Pious, bemoaned the division of his energies
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when he wrote in 820, “…in spring, with my parchments under my arm, I go down to the
coast to fight the sons of Hagar [Arabs] and the Moors. By day, I put my sword to work,
and by night I employ my books and my pen.”8 Lupus Servatus, abbot of Ferriéres under
Charles the Bald, protested in a letter to his friend Bishop Pardulus that he was out of his
depth whenever he had to answer the royal call-up, as he had “…not learned how to
strike an enemy nor parry a blow, nor indeed to execute all the other duties of the infantry
and cavalry, but our king does not need soldiers alone.”9 In another missive, on hearing
that some of the men serving Odo of Corbie had been wounded in action, he admonished
his young brother-abbot, “I am deeply concerned for you too, when I remember that you
often rush out heedlessly into the midst of danger unarmed, incited by youthful prowess
and a desire to win… I therefore urge you… to leave to professional soldiers the use of
instruments of battle.”10
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If the words of Lupus and Claudius may be taken at face value, they stand as examples
of two of the modes in which a Carolingian churchman might have participated in war: in
a position of unarmed leadership in the field, following the letter of canon law if not the
spirit, or literally fighting the enemy with sword in hand, giving as good as he got. Even
if a bishop or abbot marched with the army only to perform the spiritual functions of the
priesthood, as Pope Hadrian had insisted, the theater of war could be equally dangerous
to all men regardless of rank or vocation. The sources discussed below contain numerous
passages that put clerics physically present in a battle and at risk for their lives, armed or
not, and such citations frequently take the form of a death notice.
A brief examination of the Carolingian sources is called for before proceeding to the
Ottonian period, as they form both a historiography and a literary tradition upon which
the later writers drew. These documents may be distinguished from one another by the
backgrounds and agendas of their respective authors, but taken together by the authors’
common attitude towards war and the language they use to describe it. They are, in
roughly chronological order: the Annales regni Francorum (Royal Frankish Annals), the
core work for the deeds of the early Carolingian monarchs; Nithard’s Historarium libri
IV (four books of history), the most important source for the wars between the sons of
Louis the Pious;11 and three of the four major narrative sources for the second half of the
9th century, namely, the Annales Bertiniani (annals of St-Bertin), the Annales Fuldensis
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(annals of Fulda), and the Chronicon of Regino of Prüm.12 These works collectively
cover the years 741 through 906, but the coverage is imperfect, sometimes lacking and
sometimes, as the writers reiterated earlier writers or echoed one another, redundant.
They must also have drawn on other works that we no longer possess. Those sources that
have survived are, in Reuter’s words, the “fossilized remains of Frankish political
discussions.” 13 In contrast to the colorful testimony of Claudius and Lupus, the evidence
provided by the five narrative sources for actual fighting done by bishops or tonsured (as
opposed to lay) abbots is minimal and indirect at best.
One should also be aware that none of these accounts should be taken as gospel truth.
The notion of historiographical or journalistic impartiality was unknown to the period.
All of these chronicles “were written to advance the specific political agendas of their
authors, and they therefore are full of biases, inaccuracies, lacunae, and selective
presentations of historical events.”14 In order to arrive at an accurate and comprehensive
historical picture, the modern scholar must fact-check the narratives against one another
and supplement them with numerous other source documents. Fortunately for the
purposes of the present study, these same viewpoints and biases are as useful as the raw
facts they present (or omit). This assumes that none of the authors discussed below went
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so far as to fabricate any part of their account altogether. Current scholarship does not
seem to give any indication that this was the case.

Annales regni Francorum, a.741-829
If Charlemagne did not directly order the creation of these Annales, he certainly
encouraged it. Based on the insider’s viewpoint and a one-sided writing style (e.g., the
omission of significant Frankish defeats, such as the storied debacle at the Pass of
Roncesvalle), Leopold von Ranke argued that the ARF must have originated from a court
source or sources and must perforce have been an official chronicle.15 Not that such
“spin” made for any shortage of warfare upon which to report. War was a constant and
the king was obliged to launch at least one major campaign each year in order to maintain
an image of strength, with the usual mission being punitive economic warfare against the
Saxons or Slavs. This was seen as right and proper and such terms as “plundering” and
“laying waste” were never pejorative when applied to Frankish action. “The king’s
despotism,” declares translator Bernard Scholz, “[was] restrained by his scanty resources
rather than by the ethics of his political ideology.”16 When Charles sought to keep the
rebellious Bavarians in line, he even applied for papal forgiveness in advance:
If the duke in his stubbornness intended to disobey the word of the pope [Hadrian]
entirely, then the Lord King Charles and his army would be absolved from any
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peril of sin, and the guilt of whatever burning, murder, and other atrocities might
occur in his country should then fall upon Tassilo and his supporters, and the Lord
King Charles and the Franks would remain innocent.17
Hand in hand with this matter-of-fact brutality is an absence of overtly religious language
in the criticism of the Franks’ non-Christian enemies. While the Saxons and Slavs are
frequently condemned as incurably treacherous and deserving of every punishment they
receive, they are hardly ever described as pagans or enemies of Christianity. Yet while
Scholz finds that the ARF does not present the hand of God “as the immediate cause of
political events,”18 there are passages (particularly by the attributed author of 741-795)
where the constant interjection of God’s help on the battlefield19 becomes so tiresome
that one wonders if the writer credited the Franks with any successes of their own.
Notwithstanding the wide span of time it covers, the ARF is a thin source of evidence
for the military acts of bishops and abbots. Only two instances can be noted. The first is
the death of Archbishop Hildegar of Cologne in the castle of Iburg during Pepin’s 753
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…et si ipse dux obdurato corde verbis supradicti apostolici minime oboedire voluisset, tunc
domnus Carolus rex et suus exercitus absoluti fuissent ab omni periculo peccati, et quicquid in
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1895]), a.787.76.16-23 (trans. Bernhard Walter Scholz with Barbara Rogers in Carolingian
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invasion of Saxony,20 suggesting that he may have been part of a garrison of occupation.
The other, near the end of the Annales’ time span, is the case of Abbot Helisachar, the
chancellor of Louis the Pious. He was titular command of the Spanish March campaign
of 827 though not necessarily in actual command, as he went in company with two
counts.21 Aside from these two named individuals, the authors of the ARF seemed to
have thought it unnecessary to touch on the military roles of church lords, no doubt
leaving it to their well-informed audience to read between the lines.

Nithard, Historiarum Libri IV, a.814-843
Nithard’s Four Books of History (more simply, Histories) likewise gives few
examples of fighting churchmen, but not, as in the case of the ARF, due to brevity of
style. Nithard was a lay noble, not a churchman, with actual combat experience. He
fought at Fontenoy and would die in battle against the Normans in 845, which sets him
apart from the other chroniclers. This does not seem to have affected the content in
question per se. The first book of the Historarium sums up Frankish deeds from 814 to
839, giving a perfunctory backdrop to the events that occurred during Nithard’s own
adult life. The second and third books are something of a personal testimony embedded
in a greater narrative, rich in scope and detail. This tight focus, particularly on the
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In qua expeditione Hildigarius archiepiscopus interfectus est in monte, qui dicitur Iuburg. ARF
a.753.11.8-9.
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Imperator Helisachar presbyterum et abbatem et cum eo Hildebrandum atque Donatum
comites ad motus Hispanicae marcae componendos misit. ARF a.827.172.6-9.
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month-to-month events of the years 840 through 843, perforce limits the quantity of
relevant examples to be found therein but not the quality. Nithard was a partisan of
Charles the Bald but not an uncritical mouthpiece. As the wars between the sons of
Louis the Pious dragged on, he seems to have lost his enthusiasm for recording them—he
prefaces book three by declaring himself ashamed of what he has to tell about the
Frankish people22—yet he stuck with his task for the sake of leaving an accurate record to
posterity, at least so far as it favored his sovereign’s position.23 It seems likely that he
was affected more deeply by his direct, “unfiltered” experience with battle than might
have been a churchman who led troops in the field but not shed blood in person. As one
would expect from a man born and bred to bear arms, he makes no criticism of war qua
war. (The things that offended him most deeply were breach of faith and defiance of
public authority,24 much as destruction of church property and blasphemy by pagans were
the bêtes noirs of the clerical writer.)
Nithard makes but four mentions of churchmen in a military context. When Charles
the Bald attempts to cross the Seine in March of 841, he is prevented from doing so by a
blocking force left there by Lothar that included many contingents raised from the lands
of abbots and bishops.25 Meanwhile, Lothar assigns Bishop Otgar of Mainz to help
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subjugate Louis the German, “since [he] has a mortal hatred of Louis.”26 Otgar reappears
in February of 842 to block Louis from crossing the Rhine,27 and again in March when
Louis and Charles cross the Moselle in force and drive him and his co-commanders off.28
In a text otherwise barren of such anecdotes, these three mentions by name of an
individual bishop in a four-year span demonstrate the significant contributions a church
magnate could make to Carolingian strategy and give a tantalizing glimpse into how
personal such work might have been. Otgar seems to have received his command not
necessarily based on his duty or ability, but because he hated his lord’s enemy.

Annales Bertiniani, a.830-882
The Annals of St-Bertin, as with many medieval manuscripts, was named for the
eponymous monastery that held it longest, which place had nothing to do with its writing.
It began as a semi-official chronicle of the Carolingian court penned by palace clergy,
picking up where the composition of the ARF had stalled out due to a rebellion in 829,
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In quo negotio congrue Otgarium Magontiae sedis episcopum et Adhelbertum Metensium
comitem convocat; habebat enim uterque Lodhuvicum ad mortem usque exosum. Nithard
II.7.21.2-5 (trans. Scholtz and Rogers 148).
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but did not remain so for long.29 After the battle of Fontenoy, its writing continued in the
household of Charles the Bald. From 843 to 860, the sole author seemed to have been
one Prudentius, later bishop of Troyes and an opponent of the king. Hincmar, bishop of
Reims, then took up the pen in 866. Unlike the relatively dry and anonymous writing in
the ARF, the style of the AB strongly reflects the personality and opinions of each of
these respective men. It is also a healthy source of evidence for militant churchmen. One
of the most notable passages describes the rout of Charles the Bald by Pippin II in 844.
Three church magnates are cited by name as being captured, and two killed, including
Hugh, abbot of St-Quentin and St-Bertin and an illegitimate son of Charlemagne.30 As
his epitaph would have it, he was found naked—no doubt stripped by looters—on the
field.31 Being killed in the thick of the action and then violated afterwards, however,
does not necessarily indicate that Hugh died bearing arms himself.
Prudentius give only a roster of the casualties here without offering opinions. He is,
however, more likely to show sympathy for parties in whose cause he found justice. In
one passage, he is unusually frank and explicit about the suffering of the commons during
a time of strife:
…the Breton Nominoë and Lambert… slew Rainald duke of Nantes, and took
large numbers of prisoners. So many and such great disasters followed, while
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brigands ravaged everything everywhere, that people in many areas throughout
Gaul were reduced to eating earth mixed with a little bit of flour and made into a
sort of bread. It was a crying shame—no, worse, a most execrable crime—that
there was plenty of fodder for the horses of those brigands while human beings
were short of even tiny crusts of earth-and-flour mixture.32
Prudentius also uses religious language frequently, apt to cite “the help of Our Lord Jesus
Christ” (domini nostri Iesu Christi auxilio) as the cause for victory over pagan enemies.33
He tends to call Viking and Muslim raiders “pirates” (pyratae) throughout rather than
pagans (even the “Greeks,” i.e., Byzantines, are so called), and savage, immoral behavior
is expected of them and generally reported without excitement. The one exception is
quite zealous:
The Saracens, their ships loaded down with the vast quantity of treasures they had
taken from St. Peter’s basilica, were on their way home, when during the seavoyage they blasphemed with their foul mouths against God and our Lord Jesus
Christ and his apostles. Suddenly there arose a terrible storm from which they
could not escape, their ships were dashed against each other, and all were lost.34
The depredations of foreign enemies had become a common part of the 9th century
landscape, which did not prevent Prudentius from complaining at every opportunity that
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such-and-such a band of raiders had struck and gotten away “unscathed” (inpuneque) or
“without meeting any resistance” (nullo penitus obsistente).35 However, he reserved his
most strident criticism for offenses by Christians against their own faith. During the
invasion of Aquitaine by Charles the Bald in 854, his troops “devoted all their efforts to
looting, burning and taking people captive: they did not even restrain their greed and
insolence in the case of the churches and altars of God.”36 One Bodo, a cleric who had
converted to Judeaism and settled in Muslim Cordoba, “made such… progress in evil that
he devoted himself to urging all the Christians living in Spain… that they should abandon
Christianity and convert to the insanity of the Jews or the madness of the Saracens…”37
Hincmar of Reims shared his unhappiness in both these areas; but whereas Prudentius
seems to have seen himself as something of an advocate of a long-suffering Christendom,
Hincmar wrote unapologetically from (and for) the self-serving view of the ecclesiastical
magnate. He had better contact with the court than Prudentius, but intended his words for
the gaze of his own circle, not for that of the public and certainly not for the king. He was
not above manipulating the truth to fit his agenda.38 He was certainly not reluctant to
snipe at his peers for their shortcomings, both moral and military. He found Hugh,
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Lothar’s candidate for the see of Cologne, unfit on the grounds that he had only been
ordained a subdeacon and lived more like a secular lord than a churchman.39 Another
Hugh, the abbot of St-Martin, campaigned frequently against the Vikings on the Loire, to
which Hincmar had no objection so long as he won. Success goes by without note,40 but
a failed attack is called poorly planned (incaute).41 Likewise, Bishop Roland of Arles
foolishly (inconsulte) got captured by the Saracens when he fortified in haste.42
Nothing in these passages suggests that Hincmar took issue with clerical military
service in general. There is also nothing to confirm or deny the possibility that the men
involved had borne arms in person. However, there is little doubt that if they had done so
to Hincmar’s knowledge, he would have objected strenuously. The proof lies in his entry
for 882, the final year he chronicled before his death, in which he recorded that when the
Vikings sacked Cologne and Trier, Bishop Wala of Metz was killed in action, “bearing
arms and fighting contrary to sacred authority and the episcopal office.”43 Hincmar’s
position on churchmen shedding blood could not be clearer. Of all the instances of
clerical violence found in the Annals of St-Bertin—seven mentions of bishops or tonsured
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…Hugoni… tonsura clerico et ordinatione tantummodo subdiacono, moribus autem et vita a
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…et Walam Metensem episcopum, contra sacram auctoritatem et episcopale ministerium
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abbots performing military service, two killed in action, two captured, and four connected
to some other kind of armed mayhem— this anecdote is also the only tangible evidence
to issue from either Prudentius or Hincmar for a churchman wielding a weapon in battle.

Annales Fuldensis, a.838-901
The Annals of Fulda, the roughly contemporary East Frankish counterpart to the
Annals of St-Bertin, were initially written or supervised by Rudolf, monk and scholar,
during his tenure at the eponymous monastery from 838-863. When his teacher Abbot
Raban was promoted to the see of Mainz, Rudolf followed him thence and continued to
write until his death in 865. An anonymous author or authors in the circle of Archbishop
Liutbert (863-89) took up the pen thereafter. Because Rudolf had little contact with the
court of Louis the German, a reliance entirely on his version of the reign is problematic.
It is often vague or lacking in detail and omits important events. The earlier parts of the
AF should particularly be compared with other texts (as noted above) to fill in the gaps.
Rudolf’s successor(s) were better informed and wrote about the king’s deeds in greater
depth, thanks to Liutbert’s promotion to royal archchaplain in 870.44
Even though the later authors seem to have written from the court perspective rather
than the clerical, they had less to say about Western politics than the chroniclers in the

44

Goldberg 14-15.

47

realm of Charles the Bald did about Eastern ones.45 This more regional focus46 may
explain the greater statistical concentration of fighting churchmen to be found in its
pages: fourteen mentions of bishops or tonsured abbots doing military service, three
deaths in open battle, and one death in a defensive action. The 870s were notable for
regular campaigns against the Slavs and the 880s for clashes with the invading Norse.
Certain bishops’ names appear again and again in the reports of fighting, bearing out
Reuter’s assertion that the participation of churchmen in combat was a regular East
Frankish practice.47 The first to be mentioned in this context is Bishop Arn of Würzburg,
who was involved in a border action against the Bohemians in 871. The king sent forces
against the Moravians and Bohemians in 872. Several clerical leaders are mentioned:
Archbishop Liutbert [of Mainz] was the leader in that [Bohemian] expedition.
Those who were sent to assist Carloman, however, Bishop Arn and Sigihart,
abbot of the monastery of Fulda, although they fought bravely and pushed the
enemy hard, returned with great difficulty after losing many of their men. But
while Carloman spread fire and slaughter among the Moravians, Zwentibald sent
a large army in secret against the Bavarians who had been left to guard the ships
on the bank of the Danube, and overran them… No one escaped from there except
for Embricho, bishop of Regensburg, with a few men.48
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The reader should be wary of interpreting an apparent tilt in East Frankish statistics as a
signifier of any sort of political intent on the part of the players. Louis “the German” was a
traditional Carolingian king with a greater Carolingian viewpoint, and there is no evidence that he
ever meant to found a separate kingdom east of the Rhine with different customs and attitudes,
clerical or otherwise (Goldberg 6-7).
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Bishop Arn is also noted for repelling Norse raiders in Saxony in 884. Although the
chronicler thanks God for the Christian victory, he also leaves the pagan enemy a
sidelong compliment: “It is said that Northmen of a beauty and size of body never seen
among the Frankish people were killed in this battle.”49 In the same year, “The
Northmen fought the Frisians in a place called Norden and were defeated and many of
them killed. There is a letter about this battle, which Rimbert, bishop of the same place,
sent to Archbishop Liutbert of Mainz, which runs as follows…”50 Apparently the
Carolingian bishop could include the title of war correspondent amongst his jobs (the
letter in question, unfortunately, does not appear in the text or anywhere else.)51
Archbishop Liutbert fought the Slavs in 872 and 874 and the Norse in 883 and 885, yet
his epitaph of 889 makes no reference to his military prowess. “It would be a long story
to relate how upright his manner of living was,”52 says the chronicler, seemingly
implying that his deeds in battle were both praiseworthy and so commonplace as to go
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without saying. The text also mentions that a Bavarian army sent to repulse the Avars in
900 included only one bishop, showing that this was an exception to the rule (Reuter
notes that three such were killed at the battle of Preßburg in 907).53
The AF also reports the death in battle of the aggressive Bishop Wala of Metz, but
states only that he “came against [the Norse] rashly with a small army and was killed.”54
The death of Sunderolt, Liutbert’s successor to Mainz, is cited in nearly identical terms.
“[And] in his place,” says the chronicler smugly, “Hatto, abbot of the Reichenau, a man
of subtle mind, was made archbishop.”55 If either of these men had violated the tenets of
their office by bearing arms, which offense had so rankled Hincmar, the anonymous
author(s) of the later AF pay it no mind, seeming rather more annoyed by their failures of
tactical judgment. In the same entry as the defeat of Sunderolt, the Mainz chronicler
points out that Bishop Embricho of Regensburg, “patient, sober, humble and faithful,
died happily of old age.”56 The fact that his advanced age is mentioned suggests that he
is an unusual case.
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Regino of Prüm, Chronicon, a.1-906
Regino, Abbot of Prüm, was the last great historian of the Carolingian Empire. His
Chronicle, which he dedicated to Bishop Adalbero of Augsburg in 908, is the fourth and
final of the major narrative sources for the latter half of the ninth century. No East
Frankish chronicler would pick up the pen again for several decades.57 It is also perhaps
the most readable, engaging and lively work of the group, for Regino was both a talented
writer and a sharp observer of political and military currents with a surprising
appreciation for the nuts-and-bolts details of war (or perhaps, for an East Frankish
churchman, not so surprising). He was not, of course, an objective historian in the
modern sense. Like his colleagues of the scholarly elite, he saw history not as a neutral
scholarly discipline but a means of political argument.58 He was a war reporter with an
agenda and battles to him were parables, means to teach moral lessons that showed how
war and politics reflected sin and divine favor.59
As was Nithard, Regino was less concerned with the details of past Frankish history
than with the events of his own lifetime. Book I of the Chronicon “[reduced] the
Frankish conquests to terse stories of triumph” up through the death of Charles Martel.60
He then duplicated the text of the ARF through the death of Charlemagne in 814 and paid
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short shrift to the reign of Louis the Pious due to what he claimed is a dearth of worthy
material.61 His writing came into its own with the wars between Louis’s heirs.
The ecclesiastical body count includes Wala of Metz in 882, of whose action Regino
gives slightly better detail than either Hincmar of Reims or the chronicler of Fulda:
“[The Northmen]… led their host to Metz. When the bishop of the same town
learned about this he got together with [arch]Bishop Bertulf [of Trier] and Count
Adalhard [of Metz], and, taking the initiative, advanced to engage the enemy.
Battle was joined and the Northmen were the victors. The same bishop Wala died
in the battle, and the rest fled.”62
Simon Maclean suggests that Regino meant Wala’s “initiative” as a criticism. If so, he
fell defending his own civitas and shared responsibility for the defeat with his two cocommanders, which neither the Annales Bertiniani nor the Annales Fuldensis mention.
It was not, of course, necessary to lead a bold counterattack in order to hold out
against a besieging enemy. Bishop Gauzlin of Paris, whom the Mainz author of the AF
names one of the leading generals of France (duces praecipui Galliae regionis),63 “…had
defended the city with all his strength against the unremitting assault of the Northmen. In
those days [887], during the oppressions of that very siege, the said bishop Gauzlin
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Et de Ludowici quidem imperatoris temporibus perpauca litteris comprehendi, quia nec scripta
repperi, nec a senioribus, quae digna essent memoriae commendanda, audivi… Regino of Prüm
Chronicon, ed. F. Kurze (MGH SSrG 50 [Hannover, 1890]), a.813.73.7-10.
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Nortmanni victores extiterunt. Isdem Wala episcopus in prelio cecidit, ceteri fugerunt. Regino
a.882.119.12-18 (trans. Maclean 186).
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departed from the world…”64 (Since no direct violence is mentioned, one may assume he
died of natural causes, though it seems plausible that the stress of the siege may have
played a part.) Following a detailed acount of the Norse invasion of Lotharingia in 891,
the Chronicon records the death of Archbishop Sunzo (Sunderolt). Where the AF calls
him incaute, “rash,” Regino seems to belittle him for not being bold enough: “As the
fighting got worse the army of the Christians (oh the shame of it!) committed a sin and
retreated. In this battle [arch]Bishop Sunzo [Sunderolt] and Count Arnulf were
killed…”65 He attached no shame to the death of Arn, ecclesiae venerabilis of Würzburg,
who apparently did not let age slow him down; he died in battle against the Slavs in 892
after having held the bishopric for thirty-seven years.66 The only prelate whom Regino
seems to have blamed for rashness was Abbot Ebolus of St-Denis: “While [he] was
storming a certain fortress in Aquitaine too eagerly, he died from a blow by a rock.”67
Regino stands apart from the previous chroniclers by providing details of other types
of clerical violence, with his opinion varying by circumstance. He seems to approve
what amounts to a homicide when he (mistakenly) credits the death of Nominoë,
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…Gozlino eiusdem urbis episcopo contra Nortmannorum assiduam inpugnationem civitatem
totis viribus tuebatur. His etiam diebus predictus Gozlinus episcopus inter ipsas obsidionum
pressuras migravit a seculo… Regino a.887.126.24-127.3 (195).
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…et ingravato prelio christianorum exercitus peccatis facientibus, heu pro dolor! terga vertit.
In quo prelio episcopus Mogontiacae urbus Sunzo et Arnulfus comes occubuerunt… Regino
a.891.137.15-17 (210-11)
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Ebulo abba de sancto Dionisio, cum quoddam castrum in Aquitania situm ardentius
expugnaret, ictu lapidis periit. Regino a.893.141.12-13 (216).
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rebellious duke of Brittany, to Bishop Maurilio of Angers, who accosted him as he
mounted his horse: “‘Desist immediately, cruel bandit, from devastating the churches of
God.’ As he was saying these things he raised the staff he was carrying in his hand and
struck Nominoë on the head.”68 However, he is quick to condemn the bloodshed
resulting from the so-called Babenberger feud (897-903) between Bishop Rudolf of
Würzburg and rival nobles, “a great dispute of discords and implacable controversy of
hatreds [that] arose, from the smallest and most trivial matter.”69 He likewise seems to
blame the demise of Archbishop Fulk of Reims during another feud in 903 on his own
temper.70
All in all, Regino includes eight instances of churchmen providing military service,
four of participation in battle, four deaths in offensive actions and one in a defensive one,
and an impressive eleven mentions of bishops or abbots connected to other forms of
violence. As in the Annals of Fulda, the Chronicon seems to take the East Frankish
perspective that churchmen in battle were quite common, but Regino never explicitly
refers to any of them bearing arms.
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‘Desine iam, crudelis predo, ecclesias Dei devastare.’ His dictis baculum, quem manu
gestabat, elevans eum in capite percussit… Regino a.862.80.6-8 (138).
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SUMMARY
Hanging the surviving narrative sources for the Carolingian Empire together as a
“body of work” is risky. Their differences are as marked as their similarities. The Royal
Frankish Annals were a court chronicle approved by and biased without question towards
the monarch and written anonymously. The Annals of St-Bertin began in this form and
then evolved into two successive works (and they really should be understood separately)
by the hands of two different bishops who both ended their careers writing for themselves
and not a king. Nithard’s Histories stands out from the pack as the personal testimony of
a lay noble who lived a different set of experiences and priorities than most clerical
authors. The Annals of Fulda began in isolation from the East Frankish court under
Rudolf and then moved closer to the court circle without becoming an “official”
chronicle. Its later authors seem to have been writing from an East Frankish perspective
that was beginning to grow apart from that of the West. Regino’s Chronicle, again
providing an East Frankish view, was composed in the orbit not of a royal court but a
powerful bishopric. The content of each of these was influenced by the authors’ location
and political affiliation as well as his social station and personal biases. They duplicate
between them many of the historical facts, but their interpretation and commentary are
rarely in full agreement.
Yet all these men were writing to a certain extent out of a common “rule book”
regarding warfare in general, the relationship of the Carolingian church to its practice,
and the expectations and duties of the powerful church lords who contributed to the
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king’s forces. None of the writers exhibit anything that could be called pacifistic
tendencies. There is no question in their minds but that war is a necessary part of an
orderly Christian world when fought for a just cause in the Augustinian sense. Under the
aegis of righteousness, war was prosecuted free of modern moral constraints on targeting
noncombatants. Economic war waged against people and property was the norm and
variations on the phrase that so-and-so “devastated [his enemy’s territory] with fire and
sword” appear frequently in the manuscripts. Sympathy for the civilian victims of such
action is practically nonexistent. The authors’ ire is reserved for lords who commit acts
of violence without a just cause, but not necessarily for the effects thereof.
The Carolingian sources present considerable evidence that bishops and abbots took
part in military matters, but almost none that they fought in person. Saint Boniface
pushed to keep them out of the army altogether and Charles Martel and his sons did their
best to oblige him. Charlemagne made no great effort to enforce such rules because he
depended too much on the troops of land-holding prelates. Thus it became common
during his reign and beyond for church lords to serve as military leaders. Carolingian
writers accepted this as the norm, voicing criticism only when they performed their duties
poorly. In the five texts analyzed above, there is only a single passage alleging that a
cleric actually bore arms and fought, for which the author condemns him.71 The most
likely conclusion is that such action in the Carolingian period was a rarity.
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Hincmar of Reims, reporting the death of Bishop Wala of Metz in 882; see fn 43.
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PART II
CHURCHMEN AT WAR UNDER THE OTTONIANS
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6. THE LAST CAROLINGIANS AND THE FIRST SAXONS
The following three chapters summarize the reigns of the Saxon-Ottonian kings and
present an analysis of the so-called Reichskirchensystem in theory and reality. While the
Saxon kings are not strictly speaking the subjects of the present study, the churchmen
who are did not operate in a vacuum. The bishops and abbots of the German empire
lived in an inextricable relationship with their rulers and their actions in war cannot be
fully appreciated outside of this context. The précis of a century of rule that is presented
here is necessarily abridged—perhaps in places oversimplified—but necessary as a
background to the analysis of the Ottonian source documents.
As we have seen, the eighth-century Frankish realm grew to maturity, as it were, on a
steady diet of warfare with the various enemies on her frontiers. Once the empire was
partitioned into three kingdoms for the sons of Louis the Pious, the Frankish military elite
increasingly made war upon each other. Internecine conflict among the grandsons and
great-grandsons of Charlemagne continued unabated through the second half of the ninth
century. The rulers of West and East Francia vied for control of the middle kingdom of
Lotharingia—which would be much fought over thereafter1— and contended for the

1

Lotharingia (“Lothar’s Kingdom”) corresponded roughly to modern Lorraine, the Low
Countries, and parts of the German Rhineland. While an artificial creation of the political
settlement of the ninth century and not (as the other four duchies were) identified with an ancient
people, it was still vital as a source of wealth and a geographic buffer with West Francia. It also
contained Aachen, the site of Charlemagne’s coronation and the Carolingians’ equivalent to a
capitol, giving it great symbolic value. Every effort of the ninth and tenth centuries to recreate
Charlemagne’s empire began with an attempt to secure it. Helmut Beumann, “Das Kaisertum
Ottos des Grossen: ein Rückblick nach Tausend Jahren,” Wissenschaft vom Mittelalter:
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Imperial title. However, after the deposition of the emperor Charles III “the Fat” by his
own vassals in 887, the territories of the once-mighty Carolingian empire were never
again to be united under a single monarch; “After [Charles’s] death the kingdoms which
had obeyed his authority… dissolved into separate parts and, without waiting for their
natural lord, each decided to create a king from its own guts.”2 Of these new kings of
West Francia, Burgundy, and Italy, only one (Berengar of Friuli) was of Carolingian
blood. The nobles of East Francia chose Count Arnulf of Carinthia, the illegitimate
grandson of Louis the German, to succeed Charles; but if their hope was to see the
empire restored, it was not realized. Even though Arnulf managed to have himself
crowned emperor in 896 by Pope Formosus, in rivalry to Berengar and in the face of
Roman hostility, the title proved hollow as his authority in Italy seems to have evaporated
as soon as he returned to Germany.3 Arnulf’s hapless minor heir, Louis III “the Child”,
contended ineffectually with civil war, aristocratic feuds, and the first wave of incursions
by the fierce nomadic Magyars (Hungarians). He died shortly after reaching his majority

Ausgewählte Aufsätze (Vienna, 1972), 411-58 (in Henry Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos in
Early Ottonian Germany: The View From Cologne [London: Oxford University Press, 2007],23).
2

Post cuius mortem regna, que eius ditioni paruerant, veluti legitimo destituta herede, in partes a
sua compage resolvuntur et iam non naturalem dominum prestolantur, sed unumquodque de suis
visceribus regem sibi creari disponit. Regino Chronicon II a.888.129.12-16; trans. Simon
MacLean, in History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: The Chronicle of
Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg (New York: Manchester University Press, 2009),
199.

3

Rosamond McKitterick, ed., The Early Middle Ages: Europe 400-1000, in The Short Oxford
History of Europe, gen. ed. T.C.W. Blanning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 273.
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in 911, the last East Frankish king of the Carolingian line.4 Once again, the nobles
looked amongst themselves for a strong leader and elected Duke Conrad of Franconia.
Conrad I inherited the Magyar problem as well as a defiant and often hostile aristocracy.
Chief amongst his adversaries was Henry, the powerful Liudolfinger duke of Saxony,
who rebelled outright in 915 and was more than a match for the forces the king sent
against him.5 Conrad had no heirs. He realized on his deathbed that the qualities and
resources that made Henry such a thorn in his side also made him the best hope for East
Frankish security, and so ordered the royal insignia sent to him.6

Henry I (r. 919-936)
Henry I, first of the dynasty known to history as the Ottonians (named for his first
three successors), was duly elected by the leading magnates of East Francia in keeping
with tradition. He was the only king of the Saxon line not to be crowned emperor and is
said to have declined holy unction at his coronation as a signal to his nobles that he
would not set himself above them, but rather be first among equals. This was certainly
reflected in the first several years of his reign as he convinced some of the more reluctant

4

MacLean, intro. to History and Politics 53.

5

Bernard S. Bachrach and David Bachrach, “Saxon Military Revolution, 912-973?: Myth and
Reality” (Early Medieval Europe 15, No. 2 [2007]), 200.
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Widukind of Corvey Res gestae Saxonicae, ed. Ekkehart Rotter and Bernd Schneidmüller
(Stuttgart: Phillipp Reclam jun. GmbH & Co., 2006), I.25.67-68. Also Adalbert of Magdeburg
Continuatione Treverensi, ed. F. Kurze (MGH SSrG vol. 50 [Hannover, 1890]) a.919.156.
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dukes to aknowledge him, establishing bonds of amicitia, formal friendship, with all who
submitted to his authority.7 He enhanced his legitimacy by befriending foreign rulers in
the same way and by securing a royal bride—Edgitha (or Edith), sister of Aethelstan of
Wessex—for his son Otto in 930.8 The possession of holy relics was also important to
the prestige of the kingdom and the royal house.9 Henry acquired the Holy Lance (hasta
sancta) from Rudolph II of Burgundy, though the sources differ as to whether it was by
gift or purchase. This was said to have been owned by Constantine the Great and to
incorporate nails from the crucifixion in its head,10 and was also associated with the spear
of Longinus, the Roman soldier who pierced the side of Christ.11 It was to become the
centerpiece of the Ottonian regalia and the main religious symbol of their authority.12
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While Henry I had considerable military resources at his disposal as duke of Saxony,
even more so as king,13 the defense of the East Frankish frontiers during his reign were
generally local duties handled by the powerful marcher lords and great royal armies saw
the field less frequently than they had under the Carolingians.14 The dukedoms accepted
Henry’s authority, and though his effective personal rule seems to have been limited to
Saxony and Franconia,15 he was able to coordinate an effective defense of the East
Frankish realm against the Magyar threat and has been credited with reacting to their
incursions more effectively than many of his fellow rulers in the West.16 Although the
Magyars defeated Saxon armies in 919 and 924, Henry was able to negotiate a nine-year
truce with them in 926 that bought time for him to reorganize and strengthen his forces.
One theory holds that he reformed the rather backward Saxon military by building a
large, professional body of armored cavalry, a view that has been accepted largely thanks
to the influential work of Karl Leyser first published in the late 1960’s17 and reiterated
more recently by Timothy Reuter.18 Bernard and David Bachrach, by contrast, have
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sought to demonstrate not only that the development of the “knight” in Saxony probably
kept pace with the rest of the Frankish domains following its conquest by Charlemagne,
but that Henry’s so-called military revolution centered rather on the building of frontier
fortifications and in pioneering the organization and training of agrarii milites, i.e., local
militia, per the account of Widukind of Corvey.19 This debate notwithstanding, Henry
used the interval to deal with other threats, defeating the Danes and re-establishing Saxon
domination over the Bohemians and Slavs. He seems to have felt confident enough in
932 to withhold tribute from the Magyars and then won a famous (but not permanent)
victory over them at the battle of Riade in 933.20 Whether fought by professional
mounted men-at-arms or a general levy, war under Henry and his heirs generally fell into
three categories: defense against invasion, campaigns to punish foreign enemies or to
enforce imperial rule in subordinate territory, and the suppression of internal rebellion.
(Aristocratic feuds, which might involve the king only peripherally, made up a smaller
fourth category.)
Otto I (r. 936-973)
In addition to his foreign enemies, King Otto I “the Great” seems to have had more
than his share of rebellion and civil war to deal with during the first two decades of his

19
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impressive thirty-seven year reign. The root cause was discontent over the division of
power, or lack thereof, amongst his family members. His reign has been seen as a
transition period from the Merovingian-Carolingian way of partible inheritance to the
newer principle of an indivisible kingdom, though this came about through circumstance
as much as intent. For the next several reigns, only one of the king’s sons survived to
inherit the crown, or else there was no direct male heir at all. Yet the start of a reign was
always a difficult time and there were multiple factors at work in Otto’s case. His
autocratic style was one. He was crowned with holy unction and full Frankish rites
where his father had not been, setting himself above the other nobles of the kingdom in
contrast to Henry’s cooperative, first-among-equals approach. Otto was also younger
than his leading magnates and had not yet won the respect his father had commanded.
The tributary Slavs and Bohemians whom Henry had subdued sensed Otto’s weak
position and became rebellious, the raids of the Magyars were an ongoing problem, and a
complicated situation of feuds within the duchies fed revolts against royal authority.21
From 937 to 941, Otto weathered a series of internal crises. Bavaria rebelled and was
brought to heel in 938. Otto’s half-brother Thangmar led the Saxons in rebellion in the
same year but was killed in battle. Another revolt in 939 centered on Otto’s brother
Henry with support from the dukes of Franconia and Lotharingia. It spread to include
King Louis IV of West Francia (who supported the rebels) and his rival Dux Hugh the
Great (who took Otto’s part), each hoping to make gains in Lotharingia. Otto narrowly
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defeated his opponents. Henry then joined Saxon nobles in a conspiracy of 940-41 to
assassinate the king. Otto uncovered the plot and was later reconciled with his brother.22
The king’s main military operation in the 940’s was his intervention in West Francia
in 946 to support King Louis, with whom he had now sworn friendship.23 The decade
also saw him achieve a measure of security within his own kingdom by subordinating the
duchies to his family. He married off his daughter Liutgard to Conrad “the Red,” count
of Franconia, whom he had appointed duke of Lotharingia in 944. He made his brother
Henry duke of Bavaria in 947, and his son Liudolf duke of Swabia in 949; each sealed his
legitimacy by marrying the daughter of his predecessor.24 Otto himself made a similar
move in 951 when he answered an appeal from Adelheid, widow of King Lothar of Italy,
to help her against the usurper Berengar II of Ivrea. Otto came south with an army and
temporarily ousted Berengar, married Adelheid, and was recognized by the assembled
magnates as king of Italy through his wife. He did not stay to enforce his position but
returned with much of his host to Germany, leaving his son-in-law Conrad to make terms
with Berengar (who remained de facto king but accepted Otto as his overlord).25
In 953, Otto faced a fresh rebellion, this one led by Liudolf, who felt his status as heir
apparent threatened by his father’s new marriage, along with Conrad of Lotharingia, who
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Ibid. 169-70. Otto’s first wife, Edgitha, had died in 946.

65

resented the king for overriding the settlement he had made in Italy. Both seemed to
have directed their hostility not at the king but at Henry of Bavaria, whose growing
influence with Otto and Adelheid troubled them. Discontented magnates in Bavaria and
Saxony added their feuding agendas to the rebels’ cause. Otto and Henry were hardpressed and left with few allies.26 As fortune would have it, the archbishopric of
Cologne—the preeminent and most strategically located see in Lotharingia—came vacant
in 953 and Otto was able to advance his younger brother Brun (or Bruno) to the office,
giving him a powerful asset in the duchy. Conrad drew back from battle with Brun’s
troops, unwilling to challenge Otto so directly.27 The sources accuse Liudolf and Conrad
of allying themselves with the Magyars, and worse, of inviting them to invade via
Bavaria in 954 to increase Otto’s problems.28 This emergency seems to have led the
magnates of the Reich to set aside their differences and close ranks and the rebellion lost
its momentum. Conrad submitted in June, and Liudolf, after Otto and Henry gained the
upper hand in Bavaria, followed suit later in the year.29 The king’s son and son-in-law
were stripped of their duchies and temporarily exiled but received no harsher punishment
than this following their “official” reconciliation. Otto then made the controversial move
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of making his brother, Archbisop Brun, duke of Lotharingia in Conrad’s place, giving
him unprecedented authority to match his dual title.30
With the last major internal crisis of his reign settled, Otto was able to focus his
attention on the challenges from foreign enemies. The Magyars invaded Bavaria again in
the summer of 955, hoping to exploit the disorder left after the civil war. Contrary to
their custom, their intent this time seems to have been not to raid and run, but rather to
force a decisive battle in what may have been something of a last attempt to vindicate
their former power.31 Otto responded by fielding an army drawn not from his home
territory (the Saxons were tied down by a Slav offensive) but from other parts of his
kingdom, demonstrating that he still held full authority.32 On the 10th of August 955,
Otto’s forces met the Magyars at the River Lech near Augsburg in Swabia and routed
them thoroughly, inflicting heavy casualties.33 Of the family members who had formerly
opposed him, only Conrad the Red was able to fight alongside him. Conrad fell to a
Magyar arrow after redeeming his past offenses through a day of heroism.34 The battle
has gone down in history as having ended the Magyar threat to the West, though this
seems more a symbolic terminal point to a process that had already become a fait
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accompli.35 A Saxon force was overcome by the Obodrite Slavs at about the same time,
but Otto led a punitive campaign in October and defeated them at the Recknitz river.36
These victories by no means freed the Reich of enemies on her eastern frontier, but the
elimination of the Magyars as an effective power paved the way for Saxon domination
over the Slavs, Poles, and Danes for the rest of Otto’s reign.37 In Italy, meanwhile,
Berengar II ruled tyrannically with little regard for his distant German overlord. (An
expedition led by Liudolf in 956-7 does not seem to have resulted in anything but the
prince’s death.)38 Pope John XII felt his secular power threatened and in 960 appealed to
Otto to press his own claim by marriage to the Italian crown. Otto made sure his army
was adequate to the full task of conquest this time and had his young son by Adelheid,
Otto II, acknowledged and crowned as his successor before leaving.39 He was himself
crowned “Emperor of the Romans” by the pope on February 2, 962, in a conscious
imitation of the coronation of Charles the Great. This was signified by the Ottonianum,
an especially ornate document drawn up for the occasion confirming the papacy’s rights
in Italy and based on the same pact made between Charles and Pope Hadrian.40 Berengar
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was captured and sent into exile. John XII regretted the degree of control the emperor
had gained over the papacy and repudiated their arrangements. Otto drove him from
Rome, had him deposed by a synod in 963 and pushed through his own candidate as Leo
VIII. St. Peter’s throne changed hands twice more over the next year: the Romans staged
a revolt inspired by John XII and after his death elected Benedict V, who was in turn
removed by the emperor and replaced by John XIII. With “his” pope securely in place,
Otto went back over the Alps in 964.41 A century of German influence over papal
politics was thus initiated.42
For his third Italian expedition, launched in 966, Otto had his sights set on the rest of
the peninsula south of Rome. Control over the old Lombard principalities of Capua,
Salerno, and Benevento was a matter of both prestige and policy for the German
emperors, as this was where their territory met that of Byzantium. Otto wanted not only
to strengthen his frontier against any possible Byzantine expansion (and also to guard
against the threat from the Muslim emirate of Sicily), but also to gain Byzantine
recognition for his own imperial status.43 He brought young Otto II to be crowned coemperor by Pope John XIII in 967. The following year he sent Bishop Liudprand of
Cremona on an embassy to Constantinople to seek a political settlement and a marriage
between his heir and a Byzantine princess. The eastern emperors considered themselves
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the true heirs to the Roman Empire and resented the upstart German kings and their
pretensions to the purple.44 Liudprand was rebuffed by Emperor Nicephorus I Phocas
and had to return empty-handed.45 After Nicephorus was deposed in 969, his successor
John I Tzimisces was more amenable. The Princess whom he sent, Theophanu—
probably his niece (though her identity has always been in question)—married Otto II in
972 and went on to play an important role in Ottonian government afterwards.
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7. OTTO II, OTTO III, AND HENRY II
Otto II (r. 973-983)
Otto II succeeded his father in 973. Posterity has seen him, perhaps unfairly, as the
least accomplished of his dynasty, known best for the military disasters that marked his
last two years. To give him his due, there were enemies aplenty at home and abroad
waiting for the arrival of a new king as they had in his father’s case,1 and he responded
competently to these initial crises. The first challenge came from his cousin Duke Henry
“the Quarrelsome” of Bavaria. Henry expected and failed to receive control of Swabia
and rebelled in 974 in alliance with the dukes of Bohemia and Poland. He was defeated,
deprived of his duchy and imprisoned, only to take part in a second uprising in 977,
which resulted in his banishment. In 978, King Lothar of West Francia opened hostilities
over the old claim to Lotharingia, among other things, and peace could not be made with
him until 980. Yet the empire was now stable enough that none of these clashes carried
the same danger as the family-based insurgencies that had been directed against Otto I.2
With domestic security in hand, Otto II turned to Italy to pick up where his father had
left off. He launched his first expedition in 980 with the intent of incorporating all of the
peninsula south of Rome into his empire, shutting out Byzantine influence altogether and
neutralizing the threat from the Sicilian emirate. The emperor’s ambitions came to grief
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on the coast of Calabria in July of 982, where his army was badly mauled by an Arab
force and several leading noblemen were killed. Otto himself only avoided capture by the
skin of his teeth, riding out into the sea to hail a passing Byzantine ship.3 As their emir
had been killed, the Muslims retired to Sicily and did not press their advantage.4
In May of 983, an assembly of German and North Italian magnates met in Verona,
where they agreed both to send the Emperor reinforcements and to recognize his infant
namesake son as his co-king and heir. In the meantime, the Danes attacked on the
empire’s northern border. At the end of June, a confederation of Slav tribes known as the
Liutizi rose up against German hegemony in the east. The newer bishoprics that had
been established in the 960’s as a missionary presence were overrun, their fortresses and
cities reduced to smoking ruins.5 The Slavs were beaten back but the Saxons lost nearly
all the territorial gains they had made over the previous fifty years.6 Whether or not the
news had reached him, Otto II remained in Italy, committed to renewing his enterprise,
but died of malaria in December of 983. His successors were unable to build much upon
his efforts and southern Italy remained contested until the end of the twelfth century.7
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Otto III (r. 983-1002)
The third Otto, at the tender age of four, was obviously unable to respond to the
opening crisis of his reign. During Easter of 984, Henry the Quarrelsome of Bavaria took
custody of the boy and claimed the throne for himself by right of being his father’s first
cousin and so his closest male relative. The German nobility was divided between his
supporters and those who remained loyal to the child.8 The Empresses Theophanu and
Adelheid, respectively Otto’s mother and grandmother, returned from Italy and
negotiated a settlement with the help of Archbishop Willigis of Mainz, regaining
guardianship of the child king in June without violence. With the consent of the
nobility,9 Theophanu served with distinction as regent of the empire during most of her
son’s minority—probably following the Byzantine precedent with which she was
familiar10—and sometimes even assumed the fiction of a male persona by issuing
documents signed Theophanius gratia divina imperator augustus.11 When she died in
991, the king’s grandmother Adelheid took the reins and held them until 994, when Otto
was considered old enough to rule on his own.
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Warfare on the “national” scale did not dominate events during Otto III’s lifetime
nearly so much as it had during the reigns of the other kings of the Saxon line. In 990,
Empress Theophanu supported Duke Mieszko of Poland in a war against Bohemia.12 The
the young king probably learned military leadership at her side.13 Otto had both the
Bohemians and the Poles as his allies when he launched a raid against the Elbe Slavs in
995.14 Although hostility with the Slavic peoples continued, Germany seemed to have
maintained a peaceful balance of power with her more “civilized” eastern neighbors
during this period and their interactions consisted mostly of diplomatic and ecclesiastical
maneuvering.15 Otto III, educated, enthusiastic and pious, is best known to history for his
ambitions of renovatio imperii Romanorum, a restoration of the glories of the Christian
Roman Empire, which he attempted to accomplish by shifting the German Empire’s
focus from military to ideological expansion.16 There was a tendency in nineteenth- and
twentieth-century German historiography to accuse Otto of being being more “Greek”
(i.e., Byzantine) than German and to question the political coherence of his program,
though the historians who passed such judgements were themselves influenced by
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contemporary politics and nationalist pride.17 In any event, Otto spent more time in Italy
trying to realize his plans than he did ruling in Germany, to the exasperation of many of
his nobles. His first Italian expedition occurred in 996, during which he made the
unprecedented move of naming his chancellor and cousin Bruno of Carinthia as the first
German pope,18 angering the Roman nobility by defying the custom that gave the
German emperor the right to consent to a candidate but not to impose one.19 Indeed, Otto
was not even the emperor yet. He was crowned by “his” new pope Gregory V and then
departed. His policy of renovatio had not yet surfaced, although the teenaged king did
have his first encounter in Rome with the tenth-century polymath Gerbert of Aurillac,
then archbishop-in-exile of Reims and the future Pope Sylvester II, who would come to
have tremendous influence on him.20
Otto mounted a campaign out of Saxony against the Liutizi early in 997. Gerbert, who
had accepted the emperor’s invitation to become his personal advisor and tutor, was
probably there. He was certainly part of Otto’s travelling court when he went to the
rescue of Gregory V later in the year. The German pope did not hold onto power long
without the imperial presence to back him up. He was driven out after only a few months
in office by the Roman prefect Crescentius, who set up Johannes Philagathos, Archbishop
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of Piacenza, as the antipope John XVI in his place. The expedition that Otto III
undertook at the end of 997 demonstrated the emperor’s capacity for violence. The
frightened citizens of Rome allowed his army into the city without resistance.
Crescentius was besieged in the Castel Sant’Angelo, and when it fell, he was denied
clemency and executed, his body hung on public display. Philagathos was dragged from
his hiding place, blinded, and mutilated, an action that Otto himself almost certainly
approved. He was then deposed by formal synod and paraded in humiliating fashion on
donkey-back around Rome. He was only saved from death by the intervention of the
hermit Saint Nilus.21 To many modern historians, and even some contemporaries, this
was an act of unusual brutality and vengeance on Otto’s part. However, Crescentius had
already been involved in one attempt to usurp power in Rome and had been pardoned by
Otto and Gregory V after the imperial coronation in 996. Thus, this second offense was
unforgiveable by contemporary mores and meant that both the prefect and his antipope
deserved only the punishment meted out to heretics and apostates.22
The emperor advanced Gerbert to the papacy in 999. His choice of the name
Sylvester II was no doubt meant to evoke the first pope of that name, who had partnered
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with Constantine the Great.23 Together they granted ecclesiastical independence to
Poland, which may or may not have been the first deliberate move of their program of
renovatio.24 Otto made a pilgrimage to Gniezno at the end of the year to the grave of one
of his idols, the martyred missionary-bishop Saint Adalbert of Prague, and also oversaw
the creation of a new Polish archdiocese answerable to Duke Boleslav Chrobry. The
emperor presided at a ceremony raising Boleslav from the status of tributary to ally, but
the sources conflict as to how much autonomy he had been granted.25 Boleslav would
clash repeatedly with Henry II over this and other matters, so it seems as though Otto’s
efforts in this case towards a peaceful expansion of the neo-Roman sphere led indirectly
to future war. Otto III also oversaw the elevation of Hungary in 1001 to a Christian
kingdom with its first archbishopric,26 but its subordinate relationship with the German
empire seems to have remained amicable until about 1030.
The emperor left on his third and final Italian expedition in June of 1000, conducting
several items of governmental business on the way. Once he had settled into Rome
again, Otto III received a visit in the person of Bishop Bernward of Hildesheim, who had
come to plead for justice in his dispute with Archbisop Willigis of Mainz over the
convent at Gandersheim (described at length in chapter 13). The emperor and Pope
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Sylvester II convened a synod to hear Bernward’s case, which was decided in his favor,
but Willigis defied the papal ruling and held synods of his own. Bernward’s biographer
Francis Tschan believes this disregard for Otto’s authority shows how disconnected Otto
III had become from events in Germany.27 Gerd Althoff, on the other hand, argues that
Otto’s hands were tied by a complex legal situation about which he could do little.28
Before he returned home, Bishop Bernward was present for the emperor’s last two
military actions, which were recorded in his Vita. The city of Tivoli rebelled against Otto
in early 1001 and the emperor laid siege to it. With Bernward and Pope Sylvester as
negotiators, the citizens performed a ritual public submission and avoided further
bloodshed.29 Shortly after this, there was some form of uprising against the emperor by
the Romans. This may have been a violent response to Otto’s apparent intention to
subjugate papal indepence to imperial rule.30 The sources, however, disagree as to the
seriousness of the violence. It may have been a genuine revolt or simply a scuffle that got
out of control, typical of what happened whenever the “German army” was imposed on
the city.31 Otto and his entourage were trapped inside the imperial palace. They gathered
their resolve, armed themselves, and sallied out in force the next morning led by Bishop
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Bernward bearing the Holy Lance. The would-be rebels were cowed and sued for peace,
apparently without further violence.32 Otto made an impassioned speech from the castle
balcony berating his subjects for turning on him and then departed Rome for Ravenna.
He sent to Germany for new military levies, but also spent the balance of 1001
conducting the usual political and ecclesiastical business for both Italy and the empire’s
eastern domains. If the emperor intended revenge on the Romans, he does not seem to
have been in a hurry.33 The troop contingents of his church magnates began arriving late
in the year, but Otto was sick from a fever by this time and was unable to undertake any
action. He died in January 1002.

Henry II (r. 1002-1024)
Otto III died unmarried and childless and had made no provisions for the sucession.
His cousin Duke Henry of Bavaria, son of the late Henry the Quarrelsome, was one of
three claimants to the throne. Otto’s men escorted his body across the Alps from Italy
and towards Aachen, city of Charlemagne, where the late emperor had wished to be
buried. Duke Henry met the funeral procession in Bavaria and took charge of the corpse
and the royal insignia (the crown and Holy Lance), then outmaneuvered his rivals over
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the next several months and secured the support of enough of the kingdom’s leading
noblemen to be elected king peacefully in June.
Henry II was as pious in his way as his predecessor had been, but piety to him did not
consist of being “otherworldy and unrealistic.”34 On the surface, his accession saw the
end of Otto III’s rhetoric of renovatio and a return to traditional Saxon kingship, though
this would change later. Henry’s seal from 1003 onward was not inscribed renovatio
imperii Romanorum, but renovatio regni Francorum, reflecting an indebtedness to the
Carolingian past. He could not, in any case, properly claim to be head of a “Roman”
empire right at the start of his reign.35 He did not receive the imperial crown from the
pope until 1014, only after political conditions in Rome were right and he had assured
Germany’s security through a long period of local wars
Henry’s nemesis was Duke Boleslav Chrobry of Poland. There was ill will between
them over Boleslav’s claim by marriage to the march of Meißen and over an attack made
on the duke in Merseburg for which he blamed the king. The tipping point was
Boleslav’s annexation of Bohemia in 1003 for which he refused to pay tribute.36 Henry
launched campaigns against him every second or third year for fifteen years,
strengthening his forces through a firm alliance with the pagan Liutzi, to the scandal of
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some observers.37 This was not, however, a war of conquest, but of perennial feud with
another Christian ruler which both parties were willing to see reconciled, as seen in the
terms of the temporary peace achieved in 1013.38 Saxon expansion was a thing of the
past; Boleslav outlived his rival long enough to be crowned king in his own right.
The long series of clashes with the Poles was interspersed with rebellion in other
quarters. The Capetian kings of West Francia were not so concerned with re-acquiring
Lotharingia as their Carolingians predecessors had been, but various noble factions
within the duchy chafed against German rule regardless. Henry II went to war with
Count Baldwin IV of Flanders in 1006-7 and 1023 and with the Lotharingian brothers of
his wife Kunegunde from 1008 to 1015. The rebellions spilled into a campaign against
Burgundy in 1016, though Henry eventually made an agreement with the childless King
Rudolf III to name him as his heir.39 The Bavarian aristocracy fought with Henry shortly
after he was crowned, and the Billung clan, near-independent rulers in Saxony who had
been less than supportive of the last round of Polish wars, made trouble for the king on
several occasions late in his reign. Duke Bernard rebelled outright in 1020. Unlike the
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situations faced by Otto I in 939-41 and 953-4, these risings were not focused on a rival
member of the king’s family.40
As for Italy, Henry II spent the least amount of time there of all the Ottonians (save
for Henry I, who had never taken the imperial crown). The north Italian magnates had
chosen Margrave Arduin of Ivrea as their king when Otto III died. After settling a
rebellion in southern Germany, Henry made his first appearance in Lombardy in 1004; he
was duly elected and crowned in turn, but Arduin remained defiant. Henry was unable to
enforce his rule effectively for another ten years.41 In 1012, power in Rome shifted away
from the Crescentii, a family hostile to the emperors, and a son of the rival count of
Tusculum was elected pope as Benedict VIII. Henry was able to enter Rome at last in
1014 for his imperial coronation.42 He and Benedict began a collaborative relationship
like that enjoyed by Otto III and Sylvester II but with more tangible results. They
presided jointly over a synod in Pavia in 1014 calling for church reform and another
during the papal visit to Germany in 1020.43 At that time, Benedict called on Henry, as
defensor aecclesiae,44 to launch an operation in southern Italy against the Byzantines,
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who had suborned the treachery of the princes of Capua and Salerno. Henry undertook
his final Italian expedition in 1021-22 and the pope himself accompanied him on the
march.45 Henry and Benedict VIII convened another reforming synod in Pavia after the
campaign’s succesful conclusion.46
Henry II and Kunegunde had no children and so in 1024 a second emperor died
lacking a designated heir. With relatively little drama, the leading noblemen of Germany
elected Conrad of Franconia, great-great-grandson of Otto I through his daughter
Liudgard and Conrad “the Red,” to succeed him as Conrad II. The Salian dynasty that
followed began as a period of relative peace, but the church reform that had taken root
under Henry II would ultimately lead to the Investiture Controversy of 1075-1122 and
bring acrimony and war between empire and papacy. The timeline of the present study,
however, must be brought to a close by Henry’s passing.

The Ottonian Primary Sources
Just as it was under Charlemagne and his heirs, the long tenure of the Ottonian kings
seems to have been a relentless series of wars, or at least this is the impression given by
the chroniclers. The East Frankish bishops and abbots of the tenth and early eleventh

45

John W. Bernhardt, “King Henry II of Germany: Royal Self-Representation and Historical
Memory,” in Medieval Concepts of the Past: Ritual, Memory, Historiography, ed. Gerd Althoff et
al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67-68.

46

Arnold 93.

83

centuries appeared frequently in the accounts of battles, even more so than their
Carolingian predecessors, and the accounts themselves are numerous. East Frankish
historiography had come to an abrupt halt when Regino of Prüm laid down his pen in
906, but it re-emerged in the 960’s in the hands of Adalbert of Magdeburg and Widukind
of Corvey. Liudprand of Cremona wrote at the same time of events in the empire as seen
from Italy. His West Frankish counterpart was Flodoard of Reims, who started writing
somewhat earlier than the other three. Together with Ruotger’s vita of Archbishop Brun
of Cologne and Gerhard’s of Udalrich of Augsburg, this list comprises the major
narrative sources for the reigns of Henry I and Otto I. The period from Otto II through
Henry II is well-covered by the Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg and by the vitae of
the bishops Burchard of Worms and Bernward of Hildesheim.
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8. THE KING AND THE IMPERIAL CHURCH
The Ottonian monarchy can be summarized in three words: itinerant, personal, and
sacral. Although their roots and political clout lay in Saxony, the Liudolfing kings had
no official capital or primary royal residence there. They went on constant progress
through their domain for both political and economic reasons, traveling with their
entourage from one royal property to another and depending as well on their vassals
(nearly always the ecclesiastical ones) to host them. The kings followed a regular and
predictable itinerary to conduct business, observe the principal Christian feast days at
important religious sites, conduct public crown-wearings to broadcast the royal image,
and bind their kingdom together through their personal relationships with their magnates.
Ottonian government was thus a face-to-face affair that consisted of “institutions that
could be transported about the realm on the back of a horse.”1 In addition to securing the
other duchies of Germany by placing relatives in the titular positions, Otto I did much
work to shore up his family’s power by granting lands and privileges both to the local
aristocracy and to bishoprics and abbeys.2 These latter establishments in particular then
owed the king servicia, hospitality and military support, commensurate with the benefits
they received.
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The Liudolfings began as but one noble clan amongst others, from whom they had to
set themselves apart in order to rule effectively. They did this in part by increasing the
fear of royal punishment.3 In a real sense, they put the fear of God into their peers. The
king was the vicarius Christi, the vicar of Christ, akin to the priesthood and anointed with
holy chrism in the manner of the Old Testament kings. He was considered God’s chosen
ruler on Earth, governing the temporal sphere in partnership with the Pope and the
bishops who oversaw the spiritual one. This sacrality was partly a continuation of the
pre-Christian Germanic tradition of the king or warlord as the bearer of heil (luck), the
source of royal charisma that bound followers to him.4 At his coronation, the king was
girded with his sword and exhorted to defend the realm against “all enemies of Christ,
barbarians and bad Christians, as divine authority has given you power over the whole
empire of the Franks for the establishment of peace among all Christians.”5 His sacral
mystique bolstered his authority with the aristocracy and aided him in arbitrating their
disputes. The public rituals of the royal iter, with its crown-wearing processions and
attendance at church festivals, represented the consensus of the ruled, which is to say the
nobility and the higher clergy. The high point of the Ottonian kings’ sacrality came when
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they were crowned as emperors (as Otto I was in 962) by the popes in Rome.6
While this aspect of royal authority may seem abstract, the control that the king
exercised over his “lords spiritual” was firmly grounded in worldly priorities. He
depended on his bishops and abbots not only to host the royal progress and provide
troops for his armies, but also to serve as administrators, advisors, and ambassadors.
Thus the selection of candidates for these offices continued to be as important as it had
been under the Carolingians. The process by which German bishops and abbots were
created is best understood through the work of the late Timothy Reuter, who questioned
and then revised the traditional scholarly view of the subject. Until the last quarter of the
twentieth century, it was believed that the Ottonian and Salian rulers followed a
deliberate policy of appointing their own picked men to bishoprics and abbacies under
the so-called Reichskirchensystem in order to counter the unreliable and often hostile lay
aristocracy and turn the church into their primary instrument of government.7 The
practice is supposed to have peaked during the last two decades of the reign of Otto I
after his unsuccessful bid to control the dukedoms through his own relations, as well as in
the first quarter of the eleventh century under Henry II.8 Otto was thought to have drawn
his candidates first from a pool of former pupils of his brother Brun, Archbishop of
Cologne, and then following Brun’s death from the members of the royal chapel that
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formed part of Otto’s court entourage.9 Thanks to Reuter’s re-examination, the
Reichskirchensystem is now widely seen as a construct of nineteenth-century historians in
search of Germany’s ancient constitutional underpinnings during the “Second Reich.”
The mass of documentary evidence exactingly organized and published in the
Monumenta Germaniae Historica certainly suggests a consistent approach to rule, if not
necessarily a formalized system; but to heed the advice of Henry Mayr-Harting, one
should be careful not to mistake the structure of documentation for the structure of actual
history.10
Rather than a cut-and-dried mechanism of royal appointments, the creation of bishops
and abbots seems to have been a complicated balancing act between the king’s will, the
wishes of the local nobility, and the consent of the cathedral chapter or monastery in
question. Canon law on the matter remained as it had been since late antiquity, requiring
the candidate to be elected by the members of the institution which they were to govern.
The older bishoprics, founded before Ottonian rule, were particularly accustomed to
exercising their right of free election and often resisted the tendency of kings (Henry II
especially) to treat this merely as the right to propose a candidate.11 The royal chapel did
come to function as a sort of finishing school for some of these men—as “clerical
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vassals” of the king,12 the capellani would seem to have been ideally positioned to
benefit from royal attention—but not all were equally close to the king. Bishoprics could
just as easily go to qualified men who had not served as chaplains. Over a third of the
available positions went to outsiders under Otto III and Henry II and the proportion rose
to more than half by the reign of Henry III (r. 1017-1028).13 The majority of candidates
continued to be high-ranking aristocrats and a given see was often held continuously
within a kinship group, as was the case with five successive bishops of Worms from 999
to 1065 14 (including Burchard, discussed later.) This tradition and the relatively small
number of interrelated families that made up the Ottonian and Salian ruling elite resulted
in a large number of bishops who were cognationes of the king, tied to him by blood or
marriage.15 Neither these “royal bishops” nor the chapel alumni should be treated as a
special group drawn from more-favored candidates, although a chapter might wish to
elect such a man due to his influence at court; even Archbishop Brun was duly voted into
his position by the canons of Cologne before being confirmed by his brother the king.16
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Lacking such a connection of his own, an aspiring candidate might also approach a
member of the royal family to act as their advocate, as secular aristocrats often did.17
Regardless of their origins, the bishops should not be thought of as a “civil service” in
the modern sense. While the king wielded a high degree of influence over their
appointment, he was unable to depose them, at least in Germany; the imperial bishops in
Italy seem to have been subject to different rules. As he did with the lay nobility, the
king controlled his bishops by the bestowal or withdrawal of the royal gratia, or favor.18
Those who provided loyal service might benefit through gifts of land or governmental
privileges such as immunity from certain fees or the right to hold a market or mint coins.
Beginning under Otto II, grants of the latter predominated over the former, in part
because these simply cost the king less and could be taken back.19 Bishops were more
dependent on the king’s support than the lay nobles. One who was persona non grata
might have the royal protection withdrawn but could be received back into favor after a
generous monetary payment. Even bishops involved in rebellion might only be sent
temporarily into exile for their offense.20 Such was the case with Archbishop Frederick
of Mainz, who abandoned Otto I during his siege of Breisach in 939, attempted to join the

17

Ibid. 355.

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid. 359.

20

Ibid. 356.
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forces of Otto’s rebel brother Henry, and was banished to the monastery of Fulda.21 He
eventually returned and held his office for another sixteen years until his death. Adalbert
of Magdeburg wrote dryly that he was “vigorous in holy religion and very praiseworthy,
if only he had not seemed to reprehensible in this alone: that wherever even a single
enemy of the king sprang up he immediately placed himself at his side.”22 The simple
fact that bishops might align against the king casts doubt on the idea that they were all
somehow picked royal appointees whose first loyalty was to the crown.

21
22

Adalbert a.939.160; also Widukind II.24-25. Widukind places Frederick’s exile in Hamburg.

…vir in sancta religione strennus et valde laudabilis, nisi in hoc tantum videbatur
reprehensibilis, quod, sicubi vel unus regis inimicus emersit, ipse se statim secundum apposuit.
Adalbert a.954.168.11-14 (trans. MacLean, 256-7).
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9. THE VIEW FROM OUTSIDE: FLODOARD AND LIUDPRAND
Flodoard of Reims, Annales
Born not far from Reims and educated at its cathedral school before entering the
priesthood and becoming a canon there, Flodoard began in 919 to write his yearly
chronicle in the tradition of Archbishop Hincmar (d. 882), continuator of the Annales
Bertiniani.1 Flodoard’s viewpoint as a lifelong man of Reims is instructive, as he was
both an outsider to the events taking place in East Francia and holder of a ringside seat
for much of the action in the West. He was at all times biased somewhat towards his
home diocese, which gave him a degree of impartiality when he observed events in the
East and allowed him to be critical of both sides during the struggles for the West
Frankish crown. Even if he can be set apart as a “French” chronicler from the “German”
histories, Flodoard’s work increases our understanding of clerical involvement in war and
political conflict in all the post-Carolingian Frankish domains. Among the writers of the
Ottonian period in this study, not only was he was the earliest to begin, he was the only
one to have recorded contemporary events year by year rather than compiling history
after the fact.
Much of Flodoard’s writing focuses on the trials and tribulations of Archbishop
Artoldus of Reims (d. 961), whose possession of the title came and went according to the

1

Steven Fanning and Bernard S. Bachrach, introduction to The Annals of Flodoard of Reims,
919-966, Readings in Medieval Civilizations and Cultures IX, series editor Paul Edward Dutton
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004), viii-ix. For the AB, see Chapter 5.
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support or enmity of the West Frankish kings (Raoul and then Louis IV) and their
powerful rival Hugh the Great of Paris. The Annales is hardly a vita of Artoldus and
Flodoard was only a casual partisan. He shrugged and accepted his superior’s repeated
deposition and re-investment with equal aplomb.2 Rather, Artoldus serves as an anchor
point for Flodoard’s rich description of West Frankish bishops’ critical participation in
military affairs, whether against external enemies, internally on the part of the king
against his rivals (or vice versa), or in pursuit of feuds to support their aristocratic and
ecclesiastical rights. The lines between these categories often blur.
Feud comes into play early in Flodoard’s account as he describes how his own
Archbishop Heriveus conducted a four-week siege of the castellum of Méziéres that had
been seized from him by one Count Erlebaldus, a local enemy whom the archbishop had
excommunicated.3 The count of Cambrai destroyed a castellum belonging to Bishop
Stephen of his county for which he later made monetary reparations.4 Later we read of a
similar clash between the count and bishop of Tongres.5 Feud between the count and
bishop of the same area over disputed property seems to have been a frequent occurrence.

2

Fanning and Bachrach ix-x.

3

Flodoard of Reims Annales, ed. Philippe Lauer (Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1905), a.920.2-3
(trans. Fanning and Bachrach, 4, 2B). Flodoard’s yearly entries tend to run on without breaks,
thus the translators’ lettered paragraph subdivisions are included for clarity. For an explanation of
Flodoard’s chapter numbering system, see Fanning and Bachrach xxviii-xxix.

4

Flodoard a.924.24 (12, 6G-H).

5

Flodoard a.933.55 (23, 15A).
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Boso, King Raoul’s brother, destroyed a fortress (castrum) of the hostile Bishop Bovo
of Châlons, “whose men had lopped off the limbs of some of Boso’s men.”6 At this point
it becomes difficult to distinguish private feud from power struggles between men of the
king’s party and that of his rivals. “The clergy and people” (clerum et populum) of
Reims elected a new archbishop against King Raoul’s wishes, possibly under the
influence of the rebel Heribert, count of Vermandois.7 The king besieged and captured
Reims and elevated Artoldus to the see instead and later captured the aforementioned
Bovo of Châlons.8 After Bovo regained the king’s favor and thus his bishopric, one
Milo, whom the king had previously selected to replace him, pillaged the same area and
was excommunicated by Artoldus and the other bishops of the province.9 This is one of
several instances of how excommunication could be a useful weapon in a bishop’s
arsenal, one to which lay magnates did not have access.
Shifting alliances in 937 caused Hugh the Great, uncle to the young king Louis IV
“d’Outremer,” to force Archbishop Artoldus—whom he had previously supported—to
abdicate in favor of the former archbishop, Hugh of Vermandois, son of his enemyturned-ally Count Heribert.10 The subsequent struggles over Reims took on the character

6

…cujus homines quosdam Bosnonis membris trnucaverant. Flodoard a.931.49.3-4 (20, 13E).

7

Flodoard a.931.49.15 (21, 13F).

8

Flodoard a.931.51 (21, 13H).

9

Milo… excommunicatur ab Artoldo archiepiscopo ceterisque Remensis dioceseos episcopis.
Flodoard a.932.53.10-12 (22, 14C).

10

Flodoard a.940.76-77 (33, 22C). See also Fanning and Bachrach xvii-xviii.
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of a feud between Artoldus and Hugh, backed respectively by King Louis and Hugh the
Great. This is a perfect indicator of the importance of the West Frankish bishops to the
realm and how entwined their careers and positions could be with royal politics. Even
though Artoldus now had no retinue to command, he appeared by the king’s side on
campaign on multiple occasions11 as his royal patron attempted—with limited success—
to restore him to the archbishopric. The feud-like aspects spilled over into violent clashes
even when the greater players were absent, as seen when Archbishop Hugh sacked a
fortress held by Artoldus’ brothers.12 Finally, with Otto I as his ally, Louis invested
Reims with a large army. Hugh’s friends counseled the archbishop to surrender because
“if the urbs should be taken by storm, they would not be able to intercede with the kings
to prevent his eyes from being torn out.”13 As seen in the many examples thus far,
blinding was a customary punishment for ecclesiastical enemies who could not legally be
deprived of office. While possession seems to have counted for much, it ultimately took
a synod of bishops convened by Louis and Otto jointly to declare Hugh of Vermandois’
candidacy void and the interference by the pope on his part as uncanonical.14 The
fighting between the rival parties nonetheless continued for some time afterwards.15

11

Flodoard a.940.78-79 (34, 22F); a.941.81-82 (35, 23F); a.943.87 (37, 25A).

12

Flodoard a.943.89 (38, 25D).

13

…neque intervenire possent apud reges pro ipso quin eruentur ei oculi, si urbem vi capi
contigisset. Flodoard a.946.102.17-18 (44, 28G).

14

Flodoard a.948.107-121 passim (46-52, 30).

15

Flodoard a.949.122-24 (52-53, 31D); a.952.133-34 (57, 34C).
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Besides the struggles of Artoldus to regain his see with the king’s support, bishops and
(to a lesser extent) abbots appear prominently in Flodoard’s records of royal campaigns
against enemies of the realm. In 923, King Raoul moved against the settled Norse in
Brittany, “along with Archbishop Seulfus [of Reims]… and certain other select brave
men.”16 Seulfus then served as one of the king’s spokesmen for peace negotiations.17
The Norse attacked Burgundy in 925 and were met by forces under the command of two
bishops, Ansegisus of Troyes and Gozcelinus of Langres, the former of whom was
wounded in action. King Raoul reinforced them with troops from the church of Reims
along with Bishop Abbo of Soissons.18 In 944, King Louis retaliated against a Norse
incursion in Brittany with “certain bishops of Francia and Burgundy.”19 As evidence for
churchmen participating in combat, these instances are ambiguous at best. Only the
wound suffered by Ansegisus suggests a proximity to the action and it could as easily
have been sustained without actually bearing arms.
It is clear from Flodoard’s accounts that being a bishop could be a dangerous
occupation, whether combined with soldiering or not. Benno of Metz, appointed by
Henry I against the will of his constituency, “was the victim of a plot and was castrated

16

…illo transiit cum Seulfo archiepiscopo… aliisque quibusdam et electis viris fortibus. Flodoard
a.923.16.11-13 (9, 5I).

17

Flodoard a.924.24 (12,6F).

18

Flodoard a.925.26-27 (13, 7A).

19

…et quibusdam episcopis Franciae ac Burgundiae. Flodoard a.944.95. 2-3 (40, 26I).
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and blinded.”20 Bishop Robert of Tours was “killed in his camp by brigands” while
returning from Rome.21 The bishop of Dol was “crushed and killed in the church by the
great crowd of refugees” during the Norse assault on Brittany.22 The bishops of Pavia
and Vercelli fell victim to the Magyar sack of the former city in 924.23 Church magnates
were also intimately involved in the politics of conflict even after the fighting was done.
There are several instances of bishops serving as negotiators of treaties with both foreign
enemies and rebels,24 provided hostages to ensure their own compliance,25 or even served
as hostages themselves.26 Lest it seem that bishops were more likely to perish by
violence than not, Flodoard includes regular notes whenever one passes away of
unmentioned, though probably natural, causes. In two such cases these men succumbed
to hard work and sanctity. Bishop Otgarius of Amiens, a “holy man,” died at an age over

20

Benno Mettensis episcopus, insidiis appetitus, eviratus, luminibusque privatus est. Flodoard
a.928.43.10-12 (18,10D). Also in Adalbert a.927.158.

21

Rotbertus, episcopus Turonensis aecclesiae, Roma remeans, sub Alpibus noctu infra tentoria
cum comitantibus secum interimitur a latronibus. Flodoard a.931.48.4-6 (20,13D).

22

Civitas eorum, Dolus nomine, capta et episcopus ejusdem confugientium in aecclesiam
multitudinum stipatione oppressus et enecatus est. Flodoard a.944.94.8-11 (40, 26H).

23

Flodoard a.924.22 (11, 6D).

24

Flodoard a.924.24 (12, 6F); a.938.69 (30, 20A); a.942.83-84 (36, 24A); a.949.125 (53, 31E);
a.950.127 (54, 32A).

25

Flodoard a.936.64 (28, 18B); a.939.72(31, 21C); a.945.97 (41, 27C).

26

Flodoard a.945.99 (42, 27F).
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10027 and Archbishop Teotolo of Tours seems to have died due to the stress of acting as a
peacemaker, with his passing being marked by miracles.28
Flodoard’s own moral perspective is consistent, if subtle, in the text. The hand of God
scarcely appears as a direct influence on the course of history. The Byzantines routed the
Saracens at Freinet (Fraxinetum) in 931 “with God’s help” (Deo propitio), 29 but that
seems to be the only instance. Even the miracles that blunt the depredations of the
Magyars in 937 are described in the passive voice with no credit given to divine agency.30
The language Flodoard uses to describe the collateral damage of war suggests an unusual
sympathy for its civilian victims. “The country folk” (rusticani) suffered losses at the
hands of the forces of Count Robert of Paris in 923.31 Henry I, invading Lotharingia in
the same year, “laid waste the area between the Rhine and the Moselle, carried off herds
and plow animals, drained away other resources and captured many people, including
youths.”32 Of the Magyar sack of Pavia in 924, Flodoard says that “[from] the almost
innumerable multitude of inhabitants [of the city], only 200 are said to have survived.”33

27

Flodoard a.928.41 (17, 10B).

28

Flodoard a.945.97-98 (42, 27D).

29

Flodoard a.931.47.7 (20,13B).

30

Flodoard a.937.65-66 (29, 19C).

31

Flodoard a.923.13 (8, 5E).

32

Depopulatus est autem quod inter Rhenum et Mosellam interjacet, gregum armentorumque
abductione ac ceterarum opum exhaustu, eum plurimorum quoque juventutis captivitate.
Flodoard a.923.18.7-10 (10, 5L).

33

…atque ex illa pene innumerabili multitudine cc tantum superfuisse memorantur… Flodoard
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Displaying the usual indignation of the clerical writer for damage done to church
property, he also accuses the enemy of burning no fewer than 44 churches in the same
incursion. The king’s troops ravaged the diocese of Reims in 944, “[thus] they ran wild
with either pillaging or plundering.”34 The “thieves” (grassatoribus) of Hugh the Great
violated the lands of Reims’ dependents.35 Even King Louis, nominally one of the “good
guys” in Flodoard’s narrative, is criticized for doing the same in his attempt of 945 to
dislodge Archbishop Hugh.36 Flodoard also singles King Charles out for criticism when
he makes war during Lent37 and on Pentecost Sunday38 and names other Christian lords
who attack a castle of King Louis during Easter season,39 seemingly foreshadowing the
impetus for the Truce of God movement of the following century.
Nothing in the Annals suggests that Flodoard in any way disapproved of church lords
participating in war as a prerogative of their rank and the quid pro quo of their fealty to
the king. Indeed, he provides ample description of bishops prosecuting war vigorously
both on the king’s behalf and in order to enforce their own rights and those of their see.

a.924.22.10-12 (11, 6D).
34

Regii milites episcopatum Remensem depraedantur… sicque alterutris debacchantur rapinis
atque depraedationibus. Flodoard a.944.93.16-19 (40, 26F).

35

Flodoard a.948.117.17-18 (50, 30N).

36

Flodoard a.945.96 (41, 27B).

37

Flodoard a.922.7 (5, 4A).

38

Flodoard a.922.9 (6, 4D).

39

Flodoard a.945.96 (41, 27A).
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Other than Ansegisus of Troyes (above), who may or may not have been wounded by
being too close to the fighting, none of these instances indicate whether or not the bishops
of West Francia took up arms in person. However, a subtle and seemingly contradictory
hint of disapproval colors his description of Brun of Cologne, whose geographical and
dynastic position let him participate in the politics of both the West and East kingdoms.40
Brun is “the bishop who had become a duke” (ex praesule ducem)41 to whom King Otto
“[commits]… the Lotharingian kingdom” (regnum Lothariense committit).42 As MayrHarting points out, “The fact that Flodoard usually withheld the title ‘archbishop’ from
Brun suggests that he was another of those critics who disliked Brun’s military side
because he thought that it compromised his religious role.”43 Hartmut Hoffmann
interprets him as being even more critical, contending that Flodoard thought Brun “left
his episcopal ministry in the lurch the moment he made himself commander.”44 Given
that Flodoard seems to have accepted such conduct from most bishops, it may be that he
took exception to Brun being elevated to the ducal title, thus wielding unprecedented

40

Brun and Otto’s sister Gerberga was married to King Louis IV, and their sister Hadwig was
married to Hugh the Great, which connections allowed Brun to frequently serve as arbiter
between the rival parties; Fanning and Bachrach xxiv.

41

Flodoard a.957.144.5 (62, 39B).

42

Flodoard a.953.137.8-9 (58, 35F).

43

Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 26.

44

Hartmut Hoffman, “Politik und Kultur in Ottonischen Reichskirchensystem,” Rheinische
Vierteljahrsblätter 22 (1957), 35.
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power, without necessarily disapproving of his activities as a military leader per se.

Liudprandi Opera (The works of Liudprand of Cremona)
Liudprand, born into an influential Lombard family around 920 and taken in 931 as a
child into the household of King Hugh of Italy,45 provides a non-German perspective on
Frankish affairs and practices in much the same way as Flodoard. This similarity is,
however, only skin-deep. Flodoard enjoyed something like the Benedictine stabilitas loci
at Reims in spite of the political turmoil that affected his city and related his Annals to the
particular concerns of his house. His narrative takes place almost entirely in the West
Frankish theater. On the other hand, Liudprand’s fortunes changed for better or worse
according to the struggles of the contenders for the Lombard throne and his subsequent
service to Otto I, and during the course of his career both the man and his writing traveled
between Italy, Germany, and Byzantium. His various texts accordingly display different
tones, styles, and contradictory points of view. At some time after 950, his family having
fallen out of favor with King Berengar II, Liudprand emigrated to the East Frankish
kingdom. He attached himself to Otto’s cause for the control of Italy, rising by 962 to
become Bishop of Cremona. The high points of his clerical career were his presence at

45

Paolo Squatritti, introduction to The Complete Works of Liudprand of Cremona (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 4.
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the synod of 963 by which Otto deposed Pope John XII, and his famous mission to
Constantinople in 968.46
Liudprand himself is an enigma—none of his contemporaries have left a record of
him, so he is known only through his own work—and was also something of a
chameleon, changing his literary color according to circumstances. The impression he
left of himself seems to have been a carefully constructed image or series of images. In
his translator’s words, he projected “personae, not personality.”47 His largest piece of
work, the six books of Antapodosis (Retribution), seems to have been the early medieval
equivalent of a “blog,” always undergoing updates and revisions, serving different
missions at different points, and probably not intended for publication as a single finished
text.48 Its themes are revenge (as the title implies) on the political persecutors of his
family,49 a constant undermining of the legitimacy of the Italian ruling dynasties by
revealing the scurrilous details of their personal goings-on,50 and the making of a case for
Otto’s intervention.51

46

Ibid. 4-5 passim.

47

Ibid. 6-7.

48

Ibid. 8-9.

49

Ibid. 10-11.

50

Ibid. 11-14 passim.

51

Ibid. 15.
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As colorful and outspoken as Liudprand’s writing is, the reader must take care not to
interpret some of his language too literally or give too much weight to the face value of
its modern sense in translation. His moral position tends to be inconsistent. The dynastic
battles for Italy produced “enormous slaughter” (maxima strages)52 and King Arnulf’s
support for one side has him “butchering” (trucidat) the population of Bergamo,53 yet
these terms feel merely descriptive, not pejorative. While the usual catalogue of
barbarism is attributed to the invading Magyars—who “destroyed castles, burned
churches, massacred communities, and drank the blood of their victims so that they
would be feared more and more”54—impiety and hubris made the Christian defenders of
Italy and Germany equally culpable for their own defeats in 899.55 Even while
bemoaning in verse the civilians killed during the Magyar sack of Pavia in 924,56
Liudprand asserts that they deserved it because of their sins.57 Because King Hugh had
been “shamefully cast out” (ex qua turpiter eiectus fuerat) from Rome in 931, he
“pitifully devastated” (misere devastaret) the surrounding country.58 Liudprand seems

52

Liudprand of Cremona Antapodosis, ed. J. Becker (MGH SSrG 41 [Hannover and Leipzig,
1915]) I.XIX.19.1-2 (trans. Squatriti, 59).

53

Antapodosis I.XXIII.21.3

54

…castra diruunt, ecclesias igne consumunt, populos iugulant, et ut magis magisque timeantur,
interfectorum sese sanguine potant. Antapodosis II.II.36.28-37.2 (75).

55

Antapodosis II.X, XI, XIII, XV, XVI.

56

Antapodosis III.III.74-75.

57

Antapodosis III.II.74.

58

Antapodosis IV.II.104 (141).
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here to give the moral high ground to neither party. In 941, certain mountain districts of
Italy “were most cruelly depopulated by those Saracens who dwelt at Fraxinetum.”59
This gives some sense of empathy for the civilian casualties, but goes no farther than the
simple description. Even a shocking mutilation en masse, which he might otherwise have
called out as atrocity had it been done by a pagan enemy, seems to have been accepted as
par for the course at the hands of Christian lords. When Margrave Tedald of Camerino
and Benevento mockingly castrated Greek prisoners—fellow-Christians—taken during
the struggle against Byzantine overlordship of 929-34, Liudprand identified him as “a
certain hero” (etiam heros quidam). 60
Liudprand’s text gives little indication that the bishops of Italy normally took part in
military operations. It is probably not a coincidence that Italian bishoprics in the tenth
century were rarely filled by Germans.61 The native prelates appear instead as
conspirators and backstabbers,62 political (but not necessarily armed) rebels,63 victims of
civil unrest,64 and the rallying point for expatriates caught up in the same on foreign

59

…a Saracenis Fraxenetum inhabitantibus crudelissime depopulantur. Antapodosis
V.IX.134.34-135.1 (175-6).

60

Antapodosis IV.IX.108.5 (145).

61

Reuter, Germany 270

62

Antapodosis II.VI.40-41, III.XLI.93-95.

63

Antapodosis II.LVII.63-64, II.LXV.66-67.

64

Antapodosis III.LII.101.
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soil.65 The only “legitimate” participation Liudprand seems to have included is that of
Otto’s German bishops at the siege of Breisach, which ends in treachery and desertion on
the part of Frederick of Mainz.66
If positive examples of bishops going to war are absent or ambiguous in Liudprand’s
work, he leaves no doubt as to his position on church magnates bearing arms in person.
Two striking examples bear this out. The first is Bishop Manasses of Arles, who deserted
his see to follow his kinsman Hugh of Provence—a contender for Italian rule—for
ambition’s sake. King Hugh gave him the benefice of three churches and yet, “…not
content even with these, Manasses appropriated the March of Trent, where, with the
Devil instigating it, he ceased to be a bishop when he began to be a soldier.”67 This
came as a result of Hugh’s creation in 935 of a marcher region in northeastern Italy
combining secular and ecclesiastical authority,68 similar to Brun of Cologne’s promotion
to duke of Lotharingia. Liudprand’s criticism seems to fly in the face of his royal
patron’s policy, as he did not begin writing Retribution until 958, 69 by which time Brun’s
binary role had long since been a fait accomplí.

65

Antapodosis V.XXII.143-44.

66

Antapodosis IV.XXVII.122-23.

67

Ac nec his quidem contentus Tridentinam adeptus est marcam, quo impellente diabolo, dum
miles esse inciperet, episcopus esse desineret. Antapodosis IV.VI.105.21-23 (142, emphasis
added).

68

Squatriti 142, fn. 7.

69

Squatriti, intro. 4.
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Liudprand puts a weak scriptural argument into Manasses’ mouth to justify his seeswitching, then refutes him at length, but does not address his militarism other than to
scorn it.70 Manasses is mentioned again in Retribution71 and is cited in the opening
chapter of Concerning King Otto as one of the reasons for the king’s intervention in Italy,
inasmuch as he was appointed Archbishop of Milan “contrary to all law and decency.”72
Liudprand’s indignation shows again in a similar incident in which Berengar deprived the
pious bishop of Brescia of his see “with no council being held, no decision by the
bishops.”73 These comments bear out the current thinking that Otto could not simply
appoint bishops at will as the theory of Reichskirchensystem would suppose, for in this
case Liudprand would surely not have criticized his patron’s policy so frankly.
The second and clearest piece of evidence for Liudprand’s position on martial
churchmen is his treatment of Pope John XII. In Concerning King Otto, John’s status in
the text changes from “supreme pontiff and universal pope” (summus pontifex et
universalis papa)74 to virtual traitor against the emperor two chapters later.75 Perhaps

70

Antapodosis IV.VII.105-7.

71

Antapodosis V.XXVI.145.

72

…quae Mannassen Arelatensem episcopum contra ius fasque Mediolanensi sedi praefecerat.
Liudprand Liber de rebus gestis Ottonis magni imperatoris, ed. J. Becker (MGH SSrG 41
[Hannover and Leipzig, 1915]), I.159.21-22 (220).

73

…nullo concilio habito, nulla episcoporum deliberatione constituit. Antapodosis
V.XXIX.148.10-11 (191).

74

Liudprand Gestis Ottonis I.159.5 (219).

75

Gestis Ottonis IV.160-62.
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Liudprand introduces him by his full title to emphasize the magnitude of his supposed
moral failure. As mentioned above, Liudprand was one of Otto’s ambassadors to the
synod called in Rome to depose the inconvenient pontiff. There, before a lengthy roster
of bishops and other noblemen,76 John was accused—among other outrageous charges—
of “[girding] himself with a sword… helmet and breastplate.”77 This phrase is reiterated
twice more during the proceedings, most dramatically during the testimony of “the
clergy and the whole Roman people”:
“For if you do not accept our faithfulness, at least you ought to believe the troops
of the lord emperor, against whom John charged five days ago, girt with a sword,
bearing a shield, helmet, and breastplate. Only the Tiber, which flowed between
them, prevented John, decked out like that, from being captured by the imperial
troops.” Immediately the holy emperor said: “There are as many witnesses as
there are fighters in our army.”78
Granted that the pope was no ordinary bishop, and that Liudprand is vigorously
cranking the handle of the propaganda machine here to enhance Otto’s case for his
unprecedented deposition, surely Liudprand would not have played up this offense so
prominently if he thought it could be turned back on Otto’s own bishops to the emperor’s
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Gestis Ottonis IX.165-66.

77

… ense accinctum, galea et lorica… Gestis Ottonis X.167.22 (228). Squatriti’s translation of
lorica as “breastplate” (and he is not the only offender) is misleading, as plate armor was virtually
unknown during the medieval period prior to the late 13th century. A better reading would be
“mail,” or simply, “armor.”
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‘Quod si fidem nobis non admittitis, exercitui domni imperatoris saltem debetis credere, cui
ante quinque dies ense accinctus, clipeo, galea et lorica indutus occurrit; solus Tiberis, qui
interfluxit, ne sic ornatus ab exercitu caperetur, impedivit.’ Mox sanctus imperator dixit: ‘Tot
sunt huius rei testes, quot sunt nostro in exercitu bellatores.’ Gestis Ottonis XI.168.19-25 (22930). See also XV.171.24-25.

107

detriment. This is especially unlikely since Otto himself appears as a key witness for the
prosecution. Indeed, a militant pope was not without precedent, per the case of John X
who did battle with the Saracens.79 Regardless, Liudprand made sure to show John XII
getting his just desserts, describing how the Devil killed him before Otto could take
military action to oust him again.80 This seems to be the sole instance in Liuprand’s work
of direct supernatural intervention.81
Liudprand is unusual amongst the Ottonian chroniclers in giving Satan a walk-on role
in the course of historical events—in addition to the demise of the pope, the Devil is
blamed for turning Manasses of Arles into a soldier (above) and he inspires Otto’s
brother Henry to rebel against him in 93982 —yet God does not figure very prominently
either. The influence of divine power on military action is sporadic and variable, and
sometimes, in cases when the enemy comes out ahead, Liudprand frankly admits that
God’s plan is a mystery to him.83 Yet he is careful to admonish Otto to give God credit
for his victories84 and the king or those fighting for his causes appear to be the most
frequent recipients of reinforcement from on high, as it were. The Swabians overcame
the rebels Eberhard and Giselbert in 939 against the odds, as Liudprand explains rather
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Prinz 143.

80

Gestis Ottonis XX.173-4.

81

Squatriti 235, fn.42.

82

Antapodosis IV.XVIII.114.

83

Antapodosis I.III.5, V.III.131.

84

Antapodosis IV.XXVI.120-22 passim.
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obliquely, “…with God ordaining it not by means of speech but by inspiration… [He]
lowered his hand on those who made trouble for a king whom He recognized as walking
in his ways.”85 Indeed, even when Otto was unable to cross a river to aid his army in
person, his prayers served as a sort of divine force multiplier that ensured its victory.86 In
other cases Liudprand credits the piety of Christian troops to their advantage, even when
fighting in service to an unworthy lord (such as Pope John),87 or else blames their defeats
on their sins.88 In general, Liudprand never ascribes victory or defeat to God’s direct
intervention but only acknowledges that battles turn out for the best when God is “well
disposed” (Deo tamen propitio).89
Liudprand never admits to having had military experience of his own, but this does
not prevent him from waving the flag of martial pride. This is most noticeable in his final
major text, verbosely entitled The Embassy of Liudprand the Cremonese Bishop to the
Constantinopolitan Emperor Nicepheros Phocas on Behalf of the August Ottos and
Adelheid.90 Much of his verbal sparring with the Byzantine emperor is about the
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Verum iubente Deo non locutionis, sed inpirationis… quemadmodum super regem tribulantes
Dominus manum miserit, quem in viis suis ambulasse cognovit. Antapodosis IV.XXIX.125.7-8
and 24-25.

86

Antapodosis IV.XXIV.117-18.
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Antapodosis II.LII.62-LIV.62 passim.
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Antapodosis II.X.42-XVI.45 passim.

89

Antapodosis IV.IV.105.2 (142).
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The title is shortened in Becker’s edition (MGH SSrG 41 [Hannover and Leipzig, 1915]) to the
more manageable Liudprandi relatio de legatione Constantinopolitana.
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comparative worth of the Greek and German troops. When the emperor insulted the
training and physical prowess of Otto’s men,91 Liudprand retorted, “…the coming wars
will demonstrate what type of men you are and how pugnacious we are,” essentially
challenging him to do his worst.92 He then reported to Otto that the king could easily
overcome the entire Byzantine army with a mere forty men,93 and continued to make
disparaging comments about the poor quality of the Byzantine military later in the text.94

91

Liudprand Legatione XI.182.

92

‘…quales vos estis quamve pugnaces nos simus, bella proxima demonstrabunt.’ Legatione
XII.183.6-8 (247).

93

Legatione XXIX.191.
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Legatione XLIV.198-XLV.199.
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10. PARTISAN MONKS: ADALBERT AND WIDUKIND
Adalbert of Magdeburg, Continuatione Treverensi
Adalbert, originally an aristocratic Lotharingian monk of St-Maximin in Trier and
subsequently a chaplain in the entourage of Otto I, was promoted in 966 to abbot of
Wissembourg, where he most likely composed his work. He reached the height of his
career as the first archbishop of Magdeburg, Otto’s “personal favorite” see, serving from
968 until his death in 981.1 As Adalbert was a product of the royal chancery under Otto’s
brother Brun, his writing very much represents the Ottonian court point of view.2 The
Continuatione was a conscious and deliberate bid to emphasize the continuity between
the old Frankish and the new Saxon dynasties, written as it was at the apex of the new
order’s success—Otto’s conquest of Italy and coronation as emperor—rather than, as
with Regino, in the twilight of the failing Carolingian empire.3 He may also have
intended it as a means to enlighten and instruct the young Otto II.4
Compared to the epic grandeur of Widukind or the self-consciously abrasive
Liudprand, Adalbert’s brief addendum to Regino may justifiably be called “dry and

1

MacLean, intro. to History and Politics 55.

2

Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 28.

3

MacLean 56-7 passim.

4

Ibid. 58.
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factual,”5 but his editorial voice is easy to pinpoint when it emerges. Examples are his
self-satisfied endorsement of the battlefield death of the impious usurper Robert at
Soissons,6 his scorn for the cowardice of Charles the Simple,7 and his sarcastic epitaph
for the ever-unreliable Archbishop Frederick of Mainz (quoted above).8 His Ottonian
partisanship seems circumspect at times; while the king leads his forces to deeds fortia et
bellica at the siege of Breisach,9 he receives little personal credit for his triumph at the
Lech,10 which achievement figures so prominently in others’ accounts. Adalbert
nonetheless carefully presents a picture of dynastic legitimacy. He bookends this at the
one end with praise for Henry I, turning his “hostile intent” against the empire’s
neighbors into sanctified aggression,11 while simultaneously eulogizing him as an
imperial expansionist against paganism and as an “adherent of peace.”12 On the other
end, he offers repeated criticism for the faithlessness of the Romans in general and the
pope in particular.13 As with the majority of the Frankish-Saxon writers, he reserves his

5

Ibid. 56.

6

Adalbert a.922.157.

7

Adalbert a.923.157.

8

Adalbert a.954.168.

9

Adalbert a.939.160.32.

10

Adalbert a.955.168.

11

Adalbert a.928.158 (239), and a.934.159.
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Adalbert a.936.159 (241).
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Adalbert a.963.173-a.965.176 passim.
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greatest vitriol for the faithless, especially amongst churchmen, such as the bishops
“worthless and hateful to God” who desert Otto’s cause and support his enemies.14
Adalbert makes scant mention of bishops or abbots participating in the king’s military
campaigns, although other sources make it clear that this continued to be the norm. It
may be assumed that Adalbert expected the practice was common enough knowledge to
not need more than the occasional highlight in his terse and compact narrative. The
presence of Archbishop Frederick of Mainz and Bishop Rothard of Strassburg in Otto’s
siege camp at Breisach, to which they had brought troops, is one instance;15 King Henry’s
enlistment of Archbishop Roger of Trier to besiege Metz is another.16 Although it is
probable that Otto’s Italian expedition drew heavily on ecclesiastical contingents,17
Adalbert relates only that two churchmen—Henry, archbishop of Trier, and Abbot Gerric
of Wissembourg—were among the casualties from disease on the king’s return march.18
While their official military role is not prominent, Adalbert is quick to point out any

14

…sed et quidam ecclesiastici viri nequam et Deo odibiles… Adalbert a.939.160.15-16 (243).

15

Unde Fridericus archiepsicopus Mogontinensis et Ruohardus episcopus Strazburgensis fixis in
obsidione tentoriss et relictis copiarum, quas detulerant… Adalbert a.939.161.1-3. MacLean
translates copiarum as “packs of supplies” (244), but the word also means forces or troops—
which leads to a different interpretation of the bishops’ intended role in the siege.
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Adalbert a.923.157.
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Reuter states, “The field armies of the period would have been much smaller without [bishops
and abbots]”—“Imperial Church System,” 364—and cites the Indiculus Loricatorum (MGH
Const., ed. L. Weiland [Hanover 1893], 1.632, no. 436) that shows the numbers for the Italian
campaign of Otto II in 981, implying that the proportions of church troops were similar under
both Otto I and his son. Note that troops were still made up only of secular vassals, never clerics.
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Adalbert a. 964.174.35-37.
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instance of church lords taking part in rebellion, private feud, or becoming casualties of
civil strife. When Henry I invested Metz (above), his purpose was to bring the rebellious
Bishop Witgar to heel. His successor, Benno, was apparently foisted on the city without
the consent of the people, who blinded him.19 Blinding was also meted out as official
punishment to the rebel archbishop Herold of Salzburg.20 Bishop Waldo of Como
prosecuted a feud with Count Udo when he “seized the island of Lake Como and
completely destroyed the fortifications there”; 21 the bishop was later saved from being
blinded when his enemy was restrained by royal authority.22 A bishop’s position seems
to have been hazardous enough even without the added danger of royal military duty.
War is a constant and unremarkable presence in the Continuatione, like the weather.
Of the many clashes with the Magyars, only one rated commentary: “During Lent the
Hungarians, led by the king’s enemies, after they had crossed the Rhine, invaded Gaul
and committed unheard-of evils against God’s churches, and returned through Italy.”23
(Adalbert presents this as a triple outrage: not only have Christian rebels made the pagans
their allies, the invasion happens during a holy period and churches are desecrated.) As
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Adalbert a.927.158.

20

Adalbert a.954.167.

21

Ea tempestate Waldo Cumanus episcopus insulam in Cumano lacu cepit et muntiones in ea a
solo destruxit… Adalbert a.964.175.3-5 (267).

22
23

Adalbert a.966.177, 9-13.

Ungarii ducentibus inimicis regis in quadragesima Rheno transito pervadentes Galliam
inaudita mala in ecclesias Dei fecerunt et per Italiam redierunt. Adalbert a.954.168.7-10 (256).
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Adalbert seems to have taken the military role of bishops and abbots as a fait accompli,
there is little evidence to be gleaned from the text to show whether he approved of
militant churchmen or not. However, one may safely ascribe to him a positive view, or at
worst a neutral one, given his opportunity to criticize and his disinclination to do so. The
point that tips the balance in favor of approval is his treatment of Archbishop Brun of
Cologne, his former superior in the royal chapel and the archetype of the Ottonian
ecclesiastical warlord. Brun appears once in the text in a military role, in the same
passage as the Hungarian raid noted above: “In the same year dux Conrad was going to
meet [in battle] the Lotharingians under dux Brun the archbishop at the estate of
Rümlingen in the Bliesgau, but at the last minute he stayed where he was, because it was
against the king as God did not wish it to be done.”24 Adalbert presents Brun’s
controversial assumption of the archbishop’s miter “along with… the ducatus and rule
over the whole Lotharingian kingdom” 25 without expressing approval or disapproval in
so many words and then praises him on his death as “a man extremely worthy of the
ducatus and the episcopate alike.”26 Brun’s unique dual title and royal status set him
above the rank and file of Ottonian bishops, but as will be shown in additional sources
below, he is a useful touchstone for indicating a given writer’s opinions.

24

In eodem anno Cuonradus dux cum Lothariensibus duce Brun archiepiscopo in Blesensi pago
apud villam Rimilinga congressurus erat; sed in ultimo, quia contra regem erat, Deo volente ne
fieret, remanebat. Adalbert a.954.168.4-7 (256).

25

…cui Brun frater regis succedens totius Lothariensis regni ducatum et regimen cum episcopatu
suscepit. Adalbert a.953.167.29-30 (255).

26

Brun quoque archiepiscopus, germanus imperatoris, vir ducatu pariter et episcopatu
dignissimus, V. Idus Octobris obiit… Adalbert a.965.176.31-33 (269).
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Widukind of Corvey, Rerum gestarum Saxonicarum libri tres
The Benedictine monastery of Corvey on the Weser was founded in 822 during the
reign of Louis the Pious to bolster the religious and political integration of the recently
conquered Saxons into the Frankish empire. From the late Carolingian period on, but
especially during the 10th century, the great noble families of Saxony brought their
younger sons there to follow the Rule. One such monk, Widukind, became the author of
the monumental history of his people, the Three Books of the Deeds of the Saxons.27
Little is known of Widukind of Corvey himself, but his perspective is that of the Saxon
aristocracy and in sympathy with the Liudolfinger dynasty that emerged from it.28
Widukind’s work covers a span of time from the mythical origins of the Saxon people
up through the death of Otto I in 973. He probably completed the greater part of his text
by 967 or 968.29 His understanding of historical antiquity was no more reliable than that
of any other medieval; he subscribed, for example, to the traditional delusion of tracing
the Saxon bloodline to Alexander the Great.30 However, he almost certainly knew some
of the important late Roman and early medieval chroniclers who preceded him, including
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The shortened version of the Latin title, Res gestae Saxonicae, will be used here.
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Ekkehart Rotter and Bernd Schneidmüller, introduction to Widukind of Corvey, Res gestae
Saxonicae (Die Sachsengeschichte) (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. GmbH & Co, 1981), 3-5
passim.

29

Ibid. 8.
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Ibid. 6.
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Jordanes, Bede, Paul the Deacon, and Einhard,31 and he appears to have gotten the
sequence of events for his own century more or less correct. Regardless, his point of
view counts for more in the present study than his factual accuracy.
Part and parcel of his praise for the Saxons, and for the Liudolfinger kings, was his
appreciation of their warlike nature. While the reigns of the early Ottonians seemed to
consist of one rebellion after another, Widukind, unlike Ruotger, seems to have felt
divided loyalties between his king and his countrymen.32 He took a certain delight in
spinning scenic and tactical details into his numerous accounts of battles. Otto’s siege of
Regensburg in 953 is particularly colorful,33 although this may have been based on
classical models in lieu of his own experience. His exciting tale of the Battle of the Lech
is one of the standard sources for that event and was probably drawn from eyewitness
accounts (though it appears to suffer from errors of geography).34 While his voice
sometimes reflects a certain sympathy towards the civilians caught up in the sieges, he
did not feel the need to justify the warfare that either Henry or Otto conducts; it was
simply part of the understood duty of the king. Henry’s mission was to pacify and

31

Ibid. 5.

32

Ibid. 7-8; also Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 16.

33

Widukind III.35.188-37.192.

34

Bowlus 11-12.

117

reorder a war-torn kingdom,35 and Widukind felt that Otto’s generous and forgiving
nature36 forced him to deal harshly with incorrigible rebels throughout his reign.
Widukind naturally emphasized the evil perpetrated by disturbers of the peace and
pagan enemies who ravage the countryside. An altercation in 937 between two feuding
noblemen resulted in murders, devastated fields, and “endless burning” (incendiis
nusquam abstinerent).37 The Magyars who invaded during Henry’s reign burned cities,
towns, and monasteries, commited slaughter, and indeed threatened Saxony with
“extinction” (depopulationem).38 The Slavs invaded in 939 with the same arson and
devastation,39 and the “Avars” (Magyars) committed similar atrocities again in 954.40
Otto roundly condemned the rebels who had allied themselves with these “enemies of
God and men” that laid waste to his kingdom.41 By contrast, Widukind rarely shows Otto
himself resorting to pillage and property damage as a form of warfare; most of his
campaigns seem rather tidy. An instance to the contrary is at Regensburg, where, unable
to break the rebel defenses, the king’s army razed the surrounding territory and spared
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Widukind I.27.68-70.

36

Widukind II.7.114, II.10.116, III.8.168.

37

Widukind II.10.116.9-10.

38

Widukind I.32.74.21-22.
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Widukind II.20.132.
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Widukind III.30.182-84.
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…si non Dei hominumque inimici… Modo regnum meum habent desolatum. Widukind
III.32.186.3-4.
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nothing.42 Widukind voiced no criticism here. Of course, when Otto burned and laid
waste to pagan Slavic lands, the monk felt even less need to justify it.43
Widukind’s piety, such as is conveyed in his writing, seems surprisingly scant for a
monk. He sometimes made God the author of Christian victories, but gave equal credit to
the human actors. Following Henry’s triumph over the Slavs in 929, although God had a
hand in the weather and the inspiration of the German troops, the soldiers praised their
commanders and commended each other for their good fortune when the day was won.44
Otto rode into battle at the Lech under his customary angel standard and encouraged his
army by telling them that the enemy lacked the assistance of God.45 However, after the
battle, Otto’s victory celebrations emphasized secular glory over God’s. “The divine,”
not “God,” was praised in every church, while Otto was acclaimed as “father of the
Fatherland and emperor” by his troops for “the greatest victory won by a king in two
hundred years.”46 In fact, with the exception of a long diatribe against the pagan Danes,47
there is very little sense anywhere in the Res gestae Saxonicae that Widukind saw any of
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…absque animabus exercitus a nulla re abstinebat, sed omnia vastabat. Widukind
III.26.182.10-11.
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Widukind III.53.206.
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…omnes laudant duces, unusquisque vero militum predicat alium, ignavum quoque, ut in tali |
fortuna solet fieri. Widukind I.36.86.21-23.

45

… quod maximi est nobois solatii, auxilio Dei. Widukind III.46.200.7-8.
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…pater patriae imperatorque appellatus est; decretis | proinde honoribus et dignis laudibus
summae divinitati per singulas ecclesias… Neque enim tanta victoria quisquam regum intra
ducentos annos ante eum laetatus est. Widukind III.49.202.
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Widukind III.65.216-18.
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the warfare of the Reich as a holy endeavor against the enemies of Christ and the Church.
He seems to have been more interested in imitating the classical topos of expressing
admiration for the valor of his pagan enemies.48
Read in isolation, the Res gestae Saxonicae gives the misleading impression that
Ottonian bishops and abbots had little to do with warfare. The only relevant event
Widukind highlighted (other than his discussion of Brun of Cologne, below) was the
siege of Breisach in 939 from which some of Otto’s bishops deserted in haste,
“abandoning their tents and furniture.”49 He names only Rothard of Strassburg, but the
prime mover here was Archbishop Frederick of Mainz, whose notorious act of infidelity
was also recorded by Adalbert and Liudprand. Neither Widukind nor his fellow writers
were entirely clear on the role these bishops played in the king’s campaign.50 In any
case, Widukind goes into some detail about Frederick’s political behavior and his
uncanny knack for staying firmly outside Otto’s good graces, although he coyly dances
around the issue of his culpability and is careful to couch much of his account as hearsay.
He introduces the archbishop as “an excellent man, proven in every religious virtue” who
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Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 16.
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Nam summi pontifices relictis tentoriis et alia qualibet suppellectili. Widukind II.24.138.2-3.
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siege, but one can only speculate.

120

mediated between Duke Eberhard of Franconia and the king.51 He goes on to describe a
property dispute between the archbishop and the monastery of Fulda, of which “there
were some who thought that Archbishop Frederick did not act out of pure intentions, but
thought rather to denigrate the honorable man and the King's loyal abbot, Hadamar.”52
Widukind likewise equivocates about Frederick’s failure to find a resolution with the
rebels Liudolf and Conrad in Mainz, instead diverting the reader with lavish praise for
Frederick’s piety and generosity. He recuses himself neatly from taking sides by
declaring, “It falls not to us to pass a rash judgment on him… it is for the Lord to judge
these accusations.”53 Then, in the throes of the rebellion in Bavaria:
“…[Frederick,] out of fear of the king, as he himself said, left his episcopal duties
to lead a solitary and eremetical life. Meanwhile, the other bishops in Bavaria
wavered not a little between the two parties, now supporting the king and now his
opponents, for they could neither safely break with the king, nor without
detriment to themselves remain loyal to him.”54
In spite of his unabashed partisanship towards Saxony and the Liudolfing kings,
Widukind could not bring himself to condemn Frederick for his tepid loyalty and clumsy
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… optimi inprimis viri et omni religione probatissimi Frithurici… Widukind II.13.122.15-16.
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Fuerunt autem quidam qui summum pontificem Frithericum hoc non pure, sed ficte fecisse
arbitrati sunt, quatinus venerabilem virum regique fidelissimum abbatem Hadumarum quoquo
modo posset dehonestaret. Widukind II.37.152.12-16.
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De eo nostrum arbitramur nequaquam aliquid temere iudicare… caeterum de accusatis causis
qui iudicat Dominus est. Widukind III.15.174, 1-2, 5-6.
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Summus pontifex interea, ut ipse aiebat, timore Regis, officio pontificali amisso, hermiticam
cum solitariis ducebat vitam. Non minima quoque caeteris pontificibus cunctatio erat in
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handling of secular duties, ultimately praising him on his death in 954.55 While the above
passage gives us an intriguing glimpse into the difficulties the bishops must have faced
performing their political balancing act during fractious times, it provides no insight into
what, if any, military actions their support entailed.
Unlike the outspoken Ruotger, Widukind seems to have taken great pains to be
diplomatic in his handling of controversial bishops, perhaps in part because Ruotger
enjoyed the direct patronage of the leading archbishop of the Reich where the monk of
Corvey did not. Widukind treated the vigorous and warlike Brun, Frederick’s would-be
antithesis, with discretion as well, but clearly in accordance with the royal party’s
platform. Brun is mentioned early in the text as the third child of Henry I. Even in this
passing reference, Widukind was on the defensive: “…we have seen [Brun] take on the
duties of both an archbishop and a great duke. No one should consider him worthy of
punishment, as we have read that holy Samuel and many others were priests and judges
equally.”56 When Brun assumed his dual mantle of authority in 953:
“The younger brother, Lord Brun, was clever and superior in knowledge and in
every virtue and industry. The king placed him over the unruly Lotharingians,
and he cleaned the region of thieves and so firmly enforced the law that the
greatest order and the most complete peace prevailed in those parts.”57

55

Widukind III.41.192.
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…quem pontificus | summi ac ducis magni vidimus officium gerentum. Ac ne quis eum
culpabilem super hoc dixerit, cum Samuelem sanctum et alios plures sacerdotes pariter legamus
et iudices. Widukind I.31.74.7-10, referring to I Samuel 7.15.
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Iunior vero fratrum domnus Brun magnus erat ingenio, magnus scientia et omni virtute ac
industria. Quem cum rex prefecisset genti indomitae Lothariorum, regionem a latronibus
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Brun is mentioned only one more time, when he serves as intervenor to allow the rebel
Egbert back into royal favor.58 This abbreviated catalog of his deeds, while positive,
seems like short shrift for a powerful prince who not only caused such indignity in the
community of bishops—if Ruotger’s defense is any indication—but who was also the
king’s right-hand man, instrumental in pacifying Lotharingia and securing it as a vital
strategic region of the Reich. Widukind gives him credit for this in brief, but then in his
extensive descriptions of the campaigns fought against Liudolf and Conrad the Red from
953-4, he seems to ignore Brun altogether. Instead, he ascribes the victories only to King
Otto and his secular vassals. Writing as he did almost concurrently with Ruotger,
Widukind was obviously aware of the controversy and of the “Mainz theme” of criticism
for the duke-bishop59 preached first by Frederick and then his successor William, a “wise
and prudent man” (vir sapiens et prudens).60 Yet Widukind also lavished praise on Otto
and his family throughout his work. Exercising what seems to have been his trademark
discretion regarding the affairs of bishops, he gave Brun his due, but only just, and
refrained from criticizing the Mainz opposition. There was probably no profit in it. After

purgavit et in tantum disciplina legali instruxit, ut summa ratio summaque pax illis in partibus
locum tenerent. Widukind II.36.150.25-151.2.
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Widukind III.59.214.
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Widukind III.73.228.24.

123

all, by 961, Archbishop William had been reconciled with his father Otto and shared
guardianship with Brun of the 6-year-old heir, his half-brother Otto II.61
As with Adalbert’s Continuation, the Res gestae Saxonicae provides little evidence for
the military duties of bishops and abbots and none at all for their actual participation in
combat. The role played by Rothard and Frederick at the siege of Breisach is not fully
explained. The bishops of Bavaria took sides during the rebellion in 953, but what form
their aid to either the royal or the rebel party took is equally unclear. Brun’s dual role is
acknowledged but not elaborated on. Beyond this, in his vivid account of the battle at the
Lech, Widukind made no mention of Bishop Udalrich of Augsburg and his important role
in the campaign. While Gerhard did not compose his Vita Uodalrici until 985, it seems
odd for Widukind to have been unaware of the deeds of this “pillar of Otto’s realm.”62
Might Widukind have found the idea of a church lord commanding troops so distasteful
that he chose to ignore it? This is highly unlikely, as his brief defense of Brun shows. We
are left to assume that Widukind, like Adalbert, felt the practice was so ubiquitous that it
went without saying.
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11. HOLY ALLIES: BRUN AND UDALRICH
Ruotger of Cologne, Vita Sancti Brunonis archiepiscopo Coloniensis
The monk Ruotger, schoolmaster at the monastery of St. Pantaleon in Cologne, wrote
his Vita Sancti Brunonis shortly after the archbishop’s death in 965. It was certainly
finished before the death of Brun’s successor Folcmar in 969.1 The work appears to have
been original, even pioneering. No literary models have been found upon which the Vita
could have been directly based, though there is a similarity in style to the brevity and
matter-of-fact tone of Einhard’s biography of Charlemagne. Ruotger certainly did not
intend the Vita as a hagiography. Its language is “highly charged and confrontational…
well removed from sermo humilis.”2 While Ruotger devoted a good part of the text to
Brun’s admirable pastoral conduct, good works and efforts on behalf of his diocese, and
devotion to the liberal arts, and described his death at age 40 at some length in the
hagiographical tradition, he deliberately omitted any catalogue of posthumous miracles
associated with a saint’s life. Those who came to his tomb to pray, he said, “did not look
for miracles, but paid attention to his life and recollected his teaching.”3 Rather than
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Henry Mayr-Harting, “Ruotger, the Life of Bruno and Cologne Cathedral Library,” in
Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Margaret Gibson, ed. Lesley Smith and
Benedicta Ward (London and Rio Grande, OH: The Hambledon Press, 1992), 36.
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3

Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 5.

Frequentant locum sepulture eius, certatim memorant, quid fecerit, quid docuerit, qualis vixerit,
qualis obierit. Signa non querunt… Ruotger Vita Sancti Brunonis Archiepiscopi Coloniensis, ed.
Hatto Kallfelz (in Lebensbeschreibungen Einiger Bischöfe des 10.-12. Jahrhunderts, FSGA 22:
169-260 [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973]) 48.254.13-16. Trans. MayrHarting in Church and Cosmos, 15.
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praise his saintliness for its own sake, Ruotger intended to demonstrate that Brun’s
illustrious if short career, during which he held the offices of both archbishop and duke,
was vital to the pacification of Lotharingia without being incompatible with the archetype
of a pious bishop established by Gregory the Great in his Pastoral Care.
The idea of pax was central to Ruotger’s premise that the security of the Reich was a
prerequisite for the development of religion and virtue. Thus, in Ruotger’s eyes, the
protection of religious institutions should be equally as important to a bishop as his
purely spiritual duties. He interpreted this obligation broadly to justify a whole range of
secular actions on Brun’s part, including defense against the encroachments of the lay
nobility and participation in military-political affairs on an international scale.4 Given the
prevailing conditions, Ruotger held that clerical control of worldly affairs should be
decided on a case-by-case basis, just as each bishop was expected to support his diocese
in a different way according to need and his means.5 By drawing on the words of St. Paul
to do good not only before God but also before men,6 Ruotger formed an interpretation of
Brun’s vita activa that justified interference in all worldly affairs, including on the

4

Hoffmann 34.

5

Hoffmann 39. For a brief list of the material contributions of Ottonian bishops, see Francis J.
Tschan, Saint Bernward of Hildesheim, University of Notre Dame: Publications in Medieval
Studies 6: 12-13 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1942), 57-65 passim.

6

…providentes bona non tantum coram Deo, sed etiam coram hominibus. Ruotger 37.236.12-13.
Both Hoffmann and Kallfelz cite Romans 12:17 for this phrase, but the correct source is in fact II
Corinthians 8:21, per Mayr-Harting, “Ruotger, the Life of Bruno and Cologne Cathedral
Library,” 42.
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battlefield.7 In short, Ruotger cast Brun as an agent of Realpolitik responsive to the needs
of his time rather than a blind adherent to a naïve theory of the ecclesiastical ideal.8
Hartmut Hoffmann proposes that the rising feudal power of the nobility rendered the
power of the central state uncertain, obliging the church to take control of secular
functions out of enlightened self-interest.9 While this theory may seem apt in retrospect,
it puts the cart before the horse by allowing for neither the long tradition of bishops as
provincial defense leaders nor for their noble prerogative to bear arms.
No magnate of the church had been entrusted with this much power before or since.
Even those who supported Brun acknowledged the controversy.10 Even without the
evidence left by his critics, the quantity of ink Ruotger spent justifying his patron’s
position proves that the ideal he put forward was by no means universally accepted.11
Flodoard of Reims, as shown, was one detractor of “the bishop who had become a duke”
(ex praesule ducem).12 He was a local witness to Brun’s intervention against the
Normans in West Francia,13 which stands out as an extreme example of the unauthorized

7

Hoffmann 37.

8

Ibid. 33.

9

Ibid. 40.
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Ibid. 31.
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Mayr-Harting, “Ruotger” 33.
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Flodoard a.957.144.5 (62, 39B).
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Ruotger 39-40.240 passim.

127

practice of worldly power.14 Ruotger saw this rather as a righteous defense of greater
Christendom, and added a proto-humanistic note by paraphrasing the classical playwright
Terence, saying that “nothing of humanity was foreign to him” (humani nihil alienum).15
Resistance also formed around Archbishop Frederick of Mainz and his successor
William. Mainz was a rival of Cologne for preeminence under the Ottonians, and the
ongoing “Mainz theme” was comparable to Liudprand’s strident criticism of the bishopturned-warlord Manasses of Arles.16 William (Brun’s nephew, an otherwise loyal
member of the royal party) complained in a letter to Pope Agapetus II that a duke and a
bishop ought not to claim one another’s functions. To such critics, Ruotger fired back:
There are some, ignorant of divine ordering, who make an issue of why a bishop
should deal with secular and military affairs when he received only the care of
souls. To these people, had they any sense, there was an easy answer if they
considered the good of peace, as great as it was unusual, especially in these parts
[i.e., Lotharingia], which was spread far and wide through this protector and
teacher of a faithful people.17
The picture of Frederick that emerges from the Vita is that of Brun’s antithesis: a bishop
so involved with his own religious devotion that he not only neglected his political duty
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Hoffmann 35.

15

Ruotger 40.240.22; cited in Mayr-Harting, “Ruotger,” 36, and Hoffmann, 38.
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Hoffmann 31, referring to Liudprand, Antapodosis IV.VI-VII and V.XXVI.

17

Causantur forte aliqui divine dispensationis ignari, quare epsicopus rem populi et pericula
belli tractaverit, cum animarum tantummodo curam susceperit. Quibus res ipsa facile, si quid
sanum sapiunt, satisfacit, cum tantum et tam insuetum illis presertim partibus pacis bonum per
hunc tutorem et doctorem fidelis populi longe lateque propagatum aspiciunt, ne pro hac re quasi
in tenebras amplius, ubi non est presentia lucis, offendant. Ruotger 23.212.24-30, trans. MayrHarting, Church and Cosmos 27.
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to receive Otto on an official visit, but gave up on his attempts to mediate with the rebels
Liudolf and Conrad and abandoned Mainz to them, casting grave doubts on his loyalty to
the king.18 Although he gave the rebels no overt support, his religious authority carried
enough weight that even his tacit approval of the insurgency was a great asset to their
cause.19 To this, Ruotger placed the following stinging rebuke in Otto’s mouth:
Some perverse men will perchance say that… battles are none of your business;
they do not become the dignity of your ministry. With such words of strident
falsity you see how many the metropolitan archbishop has… enticed into the
madness of civil disorder. If he wanted to desert from… the danger of battle, in
order to pass his time in religious leisure, it would have been better for us indeed
and for our res publica, to have handed over to us what we conferred on him by
our royal munificence, rather than to our enemies.20
One basis of Ruotger’s case against the archbishop of Mainz is a philosophy derived
from the gospel of John, to wit: “The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep; the
hireling (mercennarius) and he that is not the shepherd…sees the wolf coming and leaves
the sheep; the hireling flees because he is a hireling.”21 Frederick in this context was
obviously the mercennarius who fled before the wolves, where Brun, the bonus pastor,
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Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 28.
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Hoffmann 39.
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Dicent fortasse bellis hec sedanda esse, que ad te non pertineant, que tui ministerii dignitatem
non deceant. Huiusmodi fraudulenta verborum iactantia istius metropolis presul, vides, quantos
seduxit, quantos ad civilis cladis rabiem illexit; qui si subducere vellet a dissensione,
quemadmodum fingit, et bellorum periculo, ut religioso degere posset in otio, nobis profecto et
nostre rei publice melius id, quod ei regali munificencia contulimus, reddidisset quam hostibus.
Ruotger 20.206, 28-33, trans. Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 29.
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11 Bonus pastor animam suam dat per ovibus suis; 12 Mercennarius autem, et qui non est
pastor… videt lumpum venientem et dimittit oves; 13 mercennarius fugit autem, quia est
mercennarius. John 10:11-13, cited in Hoffman, 39.
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was prepared to risk death—particularly on the battlefield—in order to protect his flock.22
This seems to be a declaration by Ruotger that for a bishop to neglect his temporal
obligations to the king and the Reich in favor of a saintly but entirely pacific lifestyle was
not only worthy of contempt, but also tantamount to treason.
The lengthy speech that Ruotger attributed to Otto in chapter 20 was designed not
only to scorn Frederick, but also to emphasize significant points of Brun’s position.
While the king authorized his brother to use all necessary means, including armed force,
to pacify Lotharingia, he was not there merely to sign Brun’s permission slip to go fight.
The entire passage is permeated by the idea of unity between the two brothers,23 and
shows that the archbishop shared in the sacral qualities of Otto’s bloodline as a “royal
priest” (regale sacerdotium).24 It essentialy implies that Brun was equally qualified to be
king. This was a unique defense that no other bishop of the Ottonian period could claim,
and was in keeping with the singularity of Brun’s dual title. Another tactic Ruotger used
that seems to appear in no other work was a discussion of contemporary popular opinion
of Brun and the archbishop’s indifference to his critics, which was couched as a sign of
his modesty and resistance to earthly fame.25
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Hoffmann 38.
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Ruotger 20.206.18.
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Hoffmann 42.
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Ruotger’s audience would have included many of Brun’s followers and appointees to
bishoprics within Lotharingia, so he was preaching to the choir to some extent while
trying on the whole to impress on the Lotharingian church the need for a new kind of
soldier/scholar/pastoral bishop.26 He related his patron’s support of the liberal arts as an
important component of sacral kingship and as intellectual training for a bishop’s
administrative duties and made the arts out to be spiritual weapons to be used in defense
of the king and the Reich.27 While Ruotger made no mention of Brun participating in
battle with actual weapons, Mayr-Harting contends that Brun’s devotion to the bonae
artes must have included a study of the military as well as the liberal arts, borne out by a
later reference by Thietmar of Merseburg to Brun as a military teacher as well as a
leader.28 Brun also dedicated a copy of a military manual, the Strategmata of Frontinus,
to his brother.29 Yet these aspects are equally balanced by his spiritual achievements.
Ruotger drew attention to the advice Brun gives Otto on the choosing of candidates for
other bishoprics, emphasizing that he “…especially [preferred] those who would never be
ignorant of what the pastoral office was.”30 This meant that Brun still thought of a bishop
as a caretaker of souls above all, regardless of the weight of his secular duties. Although
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Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 19.
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Hoffmann 51.
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Thietmar of Merseburg Chronicon IV.31.
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Hoffmann 52.
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…illos nimirum ceteris preferens, quibus nequaquam esset ingonitum, quid pastoris esset
officium… Ruotger 37.236.21-22, trans. Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 12.
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Ruotger declared that the grace of God at his patron’s side was enough to let him subdue
his enemies at times without bloodshed,31 his personal sanctity, while impressive, was
insufficient to the task of raising enough troops to properly deal with the rebels. Thus, the
ducal authority was called for.32
In short, Ruotger justified Brun’s actions by the ends he achieved. The Vita Brunonis
not only supported but also glorified Brun’s binary position as Archbishop of Cologne
and Duke of Lotharingia, pastor and warlord in one. Prinz neatly sums up his policies as
those of pax, timor, and terror.33 His ancestry was touted as having been of the highest
nobility “since men could remember,”34 and his life was held up not as a saint’s to inspire
piety, but as that of a great nobleman who pursued both secular and sacred duties with
equal devotion for the good of the realm (not to say the advancement of his brother’s
politics). To the extent that the so-called Reichskirchensystem existed, Brun appears to
have personified it. Yet while he has been seen in retrospect to be the archetype of the
Ottonian bishop, and Ruotger’s Vita a blueprint for those who followed him,35 it is also
worth considering that Ruotger may have been holding Brun of Cologne up as a subject
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…ut absque bello et humana pernicie maxima sepe pericula sedarentur. Ruotger 25.216.14,
cited in Hoffmann, 40.
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Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 29.
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Attavorum eius attavi usque ad hominum memoriam omnes nobilissimi… Ruotger 2.182.20-21.
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Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos 19-20.
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of admiration too virtuous to be imitated.36 In fact, the practice of granting secular titles
to bishops would not become the norm until the early eleventh century—and then only
with counties, not duchies—and so for his time, Brun was a novelty.37
For all his repute as a warlord, Brun of Cologne saw no actual fighting during the
most memorable military operation of his brother’s reign, the victory over the Magyars at
the River Lech in August of 955. He assembled his troops on receiving news of their
invasion, but instead of marching south, kept them in reserve against the possibility that
the enemy would turn toward Lotharingia and the lower Rhineland.38 Another man was
on the spot for the Lechfeld campaign, a different yet equally apt model— perhaps even a
better one—for the “good” Ottonian bishop.

Gerhard of Augsburg, Vita Sancti Oudalrici Episcopi Augustani
Udalrich (or Ulrich) of Augsburg was born to a noble family of Swabia, most likely
about 890;39 his own words name his birthplace as Augsburg itself.40 He began his
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clerical career as a child oblate at the monastery of St-Gall. He then entered the service
of Bishop Adalbert of Augsburg, advanced to the court of Henry I, and was elevated to
the see of his native city in 923.41 He held his office for a respectable 50 years, during
which his piety generated tales of miracles. The most well known is how he rode across
the swollen river Wertach in winter and emerged entirely dry, while a companion was
soaked to the waist.42 Gerhard, provost of the cathedral chapter, wrote the Vita Sancti
Uodalrici as part of an effort to have him canonized, and so it counts as the type of
saint’s vita that the Vita Brunonis was not. He probably began it shortly after the
bishop’s death in 973, and it must have been in circulation by 992, as it was read at his
canonization.43
His saintly qualities notwithstanding, Udalrich conducted the military part of his
office equally well. The highlight of his martial career was his defense of Augsburg
during the Magyar invasion of 955. Chapter 12 of the Vita narrates the local course of
events at some length, up to and including the Battle of the Lechfeld as seen from within
Augsburg’s walls, undoubtedly drawn from Gerhard’s own memory as well as living
eyewitnesses.44 However, this clash was by no means Bishop Udalrich’s first outing as a
military leader. He had previously served Otto I during the rebellion of the king’s son
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Liudolf from 953 to 954, and in chapter 10, Gerhard describes in tense and exciting detail
the hazards that his loyalty entailed.
In the summer of 953, Duke Henry of Bavaria had marched with his vassals to support
his brother the king, leaving his lands in the custody of Pfalzgraf Arnulf of Regensburg,
who betrayed this trust and delivered Bavaria into Liudolf’s hands. Bishop Udalrich,
“whose loyalty was so firm that he never refused the king help,”45 mustered a portion of
his own followers and went to assist Otto in restoring his brother to power. Due to the
urgency of his mission, he travelled “not in a cart, but by horse.”46 This is a seemingly
tongue-in-cheek reference to the bishop’s habit of going about his lands in an ox-drawn
vehicle, the better to conduct business or read the psalms during his “commute.”47 Once
he had left, Arnulf’s troops looted Augsburg, captured many of the bishop’s men, and left
the surrounding territory to Liudolf’s followers. When Udalrich returned from campaign,
he found his remaining vassals in dire circumstances and saw that his reduced forces
were outnumbered by the enemies around them. He decided to leave Augsburg for the
nearby fortress of Matahinga, which was “lacking all structures… and completely
abandoned,”48 to make his stand as best he could.
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…Oudalricus, cuius fidelitas firma stabilitas numquam ab adiutorio regis separata est…
Gerhard 10.96.15-16.
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…omisso vehiculo carpenti, equitando… Gerhard 10.96.18.
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Gerhard 5.76.34-36.
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…quod erat in toto interius exteriusque sine aedificiis desertum. Gerhard 10.96.35-98.1.
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Arnulf delivered threats; Udalrich negotiated and prevaricated, cleverly stalling for
time to allow him to reinforce his position. When he felt suitably prepared, he dropped
his pretense and declared openly that he would not desert Otto’s cause. Arnulf’s son,
named for his father, gathered an army and prepared to dislodge the bishop. Udalrich
offered a hefty monetary bribe in exchange for peace, but coupled it with the threat of
excommunication for all those who violated the property of the Virgin Mary, Augsburg’s
patron. Undeterred, the younger Arnulf laid siege to Matahinga “on the Sunday which
the clergy keep as the last day to eat meat before Easter.”49 The bishop hunkered down
and put his faith in God. He was rewarded shortly when his brother, Count Dietbald of
Brenzgau, along with Count Adelbert of Obermachtal—seemingly the king’s only
remaining partisans in Swabia50—marched to his aid. They launched a surprise attack on
the rebels’ siege camp “at dawn on the first day of Lent, which is a Monday.”51 The
younger Arnulf and his followers were routed; “None of those who had showed hostility
in Augsburg to God’s holy mother Mary came away unscathed, save those that had
immediately bought with their own means the indulgence of the reverend bishop.”52
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…prima die quadragesimalis temporis, quod est dies Lunae… Gerhard 10.100.1-3.
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This passage offers a thorough picture not only of an Ottonian bishop’s duties, but of
the way in which kinship and interpersonal loyalty underlay the working of German
politics and internal strife. Gerhard showcased Udalrich’s considerable leadership skills
under duress, his ability to read the strengths and weaknesses of his own forces and those
of his opponents, and his way of striking a balance between diplomacy, tactical
maneuver, and faith (in both God and the bonds of blood and amicitiae that assured his
allies’ support). It is also worth noting that Udalrich relied on his city’s patron saint as a
prop to the righteousness of his position and as an added weight to the threats he made to
his opponents, an approach which did not feature prominently in other bishops’ vitae. In
his study of the Lechfeld campaign, Charles Bowlus has observed that Gerhard may have
played down the bishop’s role in military violence in order to smooth over his candidacy
for sainthood.53 There is evidence here, however, to suggest that Gerhard’s intention was
quite the opposite. The attention he drew to the dates of the incident, with implied
criticism of the rebels who launched an attack during Holy Week, rings like legal
testimony, as if to say, “Let the record reflect that my bishop was here on these days and
did these things.” By showing how Udalrich succeeded as both a loyal vassal of the king
and a defender of his diocese and of the honor of Saint Mary, Gerhard seems to offer a
picture of the bishop as a holy warrior who used all the canonical weapons in his arsenal,
stopping short of actually bearing arms or doing violence in person. This image is drawn
even more obviously during his later actions, as it seemed that Udalrich’s experiences
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during the rebellion were a dress rehearsal of sorts for the challenges that lay ahead.
Gerhard was also careful to show the consequences of the sins perpetrated upon the
bishop and his city, by both the highborn and the low, whether repented for or not. “Not
long after, pfalzgraf Arnulf, who had presumed to invade the property of Saint Mary with
hostility, and remained incorrigibly impenitent, was at the seige of Regensburg; and as he
left the city to fight, was killed in the tumult.”54 For contrast, the passage then introduces
an anonymous soldier who was tormented by the devil for looting a cheap tablecloth from
Augsburg, but was relieved of his guilt when he returned his plunder and confessed to the
bishop. Lest the reader doubt that the narrative of events was second to the advancement
of Christian morality through the deeds of Udalrich, Gerhard states:
So that I do not digress too long from my subject, let me refrain from
enumerating the sieges of cities by one party or the other, or the raging battles
everywhere and the vicissitudes of various raids; and speak rather of Almighty
God through the merits of His servants graciously freed the people, so they might
not through the machinations of the devil be brought to ruin.55
Along with the bishop of Chur, Udalrich mediated a peace between Otto and Liudolf
in 954, “and one hoped for a time of peace and quiet. Yet in the following year, the year
of the incarnation of our lord Jesus Christ 955, the horde of the Hungarians broke upon
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Ne diu me ab incepta taxatione subtraham, libet stilum retrahere ab enumeratione ex utraque
parte obsessarum urbium et bellorum undique furentium et vicissitudine stromatum diversorum;
sed potius, quomodo Dominus omnipotens per merita servorum suorum suum dignaretur
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Gerhard 12.102.17-22.
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us.”56 After ravaging Bavaria, the Magyars crossed the Lech and pillaged Swabia, then
invested Augsburg, whose walls had not yet been fully repaired from the damage
sustained during the rebellion. However:
…the saintly bishop had brought together within the bulwarks of the city a large
number of the best soldiers, whose training and bravery ensured that the city
would be properly defended under God. When they saw that the Hungarian army
had completely surrounded the city, they wanted to sally out against it, which the
bishop did not permit them to do. Instead, he ordered that the gate through which
entry was the easiest be heavily reinforced. The bishop’s soldiers, fighting
valiantly in front of [the east] gate, resisted [the Hungarians]… During the battle
the bishop sat on his warhorse and remained unwounded in the midst of the fray
while wearing only a stola, protected by neither shield nor chain mail, nor helmet,
as missiles and stones whirled around him. After this encounter, he re-entered the
city, and, walking around it, he ordered that blockhouses be constructed
throughout the entire night at suitable places and that the walls be reinforced
whenever time allowed. He, however, spent the night in prayer.57
Charles Bowlus suggests that the bishop’s passage through the fray, unarmored yet
unharmed, may not have been all that miraculous due to the probable inaccuracy of
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…se aliquod spacium temporis in pace posse quiescere. Altero pro certo statim anno, quod est
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Magyar archery at close range.58 Regardless, this is a powerful account. It describes the
elderly Udalrich making the most of his position to lead from the front, inspiring his
troops at great personal risk, showing clearly that he had full control over his milites, and
had taken the experience of the siege of Matahinga to heart. Most importantly, it
demonstrates Gerhard’s belief that a would-be saint could very properly lead troops in a
military action, and do so protected only by his faith, without impugning his sanctity.
Udalrich’s heroism at Augsburg delayed the Magyars long enough for Otto to arrive
with his army and lift the siege, upon which the Swabian contingent in the royal host
were reinforced by Udalrich’s best troops, led by his brother Dietpald. Udalrich himself
did not join Otto’s army, but following the king’s decisive victory, emerged from his
battered city to search for his brother’s body among the slain. Thanks to his contribution
to this triumph of militant Christendom, as well as the miracles attributed to him during
his lifetime and posthumously, Udalrich was made a saint by Pope John XV in 993, the
first ever to be formally canonized by Rome.59 As a patron of the Ottonian house, his
image appeared prominently in the iconography of Henry II.60 Brun of Cologne, in spite
of the devotion of his own local cult, was not granted sainthood until 1895.61
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12. WITNESS TO WAR: THIETMAR
Theitmar of Merseburg, Chronicon
The first two books of the Thietmar’s chronicle have been called little more than a
condensation of Widukind with the benefit of a certain amount of editing.1 This is not an
unfair assessment, yet the Chronicon is much more than the sum of its parts. Born into a
noble East Saxon family in 975 and elevated in 1009 to the revived archbishopric of
Merseburg,2 Thietmar compiled his history between 1013 and his death in 1018. It
covers the period from 892 to Thietmar’s death, from the reign of Henry I into the time of
Henry II, whom Thietmar served. Possibly drawing on the Vita Brunonis and the Vita
Sancti Oudalrici as well as the Res gestae Saxonicae, Thietmar provided a narrative that
touched on the careers of numerous important churchmen, not the least of whom is
himself. Merseburg was an important staging point for the Polish and Bohemian
campaigns of Henry II and Thietmar was both an eyewitness and an active participant in
these.3 Thietmar’s point of view remained that of a dyed-in-the-wool Saxon aristocrat, a
political animal, and a devoted administrator of his see and his spiritual duties all at once,
loyal to both Reich and Church. His narrative reflects a skillful balancing act between

1

Raymund F. Wood, The Three Books of the Deeds of the Saxons, Ph.D. diss. (University of
California at Los Angeles, 1949), 67.

2

Merseburg was established in 968 by Otto I (see fn 29 below), but suppressed for various
reasons of jurisdiction in 981 by Otto II. Henry II restored the bishopric in 1004. David A.
Warner, introduction to Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, 59.

3

David S. Bachrach, “Memory, Epistemology, and the Writing of Early Medieval History: The
Example of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg (1009-1018)” (Viator 38, No.1 [2007]), 73.
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contemporary standards for the ideal behavior for a bishop and that which the political
and military reality of the “Reichskirchensystem” required.
Thietmar’s attitude towards war reflected the theory that Ottonian society was not just
militaristic, but indeed organized by war. As with Widukind and Ruotger, warfare to
Thietmar was an acceptable and normal aspect of kingly rule as ordained by God. He saw
the act of participating in war, whether sanctioned by the crown or in a “just” private
feud, as both a nobleman’s duty and his privilege, whether he held a secular title or a
church benefice. Thietmar was unapologetically proud of his own East Saxon lineage
and his immediate family. He spoke of the martial prowess of his ancestors,4 of his
father’s heroism even in unauthorized warfare,5 of his brother’s exploits on campaign
against Boleslav,6 and of his uncles’ exciting escape from the clutches of the Norsemen
and his own narrow brush with being held as an official hostage himself.7 His cousin
Werner, even as a rebel, was given his due in a tale of his vigorous warlike qualities.8
Since the Emperor’s right to make war on pagans and “bad Christians” was
unquestioned, Thietmar easily portrayed his patron Henry II and his forbears as
successful military leaders. Henry I, even as a youth, “revealed himself to be a warrior of

4

Thietmar of Merseburg I.10.16.4-7 and VI.48.334.20-22.

5

Thietmar II.29.75.30-32.

6

Thietmar VI.15.292.21-23.

7

Thietmar IV.24.159-60.

8

Thietmar VII.4.403-404.
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good character.” 9 Otto I, even though he was “a friend of peace [who] greatly
suppressed warfare,”10 was also called invincibilis,11 an epithet which his crucial victory
at the Lech must certainly have warranted to Thietmar’s generation. However, pitched
battles were a rare occurence. The Emperors and their followers most frequently
conducted economic warfare, burning and plundering property and causing loss of life to
livestock and humans. When the enemies were pagans, they were also subject to
enslavement. No phrase seems to have been used more repeatedly than that thus-andsuch a leader “laid waste to [an enemy’s territory] by fire and sword.” Thietmar did not
explicitly glorify the destruction of land and people, nor did he make an effort to
condemn it, at least not so far as it was executed by a king or magnate of his own party
conducting a “just” war. In fact, St. Augustine’s teachings seemed to have been
interpreted in this period to sanction the legitimate killing of all in war’s path, whether
they were of non-combatant status or not.12 Certainly, war waged by a Christian monarch
against the pagan required no such excuse. Henry I destroyed and burned the territory of
the Slavs;13 Otto III did likewise to the rebellious Hevelli.14

9

…et ut bonae indolis gradatim enituit tiro. Thietmar I.3.6.5 (trans. Warner, 68).

10

Pacis amicus erat bellum lateque premebat. Thietmar, Prologue to Book II, 37.14 (89).

11

Thietmar, Prologue to Book II, 38 19.

12

Christopher Allmand, “War and the Noncombatant in the Middle Ages,” in Keen, Medieval
Warfare, 258.

13

Thietmar I.3.6.

14

Thietmar IV.29.167.
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Even when conducted against fellow Christians, Thietmar recognized economic war
against rebels and other threats to the well being of the empire as appropriate. When
Lothar of Francia seized Aachen, Otto II invaded his Christian neighbor in reprisal.
Thietmar noted smugly that Otto “pursued him as far as his seat at Paris, wasting and
burning everything in his path. The emperor returned in triumph, having struck the
enemy with such terror that they never again dared such a thing.” 15 Henry II pillaged the
rebel Herman of Swabia’s territory on more than one occasion, but lest his patron appear
too little versed in Christian charity, Thietmar said of the second outing that Henry was
“conquered by the cries of the poor” and desisted.16 Following the suppression of an
uprising in Pavia in 1004 in which the Empress’s younger brother Giselbert was slain and
avenged, Henry restrained his men from excessive looting and granted mercy to those
who performed ritual submission.17 Even against the Bohemians, who were often as
much enemies as subjects, Henry found himself disturbed by the massacre of the garrison
at Saaz by its citizens in order to gain his favor and granted protection to the survivors.18
Like Widukind, Thietmar reserved his criticism for rebels and foreign enemies of
Germany, especially pagan ones. Even when they were using the same tactics as the

15

Quem celeriter abeuntem cesar insequitur, depopulatis omnibus et incendio consumptis usque
ad Parisiam sedem. Reversus inde imperator triumphali gloria, tantum hostibus incussit
terrorem, ut numquam post talia incipere auderent. Thietmar III.8.107.7-8,11-13 (133).

16

…ad ultimum clamore devictus pauperum… Thietmar V.13.236.11(214).

17

Thietmar VI.8.283.35-284.5.

18

Thietmar VI.11.288.1-6.
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German forces, the language Thietmar used to describe them is subtly harsher, sometimes
applied to the actions and sometimes to the perpetrators. In putting down the rebellion of
his son Liudolf in 954, Otto I left Bavarian territory “depopulated and ravaged by fire.”19
On the other side of the coin, the adherents of Otto’s brother Henry during a later
rebellion were “supporters of… iniquity” when they behaved in like fashion.20 The
pagans who rebelled and sacked Brandenburg in 983 are condemned for committing an
outrage, even though they seemed to be instruments of God’s anger against the arrogance
of Margrave Dietrich.21 Yet for this strong language, these statements are curiously
bloodless and do not touch on the actual suffering of war’s collateral victims. It seems as
though Thietmar, so long as he was satisfied that the war was “just,” was more concerned
with the dignity of the Church and the prerogatives of the aristocracy than he was in the
destruction of the lives and livelihood of the people of the land. When the clergy were
mocked (exactly how is unclear) during Otto II’s attack on Schleswig in 974 during the
suppression of the rebellious Danes, it seems to have instilled more indignation in
Thietmar than in any case of a city actually being sacked.22 Thietmar also expressed his
disapproval for Henry II’s alliance with the pagan Liutizi in his wars against Boleslav
Chrobry. Without criticizing Henry directly in so many words, his disdain was implied

19

…eadem regione depopulata atque combusta rediit. Thietmar II.6.46.6-7 (96).

20

…cum caeteris nequiciae suimet fautoribus cis Renum plurima depopulati sunt. Thietmar
II.34.82.4-5 (117).

21

Thietmar III.17.119-20.

22

Thietmar III.6.104.3-11.
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when he went on for some three chapters describing the Slavs’ barbaric customs.23 Yet
when Henry’s Slavic allies pillaged the lands of the rebel bishop Dietrich of Metz,
Thietmar lay the blame squarely on Dietrich himself, who “brought irreparable harm
upon himself and his successors.”24
Though his commitment to the Church and the Christian faith were unwavering,
Thietmar, like Widukind, did not often couch his descriptions of warfare in theological
terms. War for the Germans as he described it, though waged on behalf of God’s
anointed monarch, was a matter of worldly power politics as often as it was a righteous
struggle in the name of God. Christian doctrine and ritual were usually incidental to its
conduct. Defeat was sometimes seen by Thietmar as God’s punishment for sin and
sometimes simply as the fortunes of war; victory was occasionally the result of divine
favor, but more often the credit went to the earthly combatants. Those instances in which
he described God’s influence (whether direct or indirect) seem to occur in battle against
enemies of the faith, not fellow Christians. Thietmar noted that Henry I converted the
Danes by force and stamped out their practice of human sacrifice, as was proper for a
Christian monarch, citing God’s prohibition against killing the innocent and pious.25 This
is a supreme irony considering the number of innocents who were undoubtedly harmed
during all the looting and burning that came as the collateral to “just” war. Henry was

23

Thietmar VI.22.301-25.304 passim.

24

…sibi successoribusque suis inexsuperabile detrimentum promeruit. Thietmar VI.51.338.13-14
(273).

25

Thietmar I.17.23-24.
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penitent when God humbles him in battle for his pride,26 but as to whether he had a profit
motive, Thietmar the nobleman prudently absolved himself from judging: “If, as many
say, Henry enriched himself unjustly during his reign, may merciful God forgive him.”27
The epic qualities of the battle at the Lech in 955 and the conditions that led up to it
naturally called for divine participation, especially given the fortuitous timing that saw
the main day of battle occur on the Feast of St. Lawrence. He saw the Magyar invasion
of the previous year as God’s punishment, which the Almighty only lifted when the cries
of the sinners became too great.28 When Otto addressed his troops at Augsburg prior to
leading them into battle, he issued a crusading-style promise of eternal reward for those
who died fighting the pagans. Promising to dedicate a bishopric at Merseburg in
exchange for God’s help, Otto then led them with the Holy Lance in his hand.29
During the wars of Otto II against the Bohemians, the enemy sacked the church at
Zeitz and the monastery of Calbe, because, according to Theitmar, they believed strongly
in their pagan gods while “our spirits [were] fearful because of our sins.”30 In the same
passage, when the Abodrites burned Hamburg, God intervened directly in view of all to

26

Thietmar I.15.22.

27

Si quid in regno suimet, ut multi dicunt, predatus sit, huic Deus Clemens ignoscat. Thietmar
I.16.23.21-22 (80).

28

Thietmar II.7.47.
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Thietmar II.10.48. Otto was unable to fulfill his promise until 968.

30

…nostra etenim facinora nobis formidinem et his suggerebant validam mentem. Thietmar
III.18.120.8-9 (142).
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save the city’s holy relics: “A golden hand came down from the highest regions and, with
outstretched fingers, reached into the middle of the fire.”31 In the following campaign,
the Slavs ravaged “without sustaining any losses and aided by their gods;”32 this is a
curious turn of phrase that almost seems to give credence to the pagans’ religion. The
German forces under several noblemen (including Thietmar’s father Siegfried) and two
bishops, after “fortifying body and spirit with the sacrament of Heaven,”33 then dealt the
pagans a stunning defeat. Thietmar ascribed their loss to their abandonment by God for
their unbelief. The very next passage offers a contrast. When Otto II suffered his
military disaaster in Calabria in 982 against the Saracens, the “innumerable” fallen had
“names… known only to God”34 (which was to say, the “other ranks,” as he identifies
several nobles by name). Yet Thietmar makes no mention of the defeat as a punishment
for sin, nor of the error of the enemy’s religion.
Notwithstanding the seeming inconsistency in how he portrayed divine influence on
the motivation and outcome of Christians waging war, Thietmar was clearly comfortable
with the participation of churchmen (himself included) in the same, directly or indirectly.
The Chronicon contains numerous mentions of bishops and abbots being called upon to

31

Venit de supernis sedibus aurea dextera, in medium collapsa incendium expansis digitis, et
plena cunctis videntibus rediit. Thietmar III.18.120.13-15 (142).

32

…quae sine aliqua lesione residua quaeque suorum auxilio deorum tunc devastare non
dubitarent… Thietmar III.19.120.26-27. (142).

33

…corpus animamque caelesti sacramento muniunt… Thietmar III.19.122.3-4 (143).

34

… ceterisque ineffabilibus, quorum nomina Deus sciat. Thietmar III.20.124.6 (144).
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provide troops for garrison duty in frontier fortresses and to defend their own bailiwicks
against enemies of the state;35 to serve as jailors for important political prisoners;36 and,
of course, to not only provide, but command, contingents of troops for the Emperor’s
campaigns against both foreign enemies and rebels. Curiously, Brun of Cologne, who
featured so prominently in the military-political landscape of Otto the Great’s reign, is
described at length by Thietmar only once, when he intrigued with Hugh of West Francia
to betray the king his brother (an incident discreetly overlooked by writers at the time).
Thietmar did, however, report Brun’s subsequent repentance and reconciliation. On the
subject of his dual role, he said only, “I have spoken of only a few of this great man’s
innumerable deeds… because his noble lifestyle is fully described in another book
[Ruotger’s Vita Brunonis], to which I can add nothing.”37 Another notable omission
from Thietmar’s catalogue was the central role played by Udalrich of Augsburg during
the Lech campaign. This is an odd discrepancy, if, as Warner thinks, he had the Vita
Sancti Uodalrici to draw on.38 Thietmar himself, however, clearly knew what it took to
conduct the defense of a city. Assigned to garrison an old burg near Lebusa, he showed
off both his strategic acumen and his classical education: “I surveyed it with great

35

Thietmar V.21.247.3-5 and V.25.251.4-6.
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Thietmar VI.54.342.10-11.
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Pauca locutus sum de innumerabilibus et isto et isto melioribus tanti viri ingenuis actibus, quia
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II.23.69.6-9 (109).
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diligence and decided, on the authority of Lucan, that it was a large Roman structure and
the work of Julius Caesar. It could have held more than ten thousand men.”39
The following examples are worth noting, as they demonstrate the conflict that
sometimes seemed to be inherent in calling upon spiritual leaders to perform acts of
destructive warfare. In 1003, Henry II sent Bishop Henry of Würzburg and Abbot
Erkenbald of Fulda to destroy Schweinfurt to punish its rebel lord, the Margrave Henry.
When Henry’s agitated mother refused to leave, the two churchmen “…[put] aside
secular concerns in favor of the love of Christ,” and instead did only token damage.40 On
the other hand, Bishops Arnulf of Halberstadt and Meinwerk of Paderborn, among others,
were ordered by Henry II to pillage Polish territory during his expedition against
Boleslav Chrobry in 1010: “And so it was done,”41 without elaboration. Archbishop
Gero of Magdeburg was co-commander of Henry’s rearguard towards the close of the
Polish campaign of 1015. His force suffered heavy casualties and while he himself
managed to escape, he found himself in the melancholy position of having to officiate at
the funerals of some of his fellow nobles who did not.42 Archbishop Tagino of
Merseburg, who sponsored Thietmar to succeed him in his see, commanded a force

39

Hanc cum dilgenter lustrarem, opus Iulii Cesaris et magnam Romanorum structuram Lucano
ammonente tractavi; haes plus quam X milia hominum capera potuisset. Thietmar VI.59.348.1-2
(278).

40

Unde seniores prefati ob Christi amorem seculares postponendo timores decretam mutabant
sententiam… Thietmar V.38.264.10-12 (231).
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Sic ergo, ut decreverunt, factum est. Thietmar VI.57.345.27 (277).

42

Thietmar VII.21.432-22.424
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against Boleslav during the fighting of 1007. Thietmar, who was by his side on this
campaign, in fact criticizes his superior because he “knew about everything ahead of
time, but he had not made sufficient preparations.”43 Yet he later praises Tagino as a pio
pastore44 and describes his devotion to his spiritual duties at length.45 While it seems as
though Thietmar appreciated military competence in his brother bishops, he clearly did
not consider it a prerequisite for suitability to pastoral duties.
The most memorable instances of ecclesiastical magnates participating in warfare, of
course, were those in which they were not only nominally in charge of a body of men but
were involved in the thick of combat themselves. While this may be implied by the
number of times a bishop or abbot is cited as the leader of a military unit, unambiguous
descriptions of these men putting themselves directly in harm’s way are rare. The
unarmed leadership showed by Udalrich in the defense of Augsburg is a good example,
as is the case of Bernward of Hildesheim during the Roman uprising against Otto III.46
Thietmar described a similar action during the fight against the Slavs at Bardengau in
997: “Bishop Ramward of Minden took part in that battle. Followed by the standardbearers, he had taken up his cross in his hands and ridden out ahead of his companions,
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…et haec omnia prius sciens, non bene providebat. Thietmar VI.33.260.22 (260).
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Thietmar VI.38.321.18.
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Thietmar VI.63.352-65.356 passim.
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Thangmar, Vita Sancti Bernwardi 24.
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thereby encouraging them for battle.”47 In none of these cases was a churchman depicted
actually fighting. That distinction goes to Bishop Michael of Regensburg (941-72) in the
aftermath of a defeat on the Hungarian frontier. The passage is vivid and evocative:
The bishop lost an ear, was also wounded in his other limbs, and lay among the
fallen as if he were dead. Lying next to him was an enemy warrior. When he
realized the bishop alone was alive, and feeling safe from the snares of the enemy,
he took a lance and tried to kill him. Strengthened by the Lord, the bishop
emerged victorious from the long, difficult struggle and killed his enemy. Finally,
travelling by various rough paths, he arrived safely in familiar territory, to the
great joy of his flock and all Christians. He was held to be a brave warrior by all
the clergy and the best of pastors by the people, and his mutilation brought him no
shame, but rather greater honour.48
This vignette has frequently been cited as proof positive of the martial nature of Ottonian
bishops49 and seems to demonstrate Thietmar’s skillful ability in his narrative to balance
the normal behavior expected of a lord of the Church with canonically suspect deviations
from that norm.50 However, it should be noted that Thietmar never specifically said that
Bishop Michael went into the battle armed with the intention of fighting and killing the
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In illo certamine Ramwardus Mindensis episcopus fuit, qui socios, arrepta in manibus cruce
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enemy, only that he slew a Magyar soldier in self-defense. Perhaps it was by his own
sword, perhaps he picked up a weapon lying near to hand, or, for all we know, he may
have resisted his opponent so vigorously that he succumbed to existing wounds. The
result may have met with approbation, but the circumstances are ambiguous.
Yet as the Chronicon moved into the time of Thietmar’s own career under Henry II,
one gets the sense that he became more introspective and critical of the participation of a
churchman in combat. It is not surprising that the enthusiasm for warfare in his voice
waned with his own increasing proximity to the consequences of the violence of even a
“just” war. In 1009, Henry II instituted a scorched-earth policy on the east Saxon march
to deny the Poles its resources. Thietmar expresses guilt over his participation:
I also cannot omit the great misfortune that befell the margrave. All of us—and I
exclude no one—acted as though we were Gero’s enemies rather than his friends.
With the sole exception of his dependants, we destroyed everything, much of it by
fire. The king did not seek revenge for this offense, nor did he offer protection.51
Likewise lamenting the losses sustained by the troops of Archbishop Gero of Magdeburg
in the campaign of 1015 (above), he put forth an especially heartfelt mea culpa: “May
omnipotent God look upon their names and their souls with mercy! May all of us who
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Nec preterire possum, quod miserabile nimis predicto comiti ibidem accidit. Nos omnes—nec
aliquem excipere valeo—vice amicorum hostes huic fuimus exceptisque dumtaxat mancipiis
omnia consumpsimus et quaedam igne. Huius rei nec rex ultor seu defensor fuit. Thietmar VI.56.
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caused their deaths, through our sins, be reconciled to him through Christ! And, may God
mercifully protect us so that we never need to endure such a thing again!”52
Still, what good soldier who has seen much slaughter may not regret his actions and
still believe in the righteousness of his cause? It has been supposed that the onset of
Gregorian Reform in the later eleventh century brought the days of fighting bishops to an
end,53 and to a certain extent this statement is true, though just how true must be the
subject of a different study. Thietmar could not have foreseen how the Investiture
Conflict between the papacy and the Salian emperors, who succeeded the Ottonians,
would change the political landscape of Germany. He could well have believed that
“…the strained but successful collaboration of kings and bishops would endure forever
and that future generations of bishops might, under the proper circumstances, strap on
their armor, take up their swords, and confront the enemies of Christ.”54
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…quorum nomina et animas Deus omnipotens misericorditer respiciat. Nos vero, quorum
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13. FAITHFUL SHEPHERDS: BURCHARD AND BERNWARD
Vita Burchardi Episcopi
Burchard served as bishop of Worms from 1000 until his death in 1025. The Vita
Burchardi Episcopi was written shortly thereafter by a canon of the cathedral chapter
who knew him well, possibly the cathedral master Ebbo (or Eberhard), and was most
likely dedicated to Burchard’s good friend, Walter, bishop of Speyer.1 While short, the
Vita Burchardi stands as a reasonably thorough guidebook of sorts to the ecclesiastical,
political and military duties of the late Ottonian bishop. Burchard’s archiepiscopal career
straddled the reigns of Otto III and Henry II, the last of the Ottonian monarchs, and
Conrad II, the first of the Salians. His biography therefore gives us a perspective on the
politics of dynastic changeover as well as the balancing act between the roles of good
Christian shepherd and military commander that befell a bishop of the Mainz circle.
Following the common practice of keeping an ecclesiastical title within the same kingroup, Burchard’s brother Franco held the see of Worms before him. This worthy
accompanied Otto III on one of his long Italian sojourns as counselor and spiritual
confidante, where he was “…zealous in the service of the emperor with a vigilant spirit

1

W.L. North, introduction to The Life of Burchard of Worms, 1025 (Internet Medieval
Sourcebook, www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1025burchard-vita.html). As Ebbo’s authorship is
unconfirmed, the Vita Burchardi will be treated here as an anonymous work. All quotes that
follow are from North’s translation, which has no fixed page numbers as an HTML-formatted
document.
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for more than one year and was often party to his secrets”2 until his death. There is no
indication that Franco had any military responsibilities and his role in the text seems to be
to amplify the image of Otto’s self-deprecating piety. Their parents “were not low
according to the world’s dignity”3 and Burchard was apparently a youth of model
morals.4 He entered the orbit of Willigis, the powerful archbishop of Mainz (975-1011),
and rose steadily through the clerical ranks to become his right-hand man.5 After
exhibiting the conventional reluctance of the holy man to take on material advancement,
he was elevated to his late brother’s bishopric once Otto III returned from Italy in 1000.6
Franco’s administrative skills seem to have been less than stellar. Burchard found
Worms in a decrepit and depopulated state, its remaining folk living virtually under siege
from the depredations of wolves of both the two- and four-footed variety. He set himself
at once to seeing his city’s fortifications rebuilt, restoring it to its former peace and
security within five years.7 This description reiterates the shepherd-versus-wolves
metaphor of St. John found in Ruotger’s Vita Brunonis and speaks to the inherent hazards

2

…in expeditionem Italicam cum imperatore profectus est; ibique plus quam unius anni spacio in
servitio imperatoris vigilanti animo studebat, eiusque secreti saepe intererat… Vita Burchardi
Episcopi, ed. G. Waitz (MGH SS IV [Hannover, 1841]) 3.833.30-32.

3

…parentibus secundum seculi diginitatem non infimis. Vita Burchardi 1.83.1-2.

4

This is a common trope; the German biographers do not seem to have recorded anyone in the
model of Saints Augustine or Francis, who lived sensually as young men and found spiritual
enlightenment only later in life.

5

Vita Burchardi 2.833

6

Vita Burchardi 5.834

7

Vita Burchardi 6.835 passim.
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of the medieval landscape and the need for urban security. It also recalls the flight of
Roman citizens from the urbs to the countryside in the wake of the Western Empire’s
decline and allows Burchard to reprise the role of the bishops of late antiquity who had to
defend of their cities as much as they had to tend their flocks.
The theme of the bishop as vigilant guardian against outside predators is universal, but
his need to face enemies in his own back yard is not. The greatest impediment to peace
in Worms seems to have been a fortified house inside the city held by Duke Otto of
Carinthia, a refuge for “robbers, thieves, and all who committed crimes against the
bishop… As a consequence, many limbs were hacked off and many murders occurred on
both sides.”8 There is no mention of formal military action by Burchard to rid himself of
the thorn in his side, but it spurred him to reinforce Worms’ walls and build “a very
strong fortification [with] towers and structures suitable for fighting,”9 which enabled
him to resist the enemy’s hostility and raised the morale of the citizens. The silver lining
to this stalemate was that Burchard was somehow able to obtain guardianship of Duke
Otto’s young grandson Conrad, a virtuous boy rejected by his bellicose family who
would grow up to be the future King Conrad II.10 The issue was finally resolved by the
intervention of King Henry II, who negotiated Duke Otto’s surrender of his fortified

8

Ad quam domum raptores et fures et omnes contra episcopum delinquentes refugium tutissimum
habebant… et ob hoc obtruncationes et homicidia multa ex utraque parte fiebant. Vita Burchardi
7.835.28-31.

9

…et interius, turribus et habitaculis ad pugnandum idoneis non segnitur excitatis, munitionem
satis firmam construxit. Vita Burchardi 7.835.42-44.
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house as compensation for Burchard’s support for his bid for the throne in 1002. The
place was promptly demolished and its materials used to raise a monastery on the site.11
Such were the challenges facing Burchard simply to put his own house in order, a
situation that demonstrates that a bishop might have to deal constantly with martial
affairs even without being summoned to march openly to war. Burchard had to contend
with the latter duty as well. Before the above matter had been resolved, he had to raise
troops for the final Italian expedition of Otto III, and lead them himself alongside men
from Mainz and contingents under the abbot of Fulda and the bishop of Würzburg.12 The
incident that follows in the narrative is singular and telling. On hearing of the emperor’s
death, Burchard’s host turned around and headed back to Germany. Blocked by hostile
local forces at Lucca, and after failing to negotiate their way through:
“…rising swiftly, our men took up arms and all gathered together. Among them
there was a certain Thietmar, a knight of the bishop of Worms and a man of
energy and outstanding in all goodness, who was considered to be the best
informed person in military matters of the entire army. The bishop summoned
him and asked him to help this situation to be resolved without bloodshed, if
possible. … With his men, [Thietmar] swiftly ascended a mountain which was
most dangerous to climb… and secretly went behind the enemy force. When they
saw our men, the enemy was terrified by their miraculous arrival, were devastated
in spirit, and gave themselves over completely to flight. Our men followed,
destroying and cutting down in this flight as many as they were able to catch.
Greatly troubled by this slaughter, the bishop poured forth tears and rebuked
Thietmar severely for this affair. In the end, he sent back not a few denarii to the
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citizens as if for compensation. Thus, by God's grace, they returned to the
fatherland.”13
Burchard was not the only church lord to show regret at the violence of war in which
he had participated,14 but this is a rare and clear-cut expression of guilt in direct reaction
to specific incident. Rather than omit the details of battle and focus only on his patron’s
spiritual achievements, Burchard’s biographer chose to show his piety in contrast to the
onus of his military duties. Burchard fulfilled his obligation to the emperor’s service but
could not reconcile himself to the consequences. The modern reader cannot help but feel
sympathy for the miles Thietmar, who by this report performed his job admirably under
difficult conditions only to find himself called on the carpet by a superior who seems to
have been in denial about the ramifications of his own orders.
Once the ill-fated attempt by Otto III to recapture the glory of ancient Rome had come
to its end, Burchard found himself involved in the politics of succession. Duke Henry of
Bavaria secured his backing, and that of the Archbishop of Mainz, to make good his
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claim to the throne and become King Henry II. Burchard then had to badger the king at
some length to receive his quid pro quo: the transfer of Otto of Carinthia’s stronghold in
Worms to his custody.15 One sees here that while the king was dependent on loyal
bishops for both military service and political influence, fulfillment of the reverse
obligation was not always easily forthcoming. There seems to be a bit of lingering
resentment in a later encounter, when then-emperor Henry paused in Worms en route to
invading Burgundy (possibly in 1016), and the bishop agreed to consecrate a new
monastery in Henry’s presence only with great reluctance.16
Perhaps imitating the model of St. Martin, the author describes how Burchard took a
retreat from his secular duties to polish off what would become his most well-known
accomplishment: the collection of canons known as the Decretum, which he completed
around 1015.17 (This virtuous sabbatical may be contrasted with the poorly timed
abdication of responsibility on the part of Frederick of Mainz in 939.) When he was not
in the mode of dedicated scholar, Burchard often poured his energies into civil as well as
military engineering and oversaw the ordering of the human element in his proprietary
monasteries as well as the architectural.18 Even his purely ecclesiastical acts, however,
were not necessarily free of the martial theme. When Burchard supervised the enclosing
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of a young anchoress, he admonished her fellow nuns in terms that could well be
describing Joan of Arc: “Behold, this slip of a girl boldly marches ahead of you with her
banner flying high and does not fear to fight against spiritual iniquities. Behold how,
dressed in the mail of faith and the helmet of salvation, she is prepared to struggle against
the enemy with unflinching spirit.”19 This language, couching the pursuit of salvation as
an armed struggle, harkens back to the writing of Saint Ambrose in its interweaving of
military and spiritual thought.
The last few chapters are given over to scriptural analysis and discussion of how
piously Burchard met his end, all conventions of typical hagiography. Overall, however,
the anomymous Vita Burchardi Episcopi was much more than a pitch for the elevation of
a holy man. It presents his life as equal parts good shepherd and competent magnate,
committed to excellence in both his spiritual and secular obligations (even when the latter
were at odds with his conscience), without letting either one detract from the other.
Burchard of Worms is thus a fine example of a “typical” Ottonian bishop on par with
Udalrich of Augsburg.

19

Ecce puella tenuissima erecto vexillo intrepida vos praecedit, et contra spiritales nequitias
pugnare non metuit. Ecce lorica fidei galeaque salutis induta, animo imperterrito contra
inimicum dimicare est parata. Vita Burchardi 13.838.41-43.
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Thangmar, Vita Sancti Bernwardi Episcopi Hildesheimensis
Bernward of Hildesheim bears comparison to Burchard on several points. They were
contemporaries, both having trained under Archbishop Willigis of Mainz, and likely
knew each other.20 They died within two years of one another in 1022 and 1025,
respectively. Both men participated in the military actions of Otto III. Both courted the
favor of Otto’s successor Henry II to persuade him to intervene in a local struggle that
threatened to break out into armed violence. In the case of the Vita Sancti Bernwardi, we
do have a clear author. Thangmar was probably a lower-class Saxon freeman who had
served as Hildesheim’s secretary and archivist21 and was his bishop’s close companion
and advisor, and thus in an ideal position to document his complicated life. His work
comes across as rather different document than the Vita of Burchard. It is easily double
in length and goes into greater detail about its subject’s travails in the cutthroat theater of
Ottonian church politics.
Moving in the imperial circle, Bernward found himself playing for higher stakes than
Burchard had in the relatively peripheral see of Worms. His attachment to the powerful
and influential Willigis would prove a double-edged sword. Willigis was instrumental in
securing the throne for the child-king Otto III following the death of his father in 98322
and was a principal advisor to his mother and regent, Theophanu, likely serving her in the
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campaign against Bohemia in 990.23 Through the archbishop’s influence, Bernward
secured a position as the young king’s tutor, a job at which he excelled.24 When
Theophanu went to war, Bernward undoubtedly accompanied his royal pupil and learned
military science alongside him in the field.25 However, he seemed to have disapproved of
Otto’s grand vision of the glories of Rome reborn,26 which put him at odds with Willigis.
He must have had the young king’s ear a bit too much for the archbishop’s liking. When
the see of Hildesheim came conveniently vacant in 993, Willigis saw to it that Bernward
was promoted to fill it, removing him from Otto’s immediate circle.27
Bernward stepped into a job that was as much a military posting as a pastoral one.
The Magyars had not been a significant threat to Saxony since the time of Henry I28 (and
certainly not since Otto I defeated them in 955), but the incursions of the Norse and Slavs
continued to be particularly troublesome during Bernward’s tenure.29 Widukind of
Corvey referred to Hildesheim as an urbs,30 implying strong fortification, and the
barbarians knew that best-defended cities held the treasures most worth plundering. As

23

Ibid. 48.

24

Thangmar Vita Sancti Bernwardi 278.2.19-21.

25

Thangmar 7.284.20-28 and Tschan 53-4.

26

Tschan 51.

27

Thangmar 4.280 and Tschan 55.

28

Tschan 90.

29

Ibid. 87.

30

Widukind II.13

163

Otto III was obsessed with Italy, the defense of Saxony devolved increasingly onto the
local authorities.31 This was not an entirely unexpected burden, as the expense of
defensive measures had been on Hildesheim’s books since the reign of Louis the Pious.32
Thangmar says that Bernward took to his duties filled with divine inspiration:
“[Following] the example of Christ, his Lord, the watchful shepherd of God’s flock threw
himself against the enemies of the church, exulting like a hero who steps onto his path.”33
Here again, spiritual and martial language go hand in hand. He built two new forts with
Otto’s permission.34
Bernward had domestic as well as foreign enemies to worry about. The local counts
were increasingly resentful during this period of the bishops’ increasing power from land
and rights granted by the king and their jealously often resulted in violence. For instance,
Count Bruno of Brunswick of the Saxon Billung line had a history of hostility against
Hildesheim.35 During the brief struggle for the crown following the death of Otto III, he
took what seems to have been pre-emptive action based simply on the bishop’s political
alignment:
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“Many nobles, without fear of God, wanted to usurp the highest royal power for
themselves. One, named Bruno, was well aware that the venerable Bishop
Bernward held with unswerving loyalty to the revered Duke Henry [of Bavaria],
and was afraid that Bernward would oppose his plans. Therefore, he eagerly
gathered men-at-arms wherever he could find the enemies of the bishop and those
who wished the destruction of Hildesheim Church, and went here and there,
robbing and plundering the bishop’s properties and people.”36
Then there was Bernward’s military obligation to the king, which he managed to
fulfill much of the time without having to march in person. Unlike many of his brother
bishops, Bernward was disinclined to spend much time at court. As the court of Otto III,
itinerant like that of all the Ottonians, was frequently on campaign in Italy, the provision
of troops to the royal host and attendance on the monarch often went hand in hand.
Bernward’s twentieth-century biographer Francis Tschan suggests that his monastic
temperament and penchant for the arts would have made him frustrated and restless there,
playing second fiddle to the bishops of more prominent sees such as Mainz and Cologne.
His poor health (he suffered from a chronic stomach ailment), along with the expense of
the long journey, probably gave him good reasons to absent himself.37 No doubt he also
found it politic to keep himself at a distance to avoid sharing his opinion of the emperor’s
Italian ambitions.38 Nonetheless, in the winter of 1000-1001, he was obliged to travel to
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Rome to appeal to both the emperor and the pope regarding the convent of Gandersheim
in his diocese39 (of which more below).
Thangmar went with him and his account of their adventure is rich in detail. Although
military service was not the main reason for his journey, the bishop ended up taking part
in two actions under Otto’s command. In the first instance, Bernward was present at the
investment of the rebellious city of Tivoli.40 Despite the impressive siege engines at his
disposal, the emperor was unable to force the burghers to surrender and asked his former
tutor if he should cut his losses and break off the operation, risking shame. Bernward
replied, “I will not suffer you, my lord, whom I love dearer than life, to be so shaken.
Command that the city be pressed all the harder, for though I long to return home, I will
not forsake your Majesty until I see by God’s grace the city and its people subjected to
your law.”41 This is not so much tactical as spiritual advice, an attempt by Bernward to
stiffen Otto’s resolve, and gives no indication of the bishop’s own military knowledge.
In any event, it worked; the emperor ordered his troops to intensify their assault and the
citizens made a ritual submission to him a few days later.
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In the second instance, recounted in the following chapter, Otto and his entourage
were themselves besieged in a palace in Rome by a hostile populace. Bernward was very
much in the thick of the action here. He blessed the emperor’s soldiers and made a
stirring speech to inspire them, took up the Holy Lance and readied himself to serve as
standard-bearer (signifer), and the next morning rode out at the forefront of the army
against the enemy. Bernward apparently hoped for an end to the clash with minimal
bloodshed. The cowed rebels obliged him, laying down their arms and submitting to the
emperor on the following day.42 The Vita does not specify whether or not Bernward wore
armor for the sortie and the Holy Lance was certainly too valuable a relic to be used for
anything but a symbol and rallying point. Thangmar thus presents Bernward as a man of
surpassing bravery to put himself in harm’s way with no protection but faith and his
companions, in the same manner as Saint Udalrich during the Magyar siege of Augsburg.
(Hatto Kallfelz has translated parat, “prepared,” as rüstete er sich selber, “equipped /
armored himself.” One is tempted to picture Bernward kitted out in helmet and lorica for
the charge, but Thangmar’s Latin text leaves this entirely to the reader’s imagination.)43
Following the death of Otto III, the Italian theater ceased to be Bernward’s concern.
Henry II cared much more about German affairs and his military record reflected it. He
campaigned against Boleslav Chrobry of Poland in 1004 and 1005 and against Count
Baldwin of Flanders in 1007. Bernward may have marched on the latter expedition,

42

Thangmar 24.318.

43

Thangmar 24.318.17, trans. Kallfelz on 319, line 15.

167

though not in the Polish wars.44 There is no evidence that he took the field when
Boleslav intruded again in 1015 and 1017, though he probably provided troops; while
Thangmar shows that his patron believed in fulfilling his greater military obligations, he
is less clear on Bernward’s service in person. There was another Slav uprising in 1018,
but because Henry had greater concerns, Hildesheim was probably not involved.45
Deeds of armed might were not, in any case, what Bishop Bernward is remembered
for. He is best remembered for the dispute over the convent of Gandersheim that
“occupied [his] mind for nearly half his pontificate and was a frequent source of worry to
him for much of the other half,”46 and which very nearly turned into an ecclesiastical civil
war. The controversy was rooted in a simple question: did Gandersheim fall under the
aegis of Hildesheim or did it report directly to the archbishop of Mainz? It had been
founded within the former diocese in 852, but then re-settled on the river Gande four
years later, a site whose jurisdiction was debatable.47 Bernward’s troubles were sown in
987 with the veiling of the twelve-year-old Princess Sophia, the elder sister of Otto III.
The stubborn and precocious royal novice insisted that only Archbishop Willigis of
Mainz was of suitable dignity to preside, over the protests of Osdag, then bishop of
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Hildesheim.48 Under the ineffectual watch of the elderly and ill abbess Gerberga, the
younger nuns defied monastic discipline and led a material lifestyle, instigated by Sophia
and indulged by Willigis. The princess preferred to live at her brother’s court even after
she took up the mantle of acting abbess. When Bernward scolded her for her failings, he
earned her enmity and that of her protector.49
The rivalry quickly escalated and turned militant. Bernward arrived at Gandersheim
in September of 1000 to stand on his rights and consecrate its new church at Gerberga’s
invitation. Thangmar protests that nothing was further from his mind, but the denial rings
hollow.50 Not only had nothing been prepared for the ceremony, the nuns were openly
hostile to him and the absent Sophia had apparently mustered her men-at-arms to
intimidate the bishop: “The only thing we found was a contingent of men who had been
set against him, to cast him out violently should he try by force with his people to
consecrate the church.”51 Unable to see the ceremony through, Bernward placidly
celebrated mass, forbade anyone else to perform the duty in his absence, and retreated.
The gauntlet had been thrown down. Willigis came with a coterie of bishops and nobles
to usurp the privilege a week later, but Thangmar and another of Bernward’s allies,
Bishop Ekkehard of Schleswig, stood up and argued that the archbishop’s actions were a
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violation of canon law. Willigis convened a synod in November to settle the matter, but
Bernward had already departed for Rome to appeal to authority of the Holy See and the
conclave could not make a binding ruling without him present.52
Though Bernward returned from Italy with Pope Sylvester’s confirmation of his rights
in hand, a further synod was slated for June of 1001 at Pöhlde to reinforce the Holy See’s
authority and reprimand Willigis. The papal legate presided over a chaotic assembly,
made tense by an undercurrent of resentment on the part of the German magnates over
their emperor’s Italo-centric policies.53 When judgement against Willigis was read out,
“…the doors of the church flew open, and a crowd of laymen burst in with a great
noise and tumult; the men of Mainz called loudly for arms and made wild threats
against the apostolic vicar and Bishop Bernward. Yet the legate and the bishop
were not intimidated by the hubbub nor by the threats; although they had the
greater number of troops, they did not call for arms, but rather sought to calm the
excitement.”54
Order was restored and the meeting adjourned until the next day, when it was discovered
that Archbishop Willigis had slipped out of Pöhlde in the night with his followers. He
may have done so to avoid the possibility of losing an armed confrontation with his rival,
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but he certainly did it to nullify the legate’s jurisdiction over him by absenting himself,55
as Bernward had done earlier. The observation that the archbishop’s milites “called
loudly for arms” and that Bernward’s followers declined to do so seems to indicate that
no one had actually violated the sanctity of the church with weapons. It suggests that this
was not an act of real aggression by Willigis but a bit of theatrical saber-rattling that gave
him plausible deniability, as he could probably have palmed the blame off on his
subordinates if things turned against him.
Bernward may have been anticipating more than a legal conflict when he spent that
summer reinforcing Hildesheim’s defenses.56 His fears would not have been unjustified.
Invited to celebrate a feast at the convent of Hilwartshausen, he sent a pack train ahead of
him with the necessary regalia, but “the Archbishop’s men fell on it in the night, broke up
everything, and pitifully beat some of the bishop’s servants.”57 Shortly thereafter,
Bernward prepared to visit Gandersheim again to assert his rights, only to learn that
“…a great multitude opposed him, armed no differently than if they had been
summoned to open war. These people Sophia had brought together, namely, all
the vassals of the archbishop who could be mustered, and those of her friends, and
a group of her own servants; all the towers and fortifications around the church
were filled with soldiers, and all against one man, their bishop, who came
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unarmed and only to bring blessings, they fortified their castle as if to defend
against a host of barbarians.”58
Bernward decided to play it safe and forego his visit.59
The above series of incidents demonstrates how an inter-ecclesiastical feud could
become as militarized as one between secular nobles, or between a lay lord and one of the
church; yet the contest of will between Bernward and the Sophia-Willigis alliance always
stopped short of actual bloodshed. The bishop’s antagonists seemed to have consciously
reined in their followers from crossing the line between an armored shoving match and
open war. Bernward, for his part, always took the conciliatory path even when his party
may have had the numerical advantage, relying on royal and papal justice to win his case.
This presumes that Thangmar’s text is reasonably true to the facts of the case. His bias is
unavoidable, of course: witness the outrage that permeates his voice in describing the
excessive lengths to which Sophia goes to arm Gandersheim against the bishop’s
intrusion. Bernward is given the role of the suffering, peace-loving servant of the church,
Sophia is a petulant child with more power and privilege than she deserves, and Willigis
comes across as a willful and self-righteous bully. Even so, the fact that none of their
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confrontations turned bloody indicates that the possession of a private army and the
opportunity to use it did not automatically turn a church magnate into a warlord.
Though the bishops of Germany would rather have settled their differences with
words than with drawn swords, the political situation had become far from orderly. The
next synod that took place in August of 1001 was not only in defiance of papal
jurisdiction, since the pope had already ruled on the matter, but it “clearly showed how
impotent the emperor and his pope had become in Germany.”60 (One imagines that Otto
I would never have stood for his bishops carrying on like squabbling barons.) Bernward
absented himself again. The papal legate, meanwhile, had called for an “official” synod
in Rome over the Christmas season, which corresponded to another summons from Otto
III to his bishops for reinforcements in enforcing his will over the rebellious Romans.
Some led their troops but had no plans to attend the meeting, while others, Bernward and
Willigis included, duly sent their contingents but stayed at home themselves.61 Here may
be seen the ability of the bishops to separate their spheres of responsibility and how they
succeeded in fulfilling their duty to the state without necessarily compromising their
positions on local matters. Although a movement was afoot amongst a segment of the
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German nobility to force Otto to abandon his lofty Italian plans, the bishops stayed loyal,
even when their personal interests were at cross-purposes with the imperial agenda.62
As it happened, the emperor’s untimely death made the conclusion of the oft-delayed
synod moot and his successor had more important priorities than the settlement of the
Gandersheim feud. Willigis and Sophia had been allies of Henry II in his bid for the
crown, while Bernward had not; thus it behooved the bishop to bide his time carefully
and prove his loyalty to the new king before pushing the matter further. He continued to
support Henry in all political and religious matters for the next several years.63
Eventually, in 1006, the emperor negotiated a settlement with Willigis that granted
Gandersheim to Bernward without alienating any of the parties involved.64
The lesson that should be taken away from the tribulations of Bishop Bernward is that
the Ottonian bishop operated in an inextricable relationship between military organization
and the maintenance of property and rights, whether his power was exercised on behalf of
the monarch and the Reich or in support of a personal or diocesan interest. While
Bernward managed to avoid naked armed violence in his confrontations with Willigis and
Sophia, his skill in maneuvering both his followers and his political clout to counter them
was no less an exercise in strategy and tactics. He ultimately succeeded in his case
because of the good relations he maintained with Otto III and Henry II through the timely
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provision of political and military support; but it should be obvious that the bishops’ need
for private armies was more complex than their duty to provide the royal host with troops
on demand.
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CONCLUSION
Given the preponderance of evidence for the participation of German church magnates
in war during the eighth through tenth centuries, one may very well ask the question not
whether bishops and abbots saw combat in person, but rather how they managed to avoid
it. War was so omnipresent in the Frankish kingdoms, and so bound up in a militant
interpretation of Christianity, that it would have been nearly impossible for the higher
clergy to disentangle themselves altogether from armed violence and follow a purely
spiritual and pacific lifestyle. Even though bishoprics and monasteries technically
belonged to the Church—however abstract that institution may have been at the time—
and not to the individual office holders, ecclesiastical lords had been saddled with many
of the same burdens as land-owning nobles ever since Constantine the Great had granted
his bishops secular authority1 and given them a permanent stake in the things that were
Caesar’s. As the custodians of valued property and the people living there, they bore the
responsibility for maintaining physical defenses and armed followings to stand up to the
hostility of both “barbarians” and fellow-Christians. This contradictory situation
originated in late antiquity as Roman civil and military structure in the West collapsed
and was supplanted by Germanic rule and was exacerbated by the introduction in the late
sixth and seventh centuries of the warlike Frankish nobility into the church hierarchy
alongside the original Gallo-Roman aristocracy. If the political community of the
Carolingian empire, both lay and ecclesiastical, was collectively called “the army” even
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when it was not actively under arms,2 then it seems appropriate to look back on Frankish
war through the lens of Clausewitz and see it as “politics by other means.” Because
bishops and abbots wielded political authority to an equal or greater extent than spiritual
authority, and in spite of the loud protests of reformers, they could not have held
themselves completely aloft from military activity any more than the Christian kingdoms
of the early medieval period could have been divided into the modern compartments of
church and state.
A comparison of the important narrative sources from the Carolingian period of 751919 to those from the Ottonian one of 919-1024 shows no significant change over two
and a half centuries in the credo of clerical writers vis á vis war itself. War was
inevitable, necessary, and part of the natural order of human affairs. When conducted as
a “just” war on royal authority derived from God according to the tenets of Saint
Augustine, it could be a virtuous and redeeming activity with divine assurance of victory.
However, it is difficult to make an equally broad statement regarding the general clerical
position on churchmen who took part in war. In the first place, the evidence for these
men lies thicker on the ground in the Ottonian sources than in the Carolingian ones, not
because the practice was less common during the earlier regime, but because of the
brevity of the prevailing annales format and the lack of ecclesiastical vitae. In the
second, military participation covered a wide spectrum of activity, from providing troops
led by a subordinate to bearing arms and fighting in person. The most strident objection
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to bishops and abbots marching with the army for any but a spiritual purpose came from
Saint Boniface in the mid-8th century when the Carolingian dynasty was just finding its
feet. By the time Charles the Great came to power in 768, Bonifacian reform had been
pushed aside by military necessity. Thereafter it is safe to say that it was normal and
accepted practice for churchmen to lead their own troops for the royal army. As
members of the landholding class alongside the lay nobility, and particularly in light of
the influence the king had on their appointments, bishops and abbots were expected to
fulfill their feudal obligation to help safeguard the res publica as well as to oversee the
defense of the properties and people within their ecclesiastical jurisdictions. So long as
they took no part in the fighting themselves, they drew little or no criticism for these
actions per se.
On the other hand, the position of the writers on churchmen who took their military
activities too far and conducted themselves as secular captains rather than men of the
cloth—not to say those who actually went armed into battle with the intent of shedding
blood—varied tremendously across the period, without suggesting a particular pattern or
trend in clerical thought. Some Carolingian writers seem to have accepted the practice or
remained neutral while others found it reprehensible. The sampling of correspondence
seen above, though technically outside the scope of this survey, shows the range of
reactions. Whereas Boniface railed against churchmen who shed blood in battle, Lupus
Servatus and Claudius of Turin seem to have shrugged and accepted soldier’s work as the
price of advancing Christendom (even if, as in Lupus’ case, one sidestepped the duty due
to a lack of qualifications). The Carolingian annales do not contain many instances of
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churchmen at war and those that do appear are scant on detail; thus, the data from these
sources remain ambiguous. The lone exception seems to be Bishop Wala of Metz, killed
in action in 882 against the Norse. Hincmar of Reims, who otherwise does not seem to
have had a problem with bishops serving in the field, called Wala out for bearing arms
contrary to his office, but neither the Fulda chronicler nor Regino of Prüm made the same
accusation when reporting his death.
The positions of the Ottonian chroniclers and biographers likewise ran a wide gamut.
The archbishop-duke Bruno of Cologne had an enthusiastic advocate in Ruotger, received
cautious praise from Widukind of Corvey and Adalbert of Magdeburg, only a passing
(yet positive) mention by Thietmar of Merseburg, and subtle, oblique disapproval from
Flodoard of Reims. Liudprand of Cremona ignored Bruno altogether, but his disapproval
of militant bishops comes through clearly in the vitriol he directs at Manasses of Arles
who “became a soldier” and his denunciation of Pope John XII for taking the field armed
and armored. Thietmar stood firmly at the opposite end of the spectrum, recounting the
campaigns of fellow bishops throughout his Chronicon and celebrating the bloody handto-hand victory of Bishop Michael of Regensburg with barely restrained pride. In short,
because the clerical writers who commented on this phenomenon differed by locale,
background, allegiance and political agenda, the opinions they recorded were as varied as
the authors themselves.
And yet, for all the written accounts that place scores of Ottonian bishops and abbots
in the thick of war—whether leading their troops, conducting sieges of hostile cities or
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defending their own, beating back the enemies of the Reich, or dying ignominiously
when their armies were routed—the overwhelming majority of these men, even those
killed in action, were not said to have fought in person, weapon in hand. Only Michael of
Regensburg is described in unequivocal language as having done so. Even his case, as
argued above, is open to interpretation. The conclusion that follows is that while the
narrative sources suggest that bishops and abbots in the early Carolingian period went to
war under arms as a matter of course, by the time of the Ottonians, genuine “warriorprelates” who armed themselves and came to blows with the enemy alongside their
milites were very much the exception to the rule.
The rule itself—which is to say, the ideal of the Ottonian church magnate that found
general favor with the clerical community—is best revealed in the vitae of the bishops
who fulfilled both their military and pastoral duties in equal measure without losing sight
of either. Bruno of Cologne has often been put forth as such a model, but because of the
unique and pioneering scope of his career, not to mention the controversy he generated,
he should be held apart from the norm. Udalrich of Augsburg, Burchard of Worms, and
Bernward of Hildesheim all conformed more closely to the ideal. Each of them was
prompt, diligent, and competent in responding to the defensive needs of both his diocese
and the kingdom at large and each followed through with the unpleasant necessities of
warfare in spite of moral misgivings. Gerhard and Thangmar also drew attention to the
willingness of Udalrich and Burchard, respectively, to ride out into the midst of battle
with no armor other than faith. With the detailed portraits of these three bishops in mind,
it is possible to take stock of the numerous other prelates mentioned in the pages of the
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Ottonian sources and judge whether or not the clerical writers of the time considered
them worthy of their offices.
The question of whether the rise of the Salian dynasty and the onset of the Investiture
Controversy caused the era of the “fighting bishop” in Germany to fade away, as Henry
Mayr-Harting has proposed, must be answered in a different study. The bishops and
abbots who commanded troops at the behest of the Ottonian emperors did so for the most
part with a clear conscience, in the face of the inherent paradox of the Christian soldier
and the even flimsier premise of the pious pastor as military leader, secure in the
knowledge that they did God’s work through the royal authority. It should come as no
surprise that Vegetius, the late Roman writer and proponent of military reform, was
widely read among ninth and tenth century scholars;3 his immortal declaration, si vis
pacem, para bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war),4 is no less paradoxical than the
Augustinian concept of the “just war” and aptly representative of the position of the
Ottonian prelate.
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